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1
Summary
This dissertation consists of three empirical essays related to corporate governance and banking.
The first essay, entitled Independent or co-opted? Corporate directors with ties to the nonprofit
sector, studies the relation of independence and firm outcome, and focuses on independent
directors that also belong to a nonprofit organization. Independent directors who also sit at
boards of non-profit organizations (NPOs) may contribute valuable knowledge to their firms or
possess personality traits that enhance their value as monitors. However, they may also be prone
to be co-opted by the CEO with promises of donations to the NPO of their interest. This paper
studies whether independent director’s links with NPOs affect their performance by analyzing
how the presence of NPO-linked directors affects firm value, CEO pay and earnings management.
To identify the causal effect of NPO-linked directors I use the retirement of independent directors
as a source of exogenous variation in the composition of the board and its committees. I find
that the participation of NPO-linked directors at the compensation committee is significant in
terms of firm value, level of pay and compensation structure. The sign of the effect will depend
on managerial power, measured as CEO entrenchment. The results suggest that less entrenched
CEOs use the appointment of NPO-linked directors to increase their influence over the board.
The second essay, co-authored with Pablo Ruiz-Verdú and is entitled CEO Risk Taking Incentives
and Bank Failure during the 2007-2010 Financial Crisis. In this paper we show that stronger
CEO risk taking incentives prior to the 2007–2010 financial crisis are associated with a higher
probability of bank failure during the crisis. We define failure to include acquisitions facilitated
by supervisors and employ measures of incentives that account for the risk taking incentives
generated by CEOs’ stock and stock option holdings. Risk taking incentives and bank risk
were not the result of the use of particular compensation vehicles (such as stock options) or the
governance failures usually considered in the corporate governance literature. On the contrary,
CEOs’ incentives were tightly aligned with those of shareholders.
Related to the risk-taking incentives of large financial institutions, the third essay (Too big
too discipline?, also co-authored with Pablo Ruiz-Verdú) documents a possible bias in bank
supervisors behavior that benefits systematically large firms in the industry. Through formal
enforcement actions, bank supervisors can coerce banks into adopting policies or practices to
limit their risk. Moreover, formal enforcement actions are public, so they can communicate
important information to investors and depositors and, thus, constitute a source of market
discipline. In this paper, we document that supervisors appear to have a bias when issuing
formal enforcement actions: very large financial institutions are less likely to receive formal
enforcement actions than one would expect on the basis of their fundamentals. At the same time,
they do not seem to be less risky than smaller, yet large, financial firms. Very large financial
institutions seem to be too big to publicly discipline.
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Introduction and Motivation
The corporate scandals and the financial crisis of the past decade have renewed the interest
of the research related to corporate governance practices, especially in financial firms. These
events motivated an increase in the independence requirements of board members and changes
in the committee structure and the operation and responsibilities of the corporate board.
These new requirements are based on the notion that further independence should improve
governance and have a positive impact on firm value. However, the literature on the relation of
board independence and firm performance is not conclusive and has failed to connect further
improvements in board independence with firm performance. Two key concerns in the empirical
analysis regarding the impact of board structure are the endogeneity of internal corporate
governance and, on the other hand, the existence of alternative ways for the management of
a company to co-opt directors meet the independence requirements but behave as managerial
friendly (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991),(Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998).
Besides the monitoring role of the board in a company, the design of managerial incentives as a
mean to discipline management has also attracted a lot of attention. The recent financial crisis
has brought to the spotlight the matter of managerial incentives in financial firms generating
a still ongoing debate about limits and caps to compensation and bonuses. While executive
compensation is a topic that has been widely studied in the past, research related to the impact of
different compensation schemes on the risk taking behaviour of managers in financial institutions
has received less attention compared to that of non financial firms. One of the reasons is the
greater complexity of the analysis imposed by the larger opacity of financial institutions, different
level of complexity in terms of organizational structure and the possible interaction between
internal governance and regulatory requirements. In this line of research, the second paper of my
thesis is a co-authored working paper with Pablo Ruiz-Verdú that studies how the risk taking
incentives of bankers are related to bank failure during the 2007-2010 financial crisis. In the
third paper of my dissertation we study the incidence of regulatory formal enforcement actions
on financial institutions and their relation to their systemic importance.
Chapter 3 of this dissertation corresponds mostly to my job market paper. It is a study of the
effect of board independence on firm performance and managerial power. In this chapter the focus
is on the monitoring quality of corporate independent directors that also serve at the board of a
non-profit organization (NPO-linked) and how CEOs could use their bargaining power to capture
these directors. While their social involvement may be considered useful in their role as advisers,
their interest in the fund raising activities of their NPO might turn them in easy targets to be
co-opted through promises of corporate philanthropy (Bebchuk and Fried, 2006). By studying
changes in the board caused by independent directors retirements, used as in Fracassi and Tate
(2012), I find that NPO-linked directors are important in the definition of independence and that
most of their influence comes from sitting at the compensation committee. The main specification
compares the changes in the variables of interest in firms where an NPO-linked director retires
(the treatment group) and in firms in which a non-linked independent director retires, but where
both types of directors are appointed (the control group). This identification strategy controls
for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity and also takes advantage of that retirement decisions
are likely to be in many instances uncorrelated to time-varying unobserved heterogeneity related
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to the outcome variable of interest. The main finding of the paper is that removing these
directors from firms with low entrenchment index has power to explain successive increases of
firm value and total pay, a reduction of earnings management and changes in compensation
structure of the CEO reducing his portion of discretionary pay. This result indicate that CEOs
with low entrenchment take advantage of this form of influence over independent directors to
increase their power inside the firm. The main implication of these findings is that co-opting
directors works as a substitute for managerial entrenchment.
In chapter 4 (co-authored with Pablo Ruiz-Verdú) we study how the risk taking incentives of
bank CEOs are related to bank failure during the 2007-2010 financial crisis. Opposite to previous
research on bankers pay (such as Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011)) our main result is that, if we
measure incentives taking into account the risk taking incentives embedded in the equity held by
bank CEOs as proposed by Chesney et al. (2012) stronger risk taking incentives are associated
with a higher probability of failure. Although we do not prove the existence of a causal effect
of incentives on risk taking, we do not find support for several alternative explanations of our
results. We also study whether risk taking incentives may be the result of corporate governance
failures and find that, on the contrary, bank CEOs have stronger risk taking incentives in banks
whose shareholders appear to also have stronger incentives to shift risk to other stakeholders.
Finally, we show that risk taking incentives are not clearly associated with particular forms of
compensation (such as stock options or termination payments), so that monitoring the use of
different compensation vehicles may not be the optimal way to control the risk taking incentives
of bank CEOs.
Finally, chapter 5 of this dissertation is also related to corporate governance and banking. We
have manually collected data about the incidence of formal enforcement actions issued against
banks both related to solvency and capital issues as well as governance requirements. An
enforcement action is an action initiated by the federal supervisors against those financial firms
that experience distress or lack of compliance. There are different types of formal actions with
different levels of severity and scope, and in some cases they are related to downgrades in the
CAMELS rating. The paper aims to study if banking supervisors take into account the systemic
importance of the bank before issuing a formal enforcement action. Since formal enforcement
actions have to be public, they can trigger a reaction from shareholders and investors, leading
supervisors to consider avoiding issuing these types of actions. This behavior by regulators
would correspond to a too big to discipline phenomenon, which like the too big to fail, would
have consequences for banks risk taking incentives.
3
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Independent or co-opted?
Corporate directors with ties to
the nonprofit sector
3.1 Introduction
Independent directors engage in other activities outside of the boardroom. Thus, many
independent directors serve as directors at other corporate boards, are executives of other public
or private companies, or actively participate in non profit organizations. In the last years there
has been a debate about what is a true independent director and whether certain personal or
professional individual characteristics are related with the effective monitoring of the board. In
this paper I investigate whether directors’ active involvement with non-profit organizations has
an impact on their performance as monitors and advisers of the CEO.
The interest in the role of these directors is motivated by the competing views of their role as
monitors. On the one hand, directors actively engaged with NPOs may better advise the CEO
about the needs of stakeholders, such as employees, local communities or consumers; they may
also help the firm better allocate corporate donations. Their active participation in NPOs may
also endow the firm with a valuable network of connections. Moreover, directors active in the
non-profit sector may have personality traits, such as integrity, which could make them better
monitors of managers.
On the other hand, CEOs can influence the monitoring role of independent directors who are
active in the nonprofit sector with the promise of corporate donations. Large U.S corporations
engage regularly in different types of charity donations, either in cash, goods or services. In
2012 corporate giving made a total of $18.15 billion 1 with a median firm contribution of $60.95
million for the largest 100 companies in the Fortune 500. This amount represents a median
contribution as a percentage of pre-tax profit of 0.96% 2.
Since CEO’s have the power to influence the firm’s charitable decisions, they could use this
influence to reward friendly non-employee directors (Bebchuk and Fried, 2006; Shapira, 2012),
thus compromising these directors’ monitoring role.
The board of Enron is a case in point. Enron, Kenneth Lay (chairman) and Enron’s Foundation
donated $332,150 to the University of Texas’ M.D. Anderson Cancer Center since 1999. In
1999 the Center’s president John Mendelsohn became an Enron Director. Similarly, Wendy Lee
Gramm was head of regulatory studies at the George Mason University’s Mercatus Center and
an Enron director by the time the company and the Lay Family Foundation donated to the
1GivingUSA report, 2012)http://www.philanthropy.iupui.edu/news/article/giving-usa-2013
2The Corporate Giving Standard. CGS Survey, 2013. http://cecp.co/pdfs/giving_in_numbers/GIN2013_
Giving_Snapshot.pdf
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center $50,000 and made political contributions for more than $80,000 to Gramm’s husband,
Senator Phil Gramm (R-Tex.). 3
The first goal of this paper is to empirically investigate the impact of independent director
involvement with NPOs on their monitoring role. In particular, I investigate the effect of the
presence of NPO-linked directors on firm performance (measured by Tobin’s Q) CEO pay level
and composition, and earnings management activities (measured as discretionary accruals).
CEO pay and earnings management have the advantage of being annual measures that reflect
the bargaining process between the manager and the supervisory board.
The second goal of the paper is to shed light on the relation between board independence and
board and firm performance. The regulatory changes in independence requirements from the
last decade rely on the notion that more independence improves board monitoring. Better
monitoring, in turn, is expected to ameliorate the agency problem between shareholders and the
CEO, leading to better performance and curtailing excessive CEO pay.
As a response to corporate scandals in the early 2000’s, the U.S Congress and the two major US
stock exchanges revised the rules and definitions regarding corporate governance. The Sarbanes
Oxley Act (SOX) was enacted July 30, 2002 with the goal of improving transparency and
governance at the corporate level. Specifically, the SOX Act increased the standards about inde-
pendence at the board requiring firms to form compensation, audit and nominating committees
and imposing that the audit committee to be constituted solely of (at least three) independent
directors. SOX was quickly followed by changes in the listing standards of NYSE and NASDAQ.
Both exchanges define independent directors as individuals with “no material relationship” with
the firm, and not involved in activities that may interfere with their “independent judgement”
4. In general, they refer to individuals with no work relationship with the company, no family
ties with a company employee, and no business contracts or financial transactions with the firm.
These stricter requirements for independence were developed under the belief that the more
independent the director the better their monitoring quality.
However, there are different positions about whether a change in the independence requirements
of a board and changes in the board structure should necessarily be positive for the functioning
of a firm, or have any effect at all. One needs to ask why a certain board structure is in place.
While a certain board design could be there by accident, a more plausible hypothesis is that
there is an optimal board for a certain company. Then, any regulatory change that forces to
modify the current board structure should have a negative impact on overall firm performance
because it would be forcing the firm to move away form the optimally chosen board (Adams
et al., 2008).
The empirical literature about the effects of governance and board characteristics on firm
performance or CEO compensation has mixed results. Core et al. (1999) find that variables
proxying for the lack of independence of outside directors are positively correlated with executive
compensation, which is consistent with the idea that when governance mechanisms are weak the
CEO can extract more compensation from the firms. Similarly, Gompers et al. (2003) construct
a governance index (G-index) as a proxy for shareholders rights and find that better governance
is associated with higher firm value, profits and sales. Bebchuk et al. (2009) revised the relative
importance of the twenty-four provisions used to construct the G-index and concluded that only
six of them are associated with decreases in firm valuation and negative abnormal returns. These
six provisions form what the authors call the entrenchment index (E-index). However, Bhagat
3Lavelle, L., 2002, January 21. Enron: how governance rules failed. Business Week, 28-29.
4Both NYSE and NASDAQ provide a definition of material transaction and independence. NYSE defines
it in section “303A.02 Independence Tests” of the Listed company Manual at http://nysemanual.nyse.
com/. NASDAQ uses definition IM-5605. Definition of Independence — Rule 5605(a)(2) at http://NASDAQ.
cchwallstreet.com/.
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and Bolton (2008) find that better governed firms according to GIM and E-indexes are not
correlated to future firm performance although disciplinary management turnover is correlated
with board independence. Moreover, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Bhagat and Black (2001)
find no evidence of better performance of firms with more independent boards (measured as
higher outsider/insider ratio).
According to (Adams et al., 2008), the reasons for this mixed results are two-fold. The first
reason is related to the fact that, despite of the stricter requirements for independence mentioned
above, companies still can find loopholes in the regulation in such a way that they formally
meet the independence standards but at the same time assure that directors do not behave
according to what an independent monitor is expected (this is usually referred as window dressing
behavior from management). This issue about the true classification of outside directors imposes
a challenge in the study of boards leading to wrong conclusions such as no connection between
board independence and firm performance (Adams et al., 2008).
More specifically, in the case of independent directors who serve at nonprofit organizations the
issue comes from the definition of related party transactions. Bebchuk and Fried (2006) argue
that the independence and disclosure rules imposed by the NYSE do not solve the potential
conflict arising from corporate donations because the $1 million cap on business to determine
material transactions does not even apply to charitable contributions. They explain that a
non-employee director of a corporation that also works (as a board member, CEO or trustee) of
a nonprofit organization is still considered independent even if the firm of the corporate board
at which he/she sits donates more than $1 million to that nonprofit. If such a transaction takes
place, the only requirement is that the contribution should be disclosed in the statements of the
firm. Even further, in the case a donation is made to a nonprofit organization (NPO) to which
the director is not directly linked, but suggested by him to the board for a donation, not even
disclosure is necessary. Similarly, Shapira (2012) also remarks that these transactions, that he
calls pro-social expenditures can be used by CEOs to co-opt the inside governance mechanisms
and undermine the independence of outside directors.
While corporate philanthropy itself does not necessarily imply anything wrong about the
functioning of a firm, it has been debated if such behavior is or not reflecting an agency problem
at the executive level. Fich et al. (2009) find that companies identified as regular givers (either
directly or through a corporate foundation) have lower performance, higher CEO pay and weaker
governance structure. In recent work, (Masulis and Reza, 2013) find evidence that supports the
notion that corporate donations are a symptom of an agency problem between shareholders and
the CEO whenever the management has influence on the size and allocation of the donations.
If CEOs can engage in window-dressing as a way to fulfill the regulatory requirements and still
maintain a co-opted board, we should see little or no effect of increases of board independence
requirements into firm performance. Cohen et al. (2012) provide an example of opportunistic
behavior at the appointment of new directors. They study the appointment of analysts who
have been optimistic about the firm performance in years previous to their appointments. They
conclude that the appointment of these former analysts as independent directors has a negative
impact on the firm value.
The second reason for the mixed results regarding the connection between board independence
and firm performance has to do with the empirical identification strategy used in different papers.
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) stress that, besides the classification of co-opted directors as
independent directors, the main challenge of empirical study of boards is the endogeneity of
nearly all variables of interest. Boards of directors are endogenous institutions mke it difficult to
disentangle if the chosen structure of a board is the cause of the governance problem, or if the
choice of a certain board structure is a consequence of the poor governance reining in the firm.
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For example, a poor performing firm may select a more independent board to improve its perfor-
mance, but this may imply that, in the cross-section, poorly performing firms are correlated with
larger independence ratios. In general, regressions of performance on governance variables suffer
from endogeneity caused by unobserved heterogeneity (time-invariant unobserved characteristics
of the firm or the managers that are correlated with the firm’s outcomes), simultaneity bias and
the dynamics of corporate governance structure through time (i.e. past performance affects both
current performance and current board structure).
This study addresses these two issues, miss-classification of independent directors and endogeneity
of boards. I use the network of directors that overlap their participation at corporate boards
and at nonprofit organizations. This network of corporate directors and the nonprofit sector is
matched with executive compensation to form a panel of firms between years 2003 and 2008.
The links of directors to nonprofit organizations allows to evaluate whether formal or regulatory
measures of independence capture well true independence or if additional information (such as
connections of directors to the nonprofit sector) is necessary. To tackle the endogeneity concerns
of the governance mechanisms, the empirical strategy consists of using independent directors
retirements as a source of exogenous variation in the participation of NPO-linked directors at the
board. The use of a difference in differences estimator combined with firm fixed effects provides
consistent estimators of the effect of a change in the participation of directors with connection
to the non-profit sector on the outcome variables of interest.
The main findings of this paper are that changes in the proportion of linked supervisory directors
have a causal effect on firm performance, CEO pay and the absolute value of discretionary
accruals, a measure of earnings management.
Another finding is that the influence of NPO-linked directors is more relevant inside the
compensation committee compared with other committees in the board. This result is possibly
related to the fact that participation of NPO-linked independent directors in certain committees
is going to provide them a better or more direct position to bargain with the CEO. I also find that
the effect of NPO-linked directors is heterogeneous across different levels of legal entrenchment
of the firm (measured as the E-index). Reducing the participation of NPO-linked directors in
the compensation committee has a positive and significant effect on firm market value and firm
performance, affects CEO pay structure ( with a reduction of salary), and increases earnings
management in low entrenchment firms. These results are reversed in sign or nonexistent for
firms with high entrenchment levels. This implies that the positive attributes of NPO-linked
directors(such as social involvement, integrity, etc.) have a positive influence in governance for
firms with high entrenchment level, while their weak features ( such as their fund rising interest
for their NPOs) are exploited in low entrenchment contexts where the CEO might be interested
into increase his power or entrenchment.
This paper fits in the literature of independent boards, social ties of independent directors
and busy directors. Cohen et al. (2012) show that firms hire as independent directors sell-side
analysts who had previously covered the firm with a history of optimistic bias toward the
company. The authors argue that this specific type of directors, while independent according to
the listing standards, are management friendly. Such appointments result into a posterior poor
firm performance and an increase of earnings management and CEO compensation.
Hwang and Kim (2009) use mutual alma mater, military service, regional origin, academic
discipline, and industry as a proxy of social ties between a formal independent director and
the CEO. They find that only 62% of the firms in the Fortune 100 have socially independent
boards (while 87% of boards actually fulfil the legal definition of independence) and that boards
both socially and legally independent award smaller compensation packages to CEOs and higher
pay-performance and turnover-performance sensitivities. Similarly, Fracassi and Tate (2012)
use a network of external connections between independent directors and CEOs. A connection
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exists if the CEO and the independent director serve together on the board of directors of
another company, past work in the same company, play golf at the same clubs, professional
organizations, etc. Their main finding is that firms with more powerful CEOs are more likely to
appoint directors with ties to the CEO and that CEO-director ties reduce firm value.
3.2 Data
The starting point for the sample is ExecuComp’s coverage, which consists mainly of S&P1500
institutions. The base sample of ExecuComp is merged with BoardEx, using both CIK numbers
and CUSIPS, to obtain the board structure of each firm. The sample period used spans from year
2003 and 2008. The reason to start the sample in year 2003 is that BoardEx coverage, although
available for previous years, is more complete and consistent from 2003 for US firms. Another
advantage of this sample period is that it avoids including observations from years previous to
the regulatory changes that might have affected the board composition. This matching process
results into a total 1941 firms with 20279 identified directors. Accounting data and market
data are retrieved from Compustat and CRSP. For each of the members sitting at a certain
board-year I use BoardEx to obtain all the possible links of each board member with a nonprofit
organization that overlaps in time with his appointment at the corporate board.
Then, a NPO-linked director is an individual who simultaneously serves at a corporate board
as an independent director and also belongs actively to a nonprofit organization as a member,
trustee, director or any other type of tie listed by BoardEx. Following to the requirement
of the IRS to be tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code 5, I refer
as non profit organizations (NPO) to those whose main activity is not generating profit to
benefit any specific individual but serving to the general public. NPOs do not distribute profit
to shareholders but reinvest their benefits to continue their operations. Examples of NPOs
are institutions such as charitable organizations, universities, social clubs, sports associations,
medical or health associations, professional associations, arts related organizations (as museums,
ballets, orchestras) and educational institutions (community colleges, local schools, etc) 6. In
this paper NPO is going to be any organization classified by BoardEx as either a charity or a
university. However this definition of organizational type by BoardEx excludes a large number
of organization (such as museums, political associations, professional associations,etc) that are
classified as "Private" but that are also registered as NPO organzations by the IRS. Several
alternative definitions have been considered including other types of organizations containing
references to charitable or non profit activities (i.e. museum, orchestra,school, academy, etc) to
cover cases of misclassification by BoardEx, as well as information of NPO registered at the IRS.
While these process has revealed a large number of potential exclusions from BoardEx, the main
results of the paper remain unchanged if these exclusions are taken into account. The remainder
of this paper reports results using the conservative alternative of only including those NPOs
defined by the database.
Table 3.1 displays summary statistics for the entire sample (Panel A) and the subsample of firms
with at least one NPO-linked director at the board in a certain year (Panel B) and firms without
NPO-linked independent directors (Panel C ). Last column of the table shows the difference in
means for firms with and without linked independent directors.
5http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Charitable-Organizations/Exemption-Requirements-Section-501(c)
(3)-Organizations
6In the U.S. nonprofit organizations can file for tax-exempt status. The IRS provides a list of organization
types that are eligible: Publication 557 “Tax-Exempt Status For Your Organization”, pp. 65-66 http:
//www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p557.pdf
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65.3% of the firm-year observations in the sample have at least one independent director with
links to the nonprofit sector. The average fraction of independent NPO-linked directors is 16%,
while in the subsample of firms with at least one NPO-linked director the average percentage of
independent directors with NPO-links is 24%.
Compared to firms with no linked independent directors, firms with links are on average larger
in size(measured as total assets at the end of the year), are more levered, have larger boards and
a higher fraction of independent directors at the board. They are more entrenched in average
and pay higher CEO total pay than firms with no NPO-linked directors.
In the remainder of the paper I will use the entrenchment index (E-index), constructed by
Bebchuk et al. (2009), as a proxy for CEO power. The E-index consists of counting how many
of six particular provisions the board has at a specific year. The six provisions are staggered
boards, limits to shareholder amendments of the by-laws, supermajority requirements for
mergers, supermajority requirements for charter amendments, poison pills and golden parachute
arrangements. The first four out of those six provisions set obvious limits on shareholder voting
power and reduce the ability of a majority of shareholders to remove management. The last
two provisions are measures related to a hostile offer. Then, the E-index is a discrete variable
that takes values from 0 to 6. The median E-index in the sample is equal to 2.58. In the
following empirical analysis firms will be grouped as above or below the median level using 2
and 3 as alternative cutting points to better capture the true median distribution of firms across
E-index.
3.3 NPO-linked Directors
3.3.1 Director Selection
There are basically four competing hypotheses regarding the selection and impact of NPO-linked
directors at the board.
Initially, one could argue that the participation of an independent corporate director at a
non profit organization as an alternative job or a hobby is irrelevant and that such type of
individuals cannot be distinguished from any other independent director. In such case, the
incidence of these directors in corporate boards is going to follow the population distribution of
directors of certain age with certain personal characteristics that are more likely to engage in
nonprofit activities. Moreover, we should not observe any difference in their participation across
committees, their participation as independent directors shouldn’t be significant in the cross
section and an exogenous shock that changes the fraction of NPO-linked directors at the board
would have no effect in the governance or performance of the firm.
An alternative hypothesis would be to consider NPO-linked directors appointments as part of the
maximizing firm value strategy. NPO-linked independent directors could be valuable advisers
for the board because of their social involvement, their knowledge of the community where the
company operates or sells their products and even guiding corporate philanthropy to alliances
that would improve the firm’s image. Also, independent directors highly invested in non profit
organizations can be valued by shareholders as better monitors with higher ethical standards.
In this framework, NPO-linked directors would be part of an optimal board. In such case, while
their participation should not have any effect in the cross section, an exogenous shock reducing
their participation should translate into lower firm performance until they get replaced and their
9
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replacement should take place as soon as possible with a similar director. The appointment of
NPO-linked directors in this setting should not be related to CEO power and should also be
connected to more transparency and better governance.
There are two intermediate alternatives to the previous extreme cases. On one hand it could be
argued that the appointment of NPO-linked directors is a result of CEO consumption of private
benefits. CEOs are interested in developing social ties to non profit organization members as a
source of increasing their personal connections, taking advantage of the warm glow of charitable
giving or having access to art and cultural elites. Under this hypothesis , the appointment of
NPO-linked directors should be increasing on CEO power and their participation at specific
committees would be either irrelevant or less frequent in the most active or relevant ones. It
would also be consistent with this hypothesis to find a weakly worse performance of the firm in
the cross section since NPO-linked directors would be sub-optimal appointments, in the sense
that they are not hired for their skills and potential contribution to the advising and monitoring
role of the board.
Finally, an alternative hypothesis is that CEOs searching to increase their power or entrenchment
at the firm exploit the non profit connection of independent directors. Being a member of the
board of trustees of a non profit organization implies to be highly involved in the fund rising
activities of the organization. CEOs have enough discretionary power to influence the release of
funds for charitable contributions and they could use those donations to influence independent
directors. Under this hypothesis, NPO-linked directors are going to be relevant in firms where
the legal entrenchment of the CEO is low and seeks to increase his power. Then co-opting NPO-
linked directors would work as a substitute of the entrenchment power that the CEO does not
have. Opposite, in firms where the CEO already possess a large managerial power NPO-linked
directors would be either irrelevant or simply respond to the private benefits consumption of
CEOs, as stated in the previous hypothesis. The strategic position and committee where the
independent director operate is going to be significant as it provides him with bargaining power
to negotiate with the CEO in areas where there is a clear conflict of interest between CEO
and shareholders. NPO-linked directors at the compensation and nomination committees can
directly exploit their influence on CEO pay and CEO turnover. An exogenous change in the
participation of NPO-linked directors in a board where the CEO enjoys a relatively low level of
entrenchment would result into an improvement in firm value and governance characteristics.
Table 3.2 displays the results for alternative specifications using different measures of appoint-
ments of new independent directors with links, controlling for firm size (measured as the
natural logarithm of total assets), Tobin’s Q, and ROA to capture firm characteristics that are
determinants of firm strategy and overall governance and firm performance.
For robustness, specifications considered in table 3.2 uses alternative measures of the appointment
of linked directors. Column (1) contains results for a linear probability model with LinkedD_pct
(fraction of independent directors with links to an NPO) as main dependent variable. Column
(2) also uses linear model and New_Link_App (measured as the total linked appointments in
a certain year) as the dependent variable. Column (3) is similar to column (2) but restricted
to those firms that have appointed at least one independent director that year. Column (4)
uses dependent variable a dummy variable equal to 1 is the firm has appointed at least one
independent director with links. Column (5) is identical to column (4) but restricted to the
sub-sample of firms that appoint at least one independent director that year. Column (6) is
identical to (5) but introduces a logit model with firm fixed effects. Finally, column (8) displays
results for OLS with firm fixed effects where the dependent variable is the fraction of new
appointments that have links to the non-profit sector.
Overall, the results in table 3.2 support the hypothesis that highly entrenched CEOs prefer
to have less directors with NPO ties on the board. The coefficient of E-index is negative
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Table 3.2: Director Selection In columns 1 the dependent variable is the fraction of independent
directors with at least one connection to a non-profit organization. In columns 2 and 3 the dependent
variable is the fraction of new appointments that hire a linked independent director. In columns 4 to 6
the dependent variable is a dummy equal 1 if that year a linked independent director has been appointed
to join the board. Column 7 uses as dependent variable the ratio of new appointments of linked directors
to total new appointments. E-index is the entrenchment index constructed as in Bebchuk et al. (2009).
ROA is the natural logarithm of 1 plus the ratio of net income plus interest expense, scaled by the lag of
total assets. Q is the natural logarithm of 1 plus book value of assets plus market value of equity, minus
book value of equity divided by total assets. Firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Board size
is the total number of directors appointed at aboard in a year. Independence is the ratio of independent
directors scaled by board size. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance
levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LPM LPM LPM Probit Probit Logit+FFE OLS+FFE
LinkedD_pct New_Link_App New_Link_App D_app D_app D_app App_ratio
Eindex −0.0049∗∗∗ −0.0071∗∗∗ −0.0153∗ −0.0657∗∗∗ −0.0511 −0.3493∗∗∗ −0.0345∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.025) (0.033) (0.135) (0.014)
Firm Size 0.0228∗∗∗ 0.0027 0.0113 0.0193 0.0437 −0.4537 −0.0144
(0.002) (0.003) (0.009) (0.023) (0.029) (0.376) (0.047)
Board Size 0.0064∗∗∗ 0.0129∗∗∗ 0.0400∗∗∗ 0.1010∗∗∗ 0.1228∗∗∗ 0.5238∗∗∗ 0.0177
(0.002) (0.003) (0.009) (0.019) (0.028) (0.090) (0.012)
Independent −0.0017 −0.0013 −0.0168∗∗ −0.0051 −0.0551∗ 0.1932∗∗ −0.0159
(0.002) (0.003) (0.009) (0.020) (0.028) (0.089) (0.012)
New CEO 0.0054 −0.0040 −0.0262 −0.0335 −0.0719 −0.0859 −0.0175
(0.006) (0.010) (0.032) (0.096) (0.120) (0.279) (0.028)
Tenure 0.0007∗∗ −0.0004 0.0004 −0.0046 0.0029 0.0098 −0.0023
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.027) (0.002)
L.ROA −0.0002 −0.0008∗∗ −0.0021∗∗ −0.0058∗∗∗ −0.0066∗∗ −0.0075 −0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.001)
L.Q 0.0145∗∗∗ 0.0068∗∗ 0.0232∗∗ 0.0625∗∗ 0.0919∗∗∗ 0.1692 0.0224
(0.002) (0.003) (0.010) (0.024) (0.034) (0.148) (0.016)
L.LinkedD_pct 0.0193 0.0048 0.2735 0.0768 −8.1866∗∗∗ −0.9928∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.073) (0.192) (0.258) (1.111) (0.132)
N 6170 5953 1538 5953 1538 1041 1538
R2 0.087 0.026 0.046 0.096
pseudo R2 0.061 0.043 0.233
a statistically different from zero in all the alternative specifications. However, this negative
relation between managerial power and the selection of a linked director could respond to different
reasons. On one hand, one can hypothesize that CEO’s in highly entrenched firms are already
powerful enough to not to need to engage in window dressing by appointing these particular
type of directors and then co-opting them. Opposite, we could think that low entrenchment
firms have a higher proportion of NPO linked directors because of their high monitoring skills
and their contribution to better governance. Moreover, the final implications of such a dynamic
and board structure for shareholders is unclear. To shed light on this problem, the next section
provides evidence on the link between the incidence of NPO linked directors, firm value, and
monitoring intensity in the next section of the paper.
3.3.2 Non profit ties and firm outcomes
Post SOX reforms have increased the requirements of director independence for the sake of
improving monitoring. Yet, there are mixed results in the governance literature about the
relation between independence and firm value. Following Fracassi and Tate (2012), we start by
analysing whether the failure to account for ties of independent directors to the non profit sector
contributes to this empirical puzzle. Table 3.3 displays results for pooled OLS regressions of
Tobin’s Q on the fraction of independent directors on the board, controlling for board size, firm
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size, market leverage, and the E-index. Tobin’s Q (computed as the natural logarithm of one plus
the ratio of book value of assets, plus market value of equity, minus book value of equity scaled
by total assets) is used to measure firm value maximization, following Hermalin and Weisbach
(1991), Fracassi and Tate (2012), Morck et al. (1990) and Adams et al. (2005). Recent work
by Dybvig and Warachka (2012) highlight the potential endogeneity issues in measures such
as ROA and Tobin’s Q to account for firm performance and propose two operating efficiency
measures as alternatives. In non-reported robustness checks, these alternative measures have
been used instead of Tobin’s Q. The main results of this paper remain unchanged both in the
sign of the main coefficients and their statistical significance when the alternative measures are
used.
Table 3.3: Independent Directors and firm value Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of
Tobin’s Q measured as 1 plus book value of assets plus market value of equity, minus book value of equity
divided by total assets. E-index is the entrenchment index constructed as in Bebchuk at al. (2009).
Firm size is the log of total assets. Board size is the total number of directors appointed at aboard in a
year. Independent is the ratio of independent directors scaled by board size. Links Adjusted Independent
is the ratio of independent directors excluding those that have at least one connection to a non profit
organization. Industry fixed effects are 2 digits SIC codes fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at
the firm level. t-statistics reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5%
and 1% respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Independent 0.0004 0.0037 0.0023
(0.10) (1.01) (0.70)
Links Adjusted Independence −0.0138∗∗∗ −0.0121∗∗∗ −0.0093∗∗∗
(−4.78) (−4.02) (−3.26)
Firm Size 0.0057 0.0052 0.0209∗∗∗ 0.0038 0.0036 0.0173∗∗∗
(1.20) (1.08) (4.13) (0.81) (0.76) (3.49)
Board Size −0.0069∗∗ −0.0104∗∗∗ −0.0086∗∗∗ 0.0016 −0.0004 −0.0016
(−2.15) (−3.04) (−2.84) (0.57) (−0.13) (−0.59)
Leverage −0.7709∗∗∗ −0.7415∗∗∗ −0.6521∗∗∗ −0.7635∗∗∗ −0.7355∗∗∗ −0.7231∗∗∗
(−27.87) (−26.77) (−21.74) (−28.09) (−26.98) (−25.33)
E-index −0.0158∗∗∗ −0.0124∗∗∗ −0.0139∗∗∗ −0.0124∗∗∗ −0.0092∗∗ −0.0101∗∗
(−3.92) (−2.92) (−3.61) (−3.05) (−2.14) (−2.50)
Industry fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 7263 7263 7263 7263 7263 7263
R2 0.316 0.333 0.527 0.321 0.336 0.408
Table 3.3 shows that board size, leverage and entrenchment are always negatively correlated
to firm value. We also find no significant coefficient for the number of independent directors
on the board (columns 1, 2 and 3). In columns 4, 5 and 6 the table shows results for the same
specifications but using the adjusted number of independent directors computed as the number of
independent directors at the board minus the independent directors with at least one connection
to the non profit sector. While board independence (this is independence to be in compliance
with listing requirements) doesn’t seem to have any relation with firm performance, the adjusted
number of independent directors presents larger, negative and statistically significant coefficients.
This finding provides empirical evidence of the importance of accounting for NPO ties in the
definition of independence of a non-employee director and their potential influence on firm
value.
However, these results are difficult to interpret because they are subject to the same endogeneity
concerns that make the pooled OLS regression of Tobin’s Q on board independence difficult
to interpret. In the cross section, some firms may be better than others and low director
independence may be a symptom and not the cause. Board composition may also vary with firms
strategy and those differences in strategy may be responsible for any differences in performance.
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In the time series, firms may increase board independence (or remove directors with ties) when
performance is weak. Also, firms may adjust board composition as they adjust their strategies
over time. The next step needed is to account for such firm characteristics using firm fixed
effects.
In table 3.4 Tobin’s Q is regressed on the ratio of linked independent directors over total number
of independent directors on the board introducing firm fixed effects to control for firm specific
time invariant unobserved heterogeneity and year fixed effect. Column 1 shows the overall effect
of a change in the proportion of linked directors at the board level. Compared to the pooled
OLS results, we find that there is no statistically significant effect of a change in the fraction
of linked directors at the board level on Tobin’s Q after taking into account firm specific time
invariant unobserved heterogeneity.
However, the influence of a director in the board is not given solely by it’s participation at
the board as a whole, but also in more specific decisions at certain committees.Independent
directors serve both at board meetings and at specific meetings at different committees formed
by a smaller number of directors who focus (and take responsibility) on monitoring the executive
team in regard with specific activities. The four most common committees in U.S boards are the
auditing committee, the compensation committee, nominating committee and the governance
committee. The frequency, regulation and composition of each committee varies greatly, as
well as the type of decisions made in each committee and the potential conflict of interest with
the CEO. It is also likely that the bargaining power of an independent director comes from
their actions and decisions taken inside each of these committees. Then, the CEO would need
to exert more influence over those independent directors who have more direct influence over
his personal interests. Probably, the two committees where the conflict of interest with the
CEO is more straightforward is the compensation and the auditing committees. In table 3.4,
columns 2 and 3 show the regression of Tobin’s Q on the fraction of independent directors
with links at the compensation and auditing committees. According to results displayed in
column 2, an increase in the fraction of independent directors with NPO links sitting at the
compensation has a negative effect on firm value. The effect is statistically significant at the 10%.
Opposite, changes in the fraction of linked directors inside the auditing committees has a positive
coefficient (column 3), but not statistically different from zero. The analysis does not consider
the nomination and governance committees since across the sample used in this study there is a
huge overlap between the compensation and the governance committee. Moreover, the level of
activity of the nomination committee is rather low (fewer meetings per year). In non-reported
results similar analysis has been done considering separately the nominating an governance
committees. As with the auditing committee, changes in the fraction of board members with
links at governance and nominating committees present coefficients not statistically different
from zero. In the reminder of the paper I will focus the analysis in changes in the composition
of linked independent directors at the compensation committee.
3.4 Endogeneity of board structure and empirical strategy
The results of the previous section provide evidence that the presence and the relative position
of a linked director at the board have a correlation with the firm’s value. However, boards of
directors are endogenous institutions (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). Unless strong assumptions
are made, a causal analysis using cross sectional data is difficult because there is a potential
reverse causality problem. It is not easy to disentangle whether firms are choosing a certain
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Table 3.4: Fraction of linked directors at the board and committees. Dependent variable is
the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q measured as 1 plus the ratio of book value of assets + market
value of equity, minus book value of equity divided by total assets. LinkedD_pct is the fraction of
independent directors appointed in a certain year at a board that simultaneously participate of a non
profit organization. CCLinked_pct is the ratio of NPO linked independent directors appointed in the
compensation committee scaled by the number of independent directors at the committee. ACLinked_pct,
GCLinked_pct and NCLinked_pct are equivalent measures for the auditing, governance and nomination
committees respectively. E-index is the entrenchment index constructed as in Bebchuk et al. (2009).
Firm size is the log of total assets. Board size is the total number of directors appointed at aboard in a
year. Independent is the ratio of independent directors scaled by board size. Leverage is long-term debt
plus debt in current liabilities, divided by the numerator plus market equity. Industry fixed effects are
2 digits SIC codes fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t-statistics reported in
parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
LinkedD_pct 0.0154
(0.48)
CCLinked_pct −0.0471∗
(−1.67)
ACLinked_pct 0.0052
(0.18)
Independence −0.0017 0.0090 0.0085
(−0.05) (0.19) (0.19)
Firm Size −0.0950∗∗∗ −0.1050∗∗∗ −0.1032∗∗∗
(−7.00) (−6.10) (−6.13)
Leverage −0.4811∗∗∗ −0.5143∗∗∗ −0.5160∗∗∗
(−17.04) (−13.49) (−13.80)
Board Size −0.0083∗∗∗ −0.0079∗∗∗ −0.0076∗∗∗
(−4.51) (−3.34) (−3.28)
E-index −0.0136∗∗∗ −0.0113∗∗ −0.0104∗∗
(−3.89) (−2.44) (−2.26)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7257 4321 4454
governance structure as a response to their bad performance or if they are having bad performance
as a result of the chosen governance institutions.
Moreover, regressing a cross-section of the dependent variable (such as performance or executive
compensation) on to the independent variable (linked directors) leads to an omitted variable bias.
There is unobserved firm level heterogeneity, such as CEO’s managerial skills or firm strategy,
that cannot be explicitly taken into account in the empirical model to be estimated. The
inclusion of omitted variables in the error term leads to inconsistent estimates of the parameters
of interest.
An alternative to cross sectional analysis is to use firm fixed effects in order to control for
time invariant firm characteristics that are unobservable and that might be jointly affecting
performance/compensation and board structure. This is, using firm fixed effects one controls for
unobserved individual heterogeneity that might be correlated with the regressors.
Opposite to random effects and pooled OLS, fixed effects models (FE) allow to establish causation
without the need to make strong assumptions about the model. The within estimator for a fixed
effects model results is a consistent parameter and results can be interpreted as the causative
effect of a change in the proportion of linked directors in a firm with movements in the dependent
variable of interest, this is the marginal effect of a change in our regressors. Firm fixed effects is
useful in this type of data because it allows us to study the effect of a change in the number of
linked directors on the dependent variable of interest.
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However, firm fixed effects also suffer from a large number of limitations as identification strategy
in corporate governance. First of all, it only accounts for time invariant unobserved heterogeneity
across firms, leaving time variant unobservables as a potential source of omitted variable bias.
Second of all, it assumes that there is enough time series variability in the regressors. One could
argue that there is not sufficient variability in board structure for a within estimator, and if
there were any variation in the board or committee structure,then it would also be endogenous.
Another critique to firm fixed effect as a solution to endogeneity issues in performance - board
structure regressions is posed by Wintoki et al. (2012) who draw attention to the dynamics
of observable variables related to corporate governance as a third source of endogeneity in
governance empirical literature (besides unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity). Past
performance can be driving simultaneously changes in current performance and board structure
violating the sequential exogeneity assumption required to obtain consistent estimates from a
firm fixed effect estimation.
Then, the next step is to measure the impact of NPO-linked directors on firm value and CEO
pay using a better empirical strategy to address, to the extent possible, the endogeneity concerns
related to board composition. The empirical strategy is to use a subset of changes in the number
of linked directors that are plausibly unrelated to firm performance. Specifically, I consider
decreases in the number of linked directors in the compensation committee due to director
retirements in a similar way used by Fracassi and Tate (2012) A director departure is labelled as
a retirement if the director is at or beyond the company’s mandatory retirement age. These
events allow to identify sets of treated and control firms. In my sample there are 274 retirement
events happening inside the compensation committee of which 157 happen inside compensation
committees with at least one NPO-linked director. 25 out of those 157 retirement are events
corresponding to NPO-linked directors retirements.
The main identification source of this paper is to compute the difference in value changes around
the two types of events, linked and not linked retirement. The differences-in-differences approach
(DID) corrects for other (unobserved) factors that might be associated with the retirement of
directors and provides a clear and exogenous source of change in the board structure.
Every firm in the sample has at least one director connected to a nonprofit organization appointed
at the compensation committee. One should not simply make a comparison between firms
appointing linked directors and firms which are not linked to a nonprofit. The differences-in-
differences framework consists of an indicator variable called CCR (compensation committee
retirement) that takes the value of 1 for each full fiscal year after the retirement of an independent
director from a compensation committee. The specification also includes the interaction of CCR
with an indicator for connected retirements (CCLR). While the "treatment" is the retirement
of an independent director with ties to a NPO, the "control" group is the retirement of an
independent director without links to an NPO. Both treatment and control events happen inside
compensation committees with at least one linked independent director. Then, Tobin’s Q is
regressed on CCR and the interaction CCLR.
To ease the interpretation, I restrict the analysis only to isolated retirements. This means no
successive retirements inside the compensation committee happen neither 1 year before, nor 1
year after the retirement event under consideration. The coefficient of the interaction (CCLR)
captures the difference-in-differences, this is the impact of reducing the number of NPO linked
directors on the value change. All specifications contain firm fixed effects and only include
retirement events for which we can observe at least one year before the retirement year and one
year after the retirement. In all regressions standard errors are also clustered at the firm level to
correct for within-firm serial correlation of the residuals.
All regressions will be run in the symmetric window of + 3 years around the year where
the retirement event took place, as long as information is available. The sample is split by
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entrenchment level, measured using the E-index, in order to analyze if different governance
mechanisms are substitutes or complementary, and test alternative hypothesis. I will consider 4
non-mutually exclusive groups of firms in terms of the entrenchment index. While the median of
E-index is strictly 3, this includes more than 78% of the sample, cutting E-index at 2 splits the
linked compensation committees in two groups (more precisely at 46%, which is more closely
to the median level). In the remainder of this paper low entrenchment firms are defined as
those firms withE − index ≤ 2, mid-low entrenchment firms will be those with E − index ≤ 3,
mid-high entrenchment firms will be those with E − index ≥ 3, and finally high-entrenchment
firms will be those with E − index > 3.
3.4.1 Firm Value
Table 3.5: Firm value and the retirement of a connected independent director from a
compensation committee. Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q measured as 1
plus the ratio of the book value of assets + market value of equity, minus book value of equity divided by
total assets. CCR is a dummy variable equal to 1 the three following years of a retirement of a member
of a compensation committee. CCLR is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the director that retires form the
compensation committee has a connection to a NPO. E-index is the entrenchment index constructed as
in Bebchuk at al. (2009). Firm size is the log of total assets. Board size is the total number of directors
appointed at aboard in a year. Independence is the ratio of independent directors scaled by board size.
Leverage is long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, divided by the numerator plus market equity.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t-statistics reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent
significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
E ≤ 2 E ≤ 3 E ≥ 3 E > 3
CCR 0.0219 0.0207 0.0126 0.0292 0.0221 −0.0123 −0.0194
(0.78) (0.77) (0.50) (0.75) (0.79) (−0.32) (−0.30)
CCLR −0.0183 0.0012 0.0373 0.1068∗∗∗ 0.1978∗∗ 0.0560 −0.2639∗∗
(−0.27) (0.02) (0.60) (3.06) (2.03) (0.57) (−2.11)
Firm Size −0.1474∗∗∗ −0.1354∗∗ −0.1946∗∗ −0.1823∗∗∗ −0.1429∗∗ −0.2390∗
(−3.13) (−2.47) (−2.24) (−2.66) (−2.11) (−1.93)
Board Size 0.0048 −0.0002 −0.0093 −0.0007 0.0011 0.0141
(0.66) (−0.03) (−0.64) (−0.07) (0.11) (1.02)
Independence 0.0853 −0.0264 −0.1944 −0.0922 0.0162 0.1228
(0.55) (−0.19) (−0.60) (−0.55) (0.10) (0.44)
Leverage −0.3867∗∗∗ −0.4730∗∗∗ −0.0745 −0.0653 −0.5622∗∗∗ −0.9498∗∗∗
(−3.59) (−3.85) (−0.41) (−0.42) (−3.02) (−4.20)
E-index 0.0014
(0.13)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obervations 490 489 445 175 333 270 112
Adj.R2 0.320 0.447 0.442 0.385 0.438 0.498 0.550
Column 1 of Table 3.5, presents a baseline regression without controls for firm observable
characteristics, but with year and firm fixed effects. The overall change is not statistically
significant (CCR and CCLR coefficients), although the retirement of a linked director presents
a negative coefficient (-.0183). The sign of this coefficient changes as we introduce controls,
but it remains not-significant as long as we pool all the firms together (columns 2 and 3).
Columns (4) to (7) present results for different subsets of firms corresponding to different levels
of entrenchment (proxy for managerial power). The retirement of an independent director from
the compensation committee (CCR) is not statistically different from zero in any subgroup of
firms of managerial power. However, the retirement of a linked independent director from a
17
3 Independent or co-opted? Corporate directors with ties to the nonprofit sector
compensation committee (coefficient CCLR) which captures the DID effect, presents significant
and positive values for firms with low and mid-low entrenchment levels. For firms with low
entrenchment firms, the retirement of a linked independent director from the compensation
committee has an effect of 0.1068 which is significant at the 1%. In column (5), the effect of
a retirement of an independent director with links from a compensation committee in a firm
with mid-low entrenchment level has an effect on Tobin’s Q of 0.1978, significant at the %
5. The results of columns (4) and (5) are consistent with the interpretation of a increase on
firm value after the retirement of a connected director or, put in another words, a reduction
of the participation of NPO linked directors has a positive effect on firm performance in the
years following the retirement. Columns (6) and (7) show the results for mid and mid-high
entrenchment boards. While the effect of a retirement of a NPO-linked director in firms with
E≤3 is positive (0.056) , it is smaller that the one observed for the group of low entrenchment
firms and it is not statistically significant. For firms with high entrenchment ( E>3, strictly
above the median) the effect of interest changes in sign and it is the largest in magnitude. The
effect of a retirement of a linked director appointed at the compensation committee in the firm
value is -0.2639 and statistically different from zero at the 5%. The interpretation of these
results is twofold. On one hand we find that the retirement of NPO connected directors at
the compensation committee matters and has a significant effect on firm performance when
we control for observed firm characteristic’s and time invariant frim characteristics. On the
other hand, we can interpret that the overall effect of this connected directors is related to the
bargaining power of the CEO. In firms where the CEO already has a high bargaining power,
the personal treats of NPO linked directors seem to play a role improving the governance of
the firm. This is, when the CEO is already powerful he does not need to exert his influence
over linked directors enticing them with possible charitable donations the their organizations of
interest. When the CEO is in a somehow legal or institutional weak position, the presence of
NPO linked directors seem to be a target for the CEO to increase his power. Hence, the positive
effect of their retirement from low entrenchment firms. When the proportion of NPO-linked
directors decreases from the compensation committee the CEO looses targets to exert power and
the overall governance of the firm improves, translating into an increase in firm performance the
following years.
Thus far, results are consistent with the hypothesis that CEOs in low entrenchment firms use
NPO-linked independent directors in their struggle or bargain to increase their power. In high
entrenchment firms they are already enjoying the "quiet life" and there is little that NPO-linked
directors can offer to them. Unless the CEO foresees a troublesome situation in the future
where he might need an NPO-linked director’s help, there is no exchange opportunity with them.
Opposite, in firms with good governance (low level of entrenchment index) CEOs need to fight
for the position at the firm, and in that scene NPO-linked directors have an attractive position
that can be exploited by CEOs in the way of entrenchment.
3.4.2 CEO Pay structure and bargaining power
Since the main focus of this paper is the composition of compensation committees, it is natural
to focus in the effect of the presence of NPO-linked directors for different levels of managerial
entrenchment in the level and composition of pay. Moreover, using executive pay as the outcome
variable has the advantage of using a dependent variable measured and set on yearly basis, which
the same periodicity of board members elections and retirements.
This section develops results using the differences-in-differences strategy around retirement events
with alternative CEO pay variables as outcomes. We will use total pay and it’s components
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separately (salary, bonus, stocks and options).
Pay level and design is the main responsibility and outcome of compensation committees activity.
Executives incentives clearly imposes a conflict of interest. CEO’s rather to get paid as much as
possible, while shareholders want to provide the right incentives to CEO’s to align their interest
with his. Thus, total pay is the total dollar value of different components of pay. Some of these
components of pay are tied to firm performance, while others belong to a more discretionary
realm. Salary is probably the most discretionary component of pay since it is not mechanically
tied to any form performance or valuation measure. Opposite, equity pay components (stocks and
stock options) are highly dependent and increasing on firm market value and firm performance.
Table 3.6 shows that the retirement of a director from a linked compensation committee has
a positive and statistically significant effect on the level of total pay. This positive effect is
statistically significant at 5% in low and mid-low entrenchment firms (columns 4 and 5), but
changes the sign going from a positive to a negative effect of the retirement of a linked director,
and looses all the statistical power in high entrenchment firms (columns 6 and 7).
Table 3.6: CEO total pay and the retirement of a connected independent director from a
compensation committee. Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of TDC1 (as reported in
ExecuComp’s AnnComp table). CCR is a dummy variable equal to 1 the three following years of a
retirement of a member of a compensation committee. CCLR is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the director
that retires form the compensation committee has a connection to a NPO. E-index is the entrenchment
index constructed as in Bebchuk at al. (2009). Firm size is the log of total assets. ROA is the natural
logarithm of 1 plus the ratio of net income plus interest expense, scaled by the lag of total assets. Q
is the natural logarithm of 1 plus book value of assets + market value of equity, minus book value of
equity divided by total assets. Return is the the natural logarithm of 1 plus lagged firm stock annual
return. All specifications include firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm
level. t-statistics reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
E ≤ 2 E ≤ 3 E ≥ 3 E > 3
CCR 0.0840 0.0714 0.1157 −0.0886 0.1400 0.2362 0.0216
(0.70) (0.61) (0.95) (−0.40) (0.89) (1.36) (0.10)
CCLR 0.3744∗∗ 0.3408∗∗ 0.3582∗∗∗ 0.5692∗∗∗ 0.4884∗∗∗ 0.2939 −0.5754
(2.56) (2.54) (2.64) (3.84) (2.83) (1.66) (−1.14)
Firm Size 0.2705∗∗ 0.3625∗∗∗ 0.3365∗∗∗ 0.0290 0.2469∗ 0.3523∗∗∗ −0.1941
(2.04) (2.63) (2.77) (0.08) (1.97) (2.86) (−0.47)
ROA −0.4078 −0.4084 −0.5517∗∗ −0.3122 −0.6743∗∗∗ −1.2648∗∗ −0.2822
(−1.23) (−1.42) (−2.16) (−0.70) (−2.73) (−2.24) (−0.26)
Return 0.3519∗∗∗ 0.3406∗∗∗ 0.3443∗∗∗ 0.3437 0.2694∗ 0.4303∗∗∗ 0.1203
(3.05) (3.06) (2.88) (1.50) (1.79) (2.97) (0.85)
Tenure 0.0115 0.0107 0.0063 0.0120 0.0099 −0.0052 0.0028
(1.60) (1.49) (0.91) (1.39) (1.52) (−0.46) (0.08)
Q 0.5575∗ 0.5762∗ −0.4835 0.1855 1.0092∗∗∗ −0.0288
(1.87) (1.78) (−0.92) (0.48) (3.27) (−0.04)
E-index 0.0054
(0.12)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 423 423 397 158 293 239 104
The interpretation of these results should be done in the context of the results of the previous
section on firm value. The positive and significant results of linked directors retirement coincide
with the tranches of entrenchment index where the retirement of these directors was followed with
an improvement on firm performance. All specifications introduce controls for firm performance
(ROA, one year stock return and Tobin’s Q), however these measures are not enough to capture
the total effect of firm performance on CEO pay. While total pay is a function of firm performance,
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we don’t know the actual functional form that connects firm performance with CEO pay. As
mentioned above, total pay is composed by different compensation packages if which several are
closely tied to firm performance indicators. An improvement in firm maximizing value would
automatically translate in an increase on the level of such components (as it does in columns
4 and 5) and a reduction of firm value may translate in a reduction of total pay (as it does in
column 7, although not statistically significant).
The influence of compensation committee members should not only be visible in the level of
total pay but also in pay structure. This is the portions of pay in the form of equity pay (stocks
and option), bonus and salary.
Table 3.7 shows regressions of the natural logarithm of salary on the retirement of a member of
the compensation committee. Salary is the most discretionary portion of pay. Is it not linked
on performance goals and it is payed mostly in the form of cash. As expected, no performance
measure introduced as a control in these specifications is statistically significant. Again, spliting
the sample into groups of entrenchment provides different results for the main coefficient of
interest (CCLR). For firms with low and mid-low entrenchment the retirement of a NPO-linked
director is followed by a decrease in salary (columns 4 and 5). This effect is both economically
and statistically significant. This is, when a linked director retires from the board in a low
entrenchment firm, in the following years CEOs face a reduction of their salary. In firms with
mid and high level of entrenchment (columns 6 and 7) the retirement of a linked independent
director is followed by an increase in in the level of salary. However, the size of the effect is much
smaller than in the group of firms with low managerial power and not statistically different from
zero.
Further, in non reported results, similar regressions using the ratio of salary on total pay as a
dependent variable show that after the retirement of a connected director from a compensation
committee, the percentage of salary on total pay drops 26% and 19% with a 1% significance level
in low entrenchment firms, while it increases 18% in high entrenchment firms (10% significance).
Both results in terms of level and percentage of salary in total pay are consistent with higher
amounts of pay to CEOs with the precence of NPO-linked directors at the compensation
committee.
The second component of pay under study is bonus. Table 3.8 show regressions where the
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of Bonus. The interaction term of interest (again
CCLR) is positive in all groups of firms, except for high entrenchment companies where the
coefficient of the interaction is negative, implying a reduction in bonus pay in high entrenchment
firms after the retirement of a linked NPO director. However, none of these specifications present
coefficients statistically different from zero. It is worth to mention that, unlike the case of salary,
when the dependent variable is bonus alternative measures of firm performance are statistically
significant.
In table 3.9 columns 1 to 5 show results for specifications where dollar value of stock grants in
a certain year is the dependent variable. Columns 6 to 10 show results for regressions where
the dependent variable is the dollar value of option grants. In both panels, the retirement of
a linked director from a low entrenchment firm seems to have an effect on equity pay. There
is a significant reduction of equity pay with a 5% significance level, and an increase in option
pay (10% significance level). Opposite, mid high entrenchment firm experience an increase in
stock option pay (significant at the 10% level). This is, there is weak evidence that the removal
of a member of the compensation committee with links causes a shift in the equity package
from stocks to options in low entrenchment firms. Interpreting these results in the governance
framework is difficult. One could argue that a reduction of shares and an increase in options
represents a switch from short term to long term incentives. However, it is not clear what kind
of incentives structure is the most desirable from the shareholders perspective.
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Table 3.7: CEO annual salary and the retirement of a connected independent director from
a compensation committee. Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of SALARY as reported
in ExecuComp AnnComp table. CCR is a dummy variable equal to 1 the three following years of a
retirement of a member of a compensation committee. CCLR is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the director
that retires form the compensation committee has a connection to a NPO. E-index is the entrenchment
index constructed as in Bebchuk at al. (2009). Firm size is the log of total assets. ROA is the natural
logarithm of 1 plus the ratio of net income plus interest expense, scaled by the lag of total assets. Q
is the natural logarithm of 1 plus book value of assets + market value of equity, minus book value of
equity divided by total assets. Return is the the natural logarithm of 1 plus lagged firm stock annual
return. All specifications include firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm
level. t-statistics reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
E ≤ 2 E ≤ 3 E ≥ 3 E > 3
CCR 0.0319 0.0283 −0.0434 0.1299 0.1182∗ −0.2258 −0.2848
(0.26) (0.23) (−0.41) (1.55) (1.74) (−1.39) (−1.13)
CCLR −0.1036 −0.1152 −0.0407 −0.2447∗∗ −0.2482∗∗ 0.0809 0.1638
(−0.70) (−0.75) (−0.35) (−2.30) (−2.45) (0.78) (0.46)
Firm_Size 0.1956 0.2263∗ 0.1196 0.1364 0.1718∗∗∗ 0.0099 −0.1309
(1.63) (1.74) (1.28) (0.46) (3.52) (0.12) (−0.48)
ROA 0.5542 0.5541∗ 0.2655 0.2706 0.2318 −0.4870 0.6975
(1.60) (1.68) (1.15) (0.94) (1.06) (−1.06) (0.78)
Return −0.0756 −0.0793 0.0383 −0.0992 −0.0180 0.2068∗∗ 0.1474
(−0.53) (−0.56) (0.51) (−0.72) (−0.22) (2.26) (0.97)
Tenure 0.0049 0.0046 0.0024 0.0067 0.0109 −0.0050 −0.0657
(0.52) (0.49) (0.25) (0.86) (1.27) (−0.24) (−0.61)
Q 0.1867 0.1109 −0.3166 −0.0780 0.2867 −0.0659
(0.89) (0.53) (−0.72) (−0.36) (1.47) (−0.22)
E-index 0.0285
(1.02)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 427 427 400 161 296 239 104
Overall,the empirical findings seem to indicate that NPO-linked directors are relevant in the
bargaining process for the determination of CEO pay when they participate of the compensation
committee. In most of the specifications, the removal of a director (CCR) has a coefficient
that is not statistically different from zero. Opposite, there is a statistically and economically
significant coefficient for the retirement of NPO-linked directors (CCLR).
In non reported robustness checks, a similar analysis with the same identification strategy was
performed using the retirement of connected directors in other committees. None of those
retirements has any statistical significant impact on any of the compensation components. These
results reinforce the idea that the role of NPO-linked directors at the compensation committee
are influential and that results are not driven by other changes in board structure.
3.4.3 Earnings Management
Earnings management is the use of accruals to change reported earnings by temporarily rising
or reducing income using discretionary accruals. As accruals are parts of earnings that are
not reflected in current cash flows, there is a great deal of managerial discretion into their
construction and imputation. This section employs the same empirical strategy as in previous
sections, using annual discretionary accruals as the dependent variable.
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Table 3.8: CEO annual bonus and the retirement of a connected independent director from
a compensation committee. Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of BONUS as reported
in ExecuComp AnnComp table. CCR is a dummy variable equal to 1 the three following years of a
retirement of a member of a compensation committee. CCLR is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the director
that retires form the compensation committee has a connection to a NPO. E-index is the entrenchment
index constructed as in Bebchuk at al. (2009). Firm size is the log of total assets. ROA is the natural
logarithm of 1 plus the ratio of net income plus interest expense, scaled by the lag of total assets. Q
is the natural logarithm of 1 plus book value of assets + market value of equity, minus book value of
equity divided by total assets. Return is the the natural logarithm of 1 plus lagged firm stock annual
return. All specifications include firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm
level. t-statistics reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
E ≤ 2 E ≤ 3 E ≥ 3 E > 3
CCR 0.1923 0.1711 0.3183 −10.033 0.2110 1.4425∗ 0.7693
(0.31) (0.28) (0.47) (−0.92) (0.24) (1.87) (0.66)
CCLR 0.8635 0.7968 10.552 0.3645 0.2475 11.732 −27.874
(0.88) (0.82) (0.96) (0.65) (0.20) (0.89) (−1.34)
Firm_Size 0.7406∗ 0.9174∗ 0.9574∗∗ 11.741 0.8067 1.9013∗∗∗ −0.1912
(1.93) (1.97) (2.01) (0.71) (1.44) (3.82) (−0.11)
ROA 16.763 16.756 19.681 −20.535 −0.8369 6.6867∗ 17.9347∗∗∗
(0.89) (0.97) (0.99) (−1.19) (−0.64) (1.68) (3.04)
Return −0.1378 −0.1596 0.0856 1.2832∗ 0.2857 −1.3756∗ −19.617
(−0.34) (−0.39) (0.19) (1.99) (0.67) (−1.71) (−1.53)
Tenure −0.0369 −0.0383 −0.0514 −0.0698 −0.0460 −0.1219∗ 0.0769
(−0.64) (−0.66) (−0.90) (−0.84) (−0.66) (−1.81) (0.60)
Q 10.758 0.7228 −4.5789∗∗ −0.0662 2.9612∗ 24.260
(0.94) (0.59) (−2.57) (−0.04) (1.91) (0.83)
E-index 0.3454
(1.47)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 427 427 400 161 296 239 104
One would expect that the composition of the auditing committee (and not the compensation
committee) to be the explanatory variable of interest, when discretionary accruals are the
left hand side variable. However, in non reported results, I have performed a similar analysis
using changes in the auditing committee and not significant results were found. These findings
also strengthen the idea that directors at the compensation committee are in a more relevant
bargaining position with regards to the CEO compared to member of other committees.
In table 3.10 I use as a dependent variable the absolute value of discretionary accruals computed
following Jones’ modified model as described by Dechow et al. (1995). Unfortunately, in these
specifications I cannot split the sample into different entrenchment levels because I have fewer
observations and some groups would have missing cases. The analysis is restricted to the overall
effect on the entire sample. The specifications in columns 1 to 4 include controls for firm
performance and firm characteristics, as well as controls for governance. Similar to previous
results, the retirement of a director (CCR) presents a positive effect but not statistically different
from zero, while the retirement of a NPO-linked director (CCLR) has a negative and statistically
significant (10%) effect. This indicates that earnings management activity decreases in the 3
years following the retirement of a connected director to the non-profit sector.
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Table 3.10: Earnings Management.
Dependent variable is the 1% winsorized discretionary accruals computed according to the modified
Jones model as in Dechow et al. (1995). CCR is a dummy variable equal to 1 the three following years
of a retirement of a member of a compensation committee. CCLR is a dummy variable equal to 1 if
the director that retires form the compensation committee has a connection to a NPO. E-index is the
entrenchment index constructed as in Bebchuk et al. (2009). Firm size is the log of total assets. ROA is
the natural logarithm of 1 plus the ratio of net income plus interest expense, scaled by the lag of total
assets. Q is the natural logarithm of 1 plus book value of assets + market value of equity, minus book
value of equity divided by total assets. Return is the the natural logarithm of 1 plus lagged firm stock
annual return. SD_ret is the standard deviation of monthly returns in the last 12 months. Cash is the
the natural logarithm of ch as reported in Compustat. Leverage is long-term debt plus debt in current
liabilities, divided by the numerator plus market equity. New CEO is a dummy equal to 1 if the CEO
has been appointed that year. Tenure is the number of years since the CEO has been appointed. All
specifications include firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t-statistics
reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CCR 0.0130 0.0148 0.0148 0.0153
(1.04) (1.09) (1.09) (1.12)
CCLR −0.0203 −0.0239∗ −0.0240∗ −0.0287∗
(−1.49) (−1.93) (−1.92) (−1.98)
E-index −0.0023 −0.0015 −0.0012 −0.0010
(−0.50) (−0.33) (−0.28) (−0.23)
Firm Size 0.0548∗∗ 0.0562∗∗ 0.0562∗∗ 0.0615∗∗
(2.17) (2.36) (2.36) (2.43)
Independence 0.1120∗∗ 0.1315∗∗ 0.1334∗∗ 0.1507∗∗
(2.16) (2.31) (2.27) (2.49)
ROA 0.0944∗∗ 0.0934∗∗ 0.0949∗∗ 0.1020∗∗
(2.47) (2.46) (2.42) (2.61)
Q 0.0680∗∗ 0.0677∗∗ 0.0677∗∗ 0.0706∗∗
(2.44) (2.44) (2.44) (2.47)
Leverage 0.0098 −0.0102 −0.0112 −0.0211
(0.20) (−0.17) (−0.19) (−0.35)
Cash 0.0035 0.0037 0.0037 0.0035
(0.63) (0.61) (0.61) (0.56)
SD_ret 0.1583 0.1586 0.1208
(0.97) (0.97) (0.73)
New CEO 0.0023 0.0016
(0.29) (0.19)
Tenure −0.0002
(−0.31)
Observations 347 330 330 327
Adj-R2 0.138 0.144 0.142 0.153
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3.4.4 Limitations of the empirical strategy
The use of retirement of independent directors as a source of exogenous variations poses limitations
in the interpretation of the results. First, I measure the impact of NPO-linked directors on
value using only within-firm changes in the fraction of linked directors due to independent
director retirements. The identification assumption is that retirements are not driven by firm
performance itself. Unexpected deaths of independent directors would be an ideal shock for
identification, as used in Azoulay et al. (2010). However,the sample period used in this paper
doesn’t contain enough death-events related to a non-profit organization.
Another concern is the age of directors and how the fact of being near retirement might change
their incentives and career concerns. The results show that while the retirement of a director by
itself is not statistically significant, the retirement of an NPO-linked director near retirement is
statistically significant, showing that they still play an active and relevant role on the board
before leaving.
Other limitation is the speed and the type of a replacement when independent directors that retire.
If the retirement of a linked director is quickly followed by an appointment of another director
with similar characteristic it would be even more difficult to interpret the effect of a retirement
on the outcome variables. In the sample of this study 40% of the linked retirements are replaced
in the next year of the departure. However, only 10% is replaced by another linked independent
director. Non-linked retirements are followed by a replacement in the subsequent year only in
25% of the cases and only 4% of the non-linked directors is followed by the appointment of a
linked directors. As expected, in compensation committee the rate and speed of replacement is
higher compared to that of the board as a whole, since compensation committees are smaller
(an average size of 4 to 5 members). 60% of retirements happening inside the compensation
committee are followed by a replacement in the next year. However, only 8% of the linked
retirements is replaced by a linked director.
3.5 Discussion and Conclusion
This study contributes to the corporate governance literature and the current debate of what
makes a good independent director and what should be their main role at the board. In this paper
we study the definition of true independent directors and the relation between independence
and firm performance, earnings management and executive compensation.
The study focus in a particular type of independent directors that are simultaneously serving at
a corporate board and at the board of a non-profit organization (such as charitable institutions
and universities). These directors represent 16% of the board, a percentage even higher than
that of women at boards (11% for firms in the sample). NPO-linked directors are considered a
positive influence at the board because of their social involvement and at the same time they
are seen as potentially captured by the CEO with promises of donations.
To study the effect of the presence of NPO-linked directors in firm value and CEO pay, I use an
empirical strategy based on differences-in-differences estimation using retirements of NPO-linked
and not linked directors from the compensation committee combined with firm fixed effects. This
setting provides an empirical design that control for unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level
and provides a reasonable source of exogenous change in the participation of NPO-linked directors.
The main findings are that independent directors that have connections exert their influence
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mostly from their positions at the compensation committee and not from their participation
in other committees. The removal of these directors from the compensation committee causes
significant changes in firm value, total pay and pay structure. The direction of such changes
is dissimilar depending on the level of managerial power, measured as entrenchment index. In
low entrenchment firms, their removal translates in an improvement in firm value and firm
performance, an increase in total pay but a reduction of discretionary components of pay such
as salary. Moreover, the removal of an NPO-linked director from the compensation committee
causes a change in the composition of equity pay and a reduction of earnings management in the
years after the retirement happens. Opposite, in high entrenchment firms, these directors removal
either has no influence in the variables of interest or has an opposite direction (compared to firms
with low level of entrenchment) implying that their departure decreases good governance.
These findings support the idea that the monitoring quality of NPO-linked directors will depend
on CEO power. In firms where the entrenchment index is low, CEOs might be interested into
engage in activities or transactions that increase their power and secure their position. Hence,
CEOs have incentives to exploit the weakness of NPO-linked directors for their benefit. Opposite,
CEOs that are working at boards where they count with enough institutional or legal protection
are not interested in any potential exchange of favors with NPO-linked directors.
These findings reinforce the need for a more specific definition of an independent director and
leads for future research related to the study of the dynamic relation between board independence
and CEO entrenchment.
3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Variables definition
ACLinkedD_pct is the ratio of independent directors with links that serves at the compensation
committee.
App_ratio is the fraction of new appointments that have links to the non-profit sector.
Board Size Total number of members of a board of directors. Source: BoardEx.
Bonus is the log(BONUS), where BONUS is as as defined in ExecuComp. Measured in
thousands.
CCR is a dummy variable equal to 1 in the 3 years after the retirement of an independent
director that sits at the compensation commitee and zero otherwise.
CCLinkedD_pct is the ratio of independent directors with links that serves at the compensation
committee.
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CCLR is a dummy variable equal to 1 in the 3 years after the retirement of an independent
director that sits at the compensation commitee and has links to a NPO, and zero otherwise.
DAC is the 1% winsorized discretionary accruals computed according to the modified Jones
model as in Dechow et al. (1995)
D_App is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has appointed at least one independent
director with links.
E-index defined and constructed by Bebchuk et al. (2009).
Firm Size Natural log of end of year total assets of a firm (Firm Sie= log(at)).
Independent Total independent directors at a board, divided by the board size. Source:
BoardEx.
Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, divided by the numerator
plus market equity. (Leverage=(dlc + dltt)/(dlc + dltt+(prcc_c*csho))))
LinkedD_pct Fraction of independent directors appointed at a board that are also members
or serve at the board of a nonprofit organization at the same time they serve at the corporate
board. This is computed as the count of independent directors with links to a NPO divided by
the total number of independent directors at a board in a certain year.
New_Link_App is the count of independent directors appointed that have a connection to a
NPO.
Return is the log of the end of year stock one year return.
ROA is the log of net income plus interest expense (if available) divided by the total assets at
the beginning of the year (ROA=log[(ni+tie)/at[t-1]]).
Salary is SALARY as defined in ExecuComp. Dollar value of the base salary earned by the
named executive officer during the fiscal year.
Stock measured as log(1+ RSTKGRNT) if available or log(1+STOCK_AWARDS_FV) other-
wise.
Tobin’s Q is the log of total assets plus market equity minus book equity, divided by total
assets (Q= log(1+(at + (prcc_c - bkvlps)*csho)/at).
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Total Pay is TDC1 as defined in ExecuComp. Total Compensation (Salary + Bonus + Other
Annual + Restriced Stock Grants + LTIP Payouts + All Other + Value of Option Grants).
Measured in thousands.
Options is log(1+OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE) as defined in ExecuComp.
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CEO Risk Taking Incentives and
Bank Failure during the 2007-2010
Financial Crisis
Since the inception of the latest financial crisis, bankers’ compensation and the risk-taking
incentives that compensation may have induced have become the focus of both regulatory and
academic attention. This attention has led to the formulation of many compensation reform
proposals, the implementation of some of them, and to a heated debate about the need for
and the appropriate form of regulation of bankers’ pay.1 In this paper, we contribute to this
debate by studying the relation between the risk taking incentives created by the compensation
of the CEOs of large U.S. financial institutions and the probability of failure of these institutions
during the financial crisis. We also analyze whether CEOs’ risk taking incentives are the result of
certain compensation vehicles as well as the factors that may have determined those incentives.
In particular, we investigate whether CEOs’ incentives are aligned with those of shareholders or
whether they are the result of corporate governance failures at large US banks.
Analyzing the relation between managerial incentives and risk taking requires addressing two
measurement challenges: how to measure bank risk and how to measure risk taking incentives.
Although there are very different approaches to measuring bank risk, most share one or both of
the following limitations. First, many measures have a limited ability to capture certain risks,
particularly tail risk. For example, measures such as the commonly used z-score or the volatility
of equity returns are unlikely to capture this kind of risk, especially if they are computed prior
to crisis. Second, many measures (especially those that infer bank risk from the market value of
securities) capture the part of firm risk that is borne by investors, but not the total amount
of risk. This distinction is likely to be important for large financial institutions, since bank
supervisors may (and do, as manifested during the financial crisis) intervene to prevent the
default of systemically relevant institutions. The possibility of bank bailouts, thus, implies that
measures of bank risk based on security prices may underestimate bank risk. More importantly,
if different banks have different probabilities of being bailed out in the event of likely insolvency,
differences in market risk measures may not reflect corresponding differences in the risk of
banks’ assets. To clarify this point, suppose that bank A would be bailed out for sure in case of
distress, whereas bank B would never be bailed out. Bank A could take on greater risk (and,
in fact, would have the incentive to do so) than bank B, yet market based measures of the
banks’ probability of default could show bank B as being riskier. To address these limitations of
1Section 956 of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act requires that the banking agencies regulate compensation arrangements
at large financial institutions to discourage inappropriate risk taking. In 2011, the different supervisory agencies
issued a proposed rule to regulate pay in covered institutions. Outside of the US, regulatory action has been
intense as well. For example, in Europe, the Committee of European Banking Supervisors issued in 2010
a set of Guidelines on Remuneration Policies and Practices, the European Union approved directives CRD
III (in 2010) and CRD IV (in 2013) to regulate compensation at financial institutions, and, in the UK, the
Financial Services Authority issued in 2009, and amended in 2010, the so called Remuneration Code. At the
multinational level, the Financial Stability Forum issued the Principles for Sound Compensation Practices in
2009.
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existing risk measures, we use bank failure during the 2007-2010 financial crisis as en ex post
measure of risk taking in the run-up to the financial crisis. Because of the possibility (realized
during the financial crisis) that bank supervisors or the government may intervene to prevent
outright default of systemically important financial institutions, our definition of bank failure
includes not only bank closures but also acquisitions of distressed banks with the assistance or
under the influence of supervisors or the government. As a case in point, Bear Sterns did not
technically fail, yet it was acquired by JPMorgan with the intervention and assistance of the
Federal Reserve for $10 per share, when the previous closing price was $30 and when just two
weeks earlier the stock had traded at $85.88.
Regarding the challenge of measuring CEOs’ risk taking incentives, in recent years the empirical
analysis of managerial incentives has focused on the incentives generated by managers’ holdings
of stock options. The convexity of a call option’s payoff profile implies that its Black-Scholes
value is increasing in the volatility of the underlying stock. Therefore, since Guay (1999)
proposed the measure, several papers (notably Coles et al. (2006)) have used the sensitivity of
the Black-Scholes value of a CEO’s holdings of stock options to the volatility of the firm’s stock
as a measure of the CEO’s risk taking incentives. In particular, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011)
use this measure of risk taking incentives (which we label in this paper option vega or OV ) and
find that it has no significant relation with bank risk in a sample of large U.S. banks. However,
because of limited liability, the payoff of the stock of a levered firm is also a convex function
of the value of the firm’s assets. As argued by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973),
equity can be understood as a call option on the firm’s assets, so that equity value is increasing
in the volatility of the firm’s assets. Therefore, in levered firms, the CEO’s holdings of company
stock may provide incentives for risk taking. To capture these incentives, Chesney et al. (2012)
propose a measure of the sensitivity of the value of CEOs’ equity holdings to the volatility of
the firm’s assets (which they label Asset Volatility Vega, or AVV ) and show that this sensitivity
is large for the CEOs of large U.S. financial institutions.2 In this paper, we use Chesney et al.
(2012)’s measure as our baseline measure of incentives. However, option vega and AVV are highly
nonlinear functions of their arguments, many of which are approximated somewhat crudely.
Moreover, their ability to measure risk taking incentives hinges on the accuracy of the structural
model used to estimate the option value. Therefore, both for ease of interpretation and to
assess the robustness of our results, we also propose a simple reduced form measure of risk
taking incentives (Leveraged Delta, or LD), which is just the product of a bank’s leverage (which
determines the sensitivity of the value of the firm stock to changes in asset volatility) and the
sensitivity of the CEO’s wealth to changes in the value of the firm stock (known as Delta). LD
also constitutes a computationally simple alternative to measure risk taking incentives. Our
estimates of AVV and LD for the year 2006 suggest that bank CEOs had strong incentives
to take on risk. Moreover, there was substantial variation across financial institutions in the
strength of those incentives.
We estimate the relation between risk taking incentives measured in year 2006 and bank failure
in the period 2007-2010 for a sample of large US financial institutions. We find that, whereas
there is no significant relation between bank failure and risk taking incentives measured as
option vega (in line with the findings of Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011)), there is a statistically
and economically significant relation between AVV or LD and bank failure. Having documented
such a relationship, we discuss and test several alternative explanations for it. Thus, we consider
the possibilities that the relation is due to the correlation of our incentive measures with the
strength of other unmeasured incentives (such as those stemming from the threat of replacement)
or with firm or CEO characteristics potentially correlated with greater risk taking. We test
2Anderson and Core (2013) propose alternative measures of risk taking incentives that aim to capture the
incentives embedded in options, equity, and debt-like claims held by CEOs, such as pension benefits and
deferred compensation.
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these explanations by using different proxies for the unmeasured incentives or firm or CEO
characteristics. Our tests provide, at best, weak support for these explanations and show that
the relationship between risk taking incentives and bank failure survives the inclusion of the
different proxy variables. We also consider, and find no support for, the alternative that our risk
taking measures are simply measuring risk and not risk taking incentives.
The possibility that the incentives created by CEOs’ compensation arrangements may have been
responsible for excessive levels of risk taking prior to the crisis has led to a variety of proposals
for the regulation of bankers’ pay. Some proposals aim at improving the quality of banks’
governance, under the assumption that the excessive risk taking incentives were the consequence
of faulty monitoring by boards or shareholders.3 Other proposals involve limitations in pay
levels or the use of certain compensation vehicles, such as stock options or termination payments
(severance pay or golden parachutes).4 To investigate the sources of risk taking incentives and
the potential impact of the different proposed forms of regulation, we analyze whether risk
taking incentives are associated with the quality of corporate governance or with the use of
certain compensation vehicles. If we measure the quality of corporate governance using standard
governance measures, which aim to capture managerial entrenchment or the severity of the agency
problem between shareholders and managers (such as board size or independence, Gompers
et al. (2003)’s governance index, or Bebchuk et al. (2009)’s entrenchment index), we find no
significant relation between these measures and either bank failure or risk taking incentives.
Therefore, our results do not lend support to the idea that improving shareholders’ ability to
monitor and discipline managers would have substantially affected bank risk. In contrast, we
propose a measure of shareholders’ incentives to take on risk (which we label, shareholder asset
volatility vega or SAVV) and find that it has a very strong and positive correlation with our
incentive measures. Therefore, our results suggest that, if anything, CEOs’ risk taking incentives
were too well aligned with those of shareholders.
Regarding the relation between compensation structure, risk taking incentives, and bank risk we
do find that risk taking incentives are related to the level of total pay, yet we fail to find any
significant relation between different measures of compensation structure, which capture the
importance of equity or stock option compensation or the use of termination payments, and
either incentives or bank failure. Thus, our findings indicate that limiting particular forms of
compensation may not be the most effective way of curbing risk taking incentives.
In the wake of the financial crisis, several articles have analyzed the relation between the
compensation of bank CEOs and risk taking.5 Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) analyze the relation
between the stock returns of a sample of large U.S. banks in the period from July 2007 to
December 2008 and two measures of incentives computed in 2006: pay-performance sensitivity
(delta) and option vega (which they label equity risk). They find that, whereas there is a negative
relation between stock returns during the crisis and delta, there is no significant relation between
stock returns and option vega. DeYoung et al. (2013) analyze the relation between both risk
(measured as the standard deviation of returns, the stock’s beta, or the stock’s idiosyncratic risk)
and business policies likely to be related to bank risk (such as noninterest income, commercial
loans, or private MBS holdings) and one-year lagged CEO incentives (measured by delta and
option vega). In contrast to Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), DeYoung et al. (2013) do find
3See, e.g., the SEC Chairman’s speech at the Transatlantic Corporate Governance Dialogue 2009 Conference
(Shapiro (Shapiro)).
4For example, firms receiving TARP funds were not allowed to pay golden parachutes and could not pay bonuses
unless they had the form of restricted stock. Although caps on compensation initially proposed by the Treasury
in February 2009 were later lifted, stringent limits on the tax deductibility of executive compensation were
maintained. A starker example is the European Union’s Capital Requirements Directive IV, which, among
other things, establishes that the ratio of variable compensation to fixed compensation cannot be, generally,
greater than one (and under no circumstances greater than two).
5There are few earlier studies of these relation, notably Houston and James (1995) and John and Qian (2003).
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a relation between option vega and both bank risk and bank policies for a sample of U.S.
commercial banks in the period from 1995 to 2006. Cheng et al. (2013) propose a simple
principal-agent model that yields the result that inherent firm riskiness may be unrelated to
CEOs’ pay-performance sensitivity and, at the same time, positively related to excess CEO
pay. They test empirically the model’s predictions by analyzing the relation between lagged
measures of risk (especially, the volatility of stock returns and the stock’s beta), which aim to
capture banks’ inherent riskiness, managerial stock ownership and excess pay in a sample of
large U.S. financial institutions. They find that whereas there is no significant relation between
risk and managerial ownership, there exists a positive relation between risk and excess pay.
They also find no significant relation between a series of governance variables (governance index,
entrenchment index, board independence) and either pay or risk. In the paper most closely
related to ours, Chesney et al. (2012) propose AVV as a measure of risk taking incentives for
levered firms and, for a sample of large U.S. banks, find evidence generally consistent with
a positive relation between AVV in the year prior to the crisis and bank write-downs (which
they use as an ex post measure of risk) during the crisis. They also fail to find any significant
relation between governance variables and write downs. Gande and Kalpathy (2012) use a
form of government assistance to banks (the extent of U.S. Federal Reserve emergency loans
provided to banks) as an ex post measure of bank risk. In their sample, option vega before the
crisis is positively associated with the extent of Federal assistance. John et al. (2010) study the
relation between the pay-performance sensitivity of bank CEOs, leverage, and several measures
of outside monitoring and find that pay-performance sensitivity is positively associated with
outside monitoring and negatively associated with bank leverage. Finally, Bebchuk and Spamann
(2010) and Bebchuk et al. (2010) analyze case studies of executive compensation at large U.S.
financial institutions and propose compensation reforms.6
Our article contributes to the rapidly growing literature analyzing executive compensation and
risk taking in banks in several ways. First, we propose an ex post measure of bank risk, bank
failure during the crisis, that aims to capture the full extent of bank risk taking prior to the crisis.
Second, we use measures of risk taking incentives (both Chesney et al. (2012)’s AVV and the
reduced form LD, which we propose here) that better capture the risk taking incentives generated
by CEOs’ portfolios of stock and stock options. Third, we propose a measure of shareholder
incentives to take on risk and analyze its relation with CEO risk taking incentives. Finally, we
investigate whether risk taking incentives can be attributed to particular compensation practices,
such as the use of termination incentives, or compensation structures, an issue that is relevant
for the potential regulation of the compensation of bank executives.
4.1 Sample selection
To select our sample of financial institutions, we first select all firms with 4-digit SIC codes
between 6000 and 6300 covered by the compensation database Execucomp and whose CEO is
identified in this database in year 2006. Of the 167 firms so selected, we keep all firms with
SIC codes 6020 (Commercial Banks), 6035 (Savings Institutions, Federally Chartered), and 6036
(Savings Institutions, Not Federally Chartered)—a total of 114 firms—and we exclude firms
with SIC codes 6111 (Federal Credit Agencies) and 6282 (Investment Advice). To determine
the inclusion of the 41 firms in the remaining SIC codes, we search the National Information
Center of the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) to verify each firm’s
6Laeven and Levine (2009) and Erkens et al. (2012) also analyze the relation between bank governance and bank
risk for international samples of large financial institutions.
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institution type in year 2006.7 We keep a firm in the sample firm if it is identified as any type of
regulated institution.8 We also keep in the sample those firms listed as primary dealers by the
New York FED.9 This process yields a base sample of 130 firms in 2006, from which we drop
five firms because there is not enough information about them for the analysis.10 Therefore, our
final sample has 125 firms. However, for some firms there is not enough information to compute
all variables of interest, so the final number of firms that we use in the analysis depends on
the data requirements of each specification. For transparency, in Table 4.1 we report our final
sample.11 In Section 4.8, we also check the robustness of our results to different sample selection
criteria.
Since we obtain compensation data from Execucomp, our sample is composed of relatively large
publicly traded financial institutions. The sample contains all large bank and financial holding
companies whose main activity is commercial banking, from banks with national presence (such
as Bank of America or Wells Fargo) to regional banks (Fifth Third Bancorp., National City
Corp. or Regions Financial Corp.) or banks operating mainly in one or two states (such as
Anchor Bancorp Wisconsin Inc. or Tompkins Financial Corp.). The sample also contains the
five large investment banks (Bear Sterns, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and
Morgan Stanley) and several holding companies (such as American Express Co. and Charles
Schwab) that have bank subsidiaries and are federally regulated.
We obtain accounting information from Compustat Fundamentals. Panel A in Table 4.3 displays
several summary statistics of the firms in our sample, whereas Panel B displays the same
statistics for the universe of firms in Compustat with SIC codes between 6000 and 6050. If one
compares the two tables, one can indeed observe that the financial institutions in our sample are
significantly larger, irrespectively of whether size is measured by market capitalization or total
assets. In our sample, the average market capitalization is $466 billion (median $36.7 billion)
and the average total asset value is $106.8 billion (median $11.2 billion). The same values in the
Compustat universe of banks are $113.2 billion (median $2.2 billion) and $41.4 billion (median
$1 billion), respectively. The financial institutions in the sample appear as well to have a lower
leverage and higher ROA than the Compustat universe of banks.
4.2 Risk and bank failure
Our measure of risk taking in the years preceding the crisis is the occurrence of bank failure
during the crisis period. Because of the potentially systemic importance of many of the banks in
our sample, regulators may be expected to intervene to bail out a bank at risk of insolvency
or to encourage sound banks to acquire the financially distressed banks so as to avoid actual
7These firms have SIC codes: 6099 (Functions Rel. To Dep. Bkg.), 6141 (Personal Credit Institutions), 6153
(Short-Term Business Credit), 6159 (Misc Business Credit Instn), 6162 (Mortgage Bankers & Loan Corr), 6172
(Finance Lessors), 6199 (Finance Services), 6200 (Security & Commodity Brokers), 6211 (Security Brokers &
Dealers). We access the National Information Center of the FFIEC at http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/
nicweb/SearchForm.aspx.
8The classes of regulated institutions are: financial holding company, bank holding company, savings and loans
holding company, federal savings bank, national bank, state member bank, FDIC-insured non-member bank,
federal savings association.
9http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2006/an060915p.html
10We drop Center Financial Corp., with SIC 6036, because it does not match with Compustat Fundamentals.
We drop Raymond James Financial Corp., Bankunited Financial Corp., Glacier Bancorp Inc., and Guaranty
Financial Group Inc. because there is not enough information to compute our measures of risk taking incentives.
11Our sample selection procedure is like the one employed by Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) except that we exclude
Federal Credit Agencies, so, for example, Fannie Mae is not in our sample.
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default. Identifying bank failure with default would, thus, not pick up the instances of financial
distress in which the regulators’ intervention averts bank failure. Therefore, even in the midst of
a financial crisis, outright default of large financial institutions may be too rare (and it is indeed
rare in the 2007-2010 period) to allow for a precise estimation of the coefficients of interest.
Moreover, using default as a measure of failure could bias the estimates if different banks have
different probabilities of being bailed out. In particular, the CEOs of those banks more likely to
be bailed out if they are at risk of insolvency may take on greater risk in the anticipation of a
bailout. If regulators would not allow these banks to default, one would incorrectly attribute a
low level of risk taking to banks with a large risk exposure. Therefore, we define bank failure so
as to encompass both institutions that default and those that are acquired by other financial
institutions with the support or intervention of regulators.
We define as failed a financial institution that ceases operations as an individual entity during
the financial crisis because of financial distress. To date the crisis, we follow the time-lines
provided by the New York Fed (which dates the beginning of the “financial turmoil” in June
2007, when Bear Stearns pledged $3.2 billion to aid one of its hedge funds)12 and the Saint
Louis Fed (which dates the beginning of the financial crisis in February 2007, coinciding with
Freddie Mac’s announcement that it would no longer buy the riskiest subprime mortgages and
mortgage-related securities)13 and define 2007 to be the first year of the financial crisis.
To determine the firms that cease operations we first identify which firms are delisted in the
period 2007-2010 by analyzing the series of monthly returns in the CRSP stock database.14
This process yields a set of 33 delisted firms. However, firms may delist for reasons other than
bankruptcy or financial distress. For example, firms may go private, merge, or be acquired for
strategic reasons even if they are sound. To determine whether firms were delisted because of
financial distress, we take the following steps:
1. We check the FDIC webpage for information about banks that become inactive during
the crisis period.15 However, the FDIC provides information about active and inactive
banks but not holding companies (which are our unit of observation). Therefore, we first
identify the main banking subsidiary of each holding company from the organization’s
structure provided by the FFIEC. The FDIC indicates if a bank is inactive because it was
put into receivership, or because it was merged (with or without financial assistance by
the regulator). If the FDIC indicates that the firm was closed or there was a merger with
financial assistance by the FED or the FDIC we consider the firm failed. We unambiguously
identify 9 firms as failed in this step.
2. Merger discount. Following the procedure used by Fahlenbrach et al. (2012), we use the
SDC Platinum database to identify mergers and check whether firms not classified as failed
in the previous steps are acquired with a discount in the crisis period. In particular, we
identify three firms acquired with significant discounts (with 1-day, 1-week and 1-month
negative premiums of above 30%). We also consider as failed a firm (Mellon) acquired with
a one-day small discount of 6% as well as a firm (Countrywide) that is actually acquired
with a 1-day positive premium of 40%, but with 1-week and 1-month discounts of 18 and
28%, respectively.
3. For those delisted firms that we do not classify as failed in the previous steps, we search
the PROQUEST database using the company name and the following words as keywords:
12http://www.ny.frb.org/research/global_economy/Crisis_Timeline.pdf (last accessed on October 17,
2013).
13http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/index.cfm?p=timeline (last accessed on October 17, 2013).
14More precisely, we merge the sample with CRSP monthly stock returns and we identify the last available month
of returns provided for each PERMCO.
15http://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/main.asp.
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failed, bankrupt, intervened, closed. The PROQUEST search identifies one firm as failed
(Lehman Brothers).
4. We finally perform the same search on the internet (using standard search engines). This
broader internet search indicates that one firm is acquired with substantial regulatory
pressure (Merrill Lynch), another one with TARP aid given to the acquiring institution
(National City Corp), and another one after a large amount of TARP bailout money is
given to the target institution (Provident Bankshares).16
The procedure identifies 21 firms in the sample as failed, but we delete two of these firms
(Bankunited Financial Corp. and Guaranty Financial Group Inc.) from the sample because we
do not have enough data about them to estimate risk taking incentives. Therefore, the final
number of failed firms is 19. For transparency, we provide the list of failed firms as well as the
reason why they are identified as such in Table 4.2. Since the last three steps involve some
judgment on our part, in Section 4.8 we consider the robustness of our results to alternative
classifications of the borderline cases.
Panel C in Table 4.3 displays the characteristics (measured in 2006) of failed and surviving banks.
The most significant difference between failed and surviving banks is their leverage: In 2006,
the banks that eventually failed during the crisis had a leverage about 40% larger than that of
the banks that would survive the crisis. Failed banks are also larger on average than surviving
banks, but the difference in means is not statistically significant at conventional levels (although
a non-parametric test of the difference in medians rejects the null of equality of medians at the
10% level).17 Although failed banks had a higher average ROA in 2006, one cannot reject the
hypothesis that the two groups of banks came from populations with the same median.
As discussed in the introduction, using bank failure as a measure of risk helps us avoid some of
the key limitations of alternative risk measures. However, bank failure is not without problems.
First, as an ex post measure of realized risk, bank failure likely contains a significant amount
of measurement error: Whether a bank fails is determined not only by ex ante decisions that
determine the level of risk, but also by luck. This measurement error will push up the standard
error of our estimates. Second, our measure of bank risk captures the exposure to risks that
have negative realizations during the financial crisis. It is possible that those banks more likely
to fail conditionally on the events that led to the financial crisis were not riskier ex ante. Third,
with our definition of failure we capture instances in which a firm’s financial condition is so weak
that it is forced to disappear as an independent entity (either because of bankruptcy or forced
merger). However, we may consider as healthy systemically important financial institutions that
managed to survive only thanks to massive public aid (such as Citigroup or Bank of America).
Since this misclassification may bias our results, in Section 4.8 we evaluate the robustness of the
results to classifying as failed (or excluding from the sample) some institutions that survived as
separate entities only because they receive extremely large amounts of public funding. Finally,
16In the case of Merrill Lynch, there were sustained rumors that the Federal Reserve had pressured Bank of
America to carry out the acquisition and Congressional hearings were held in 2009 to determine, among
other things, whether the Government or the Federal Reserve had pressured or threatened Bank of America’s
management to acquire Merrill Lynch (see, e.g., Story and Becker (2009)). National City Corp was acquired
after being one of the few qualified banks that was denied TARP help. On the contrary, the acquirer (PNC)
received TARP money a few weeks before the purchase of National City was announced. We interpret this as
a passive way of regulators to support the acquisition of National City by PNC Financial. Finally, Provident
Bankshares Corp received $151,500,000 from TARP to prop up capital on Nov. 14, 2008. One month later the
purchase by M&T was announced.
17Throughout the article, we define size in terms of total assets. Defining size in terms of market capitalization
does not alter the results. Similarly, we follow Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) and define leverage as the quasi-market
value of leverage, computed as the ratio of book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value
of equity divided by market value of equity.
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as a binary variable, our measure is coarse, since it makes no distinctions within the groups of
failed or surviving banks.
4.3 Risk taking incentives measures
Executive stock options are call options on the firm’s stock. Since the value of a call option
increases with the volatility of the underlying stock, the most common measure of risk taking
incentives in the recent literature on executive compensation is the option vega of the executive’s
wealth (Guay, 1999). The option vega approximates the change in a CEO’s wealth that would
follow from a 0.01 change in the volatility of the returns of the stock of the CEO’s firm. In the
baseline case in which the CEO holds nO identical options, the CEO’s option vega νO is:
νO = nO
dOV
dσS
0.01, (4.1)
where OV is the option’s value and σS the volatility of the stock’s returns. In applications, OV
is computed as the Black-Scholes value of the option adjusted by dividends (Black and Scholes,
1973; Merton, 1973). If the CEO holds different option grants, then:
νO =
∑
i
nO,i
dOVi
dσS
0.01, (4.2)
where the index i identifies each option grant.
However, because of limited liability, the equity value of a levered firm also increases with the
volatility of stock returns. In fact, equity can be understood as a call option on the firm’s assets
(Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton, 1973), so that equity value is increasing in the volatility of
the firm’s assets. Guay (1999) proposes a method to estimate the derivative of equity value
with respect to the volatility of stock returns ( dSdσS ). With this method, he estimates the
sensitivity of CEO’s stock portfolio to the volatility of stock returns for a sample of US CEOs
in 1993 and finds that it is generally very small, corresponding to a generally small leverage
in his sample.18 Therefore, most papers analyzing CEOs’ risk taking incentives measure these
incentives simply by means of option vega (e.g., Coles et al. (2006)). Using this measure of risk
taking incentives, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) find that there is no statistically significant
relation between risk taking incentives and bank risk (measured by banks’ buy-and-hold returns
during the financial crisis). However, banks are highly levered institutions. Therefore, whereas
approximating risk taking incentives with option vega may be appropriate for samples of healthy
non-financial institutions, it is an open question whether the approximation is valid for financial
institutions.19
Chesney et al. (2012) propose a measure of CEO risk taking incentives that incorporates explicitly
the sensitivity of equity value to firm risk (for an alternative measure, see Anderson and Core,
2013). In the baseline case in which the CEO holds identical options, their measure of risk taking
incentives (which they label Asset Volatility Vega or AVV) is:
AV V = nO
dOV
dσv
0.01 + nS
dS
dσv
0.01, (4.3)
18The median sensitivity estimated by Guay (1999) is very small. However, Guay reports that it is substantial for
a small number of CEOs.
19It is worth noting that, as discussed by Chesney et al. (2012), the Black-Scholes option vega may also be a poor
approximation to a firm’s option vega if the firm is highly levered.
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where the derivatives are with respect to the volatility of firm value, σv (and not of stock returns).
Chesney et al. (2012) estimate both this measure and option vega for a sample of US bank CEOs
and find that option vega is substantial (the average νO is $301,000) and larger than the one
estimated in other studies for CEOs of non-financial firms. However, average AVV is ten times
larger and the correlation between the two incentive measures is far from 1. Chesney et al.’s
results thus suggest that the risk incentives measured by AVV are distinct (and stronger, in
the case of bank CEOs) from those measured by option vega. In this paper, we follow Chesney
et al. (2012) and use AVV as a measure of incentives. In Appendix 4.10.1, we summarize how
we compute AVV, but we refer to the article by Chesney et al. (2012) for the details.
Measures such as option vega or AVV have the advantage (with respect to model-free measures
such as, for example, the proportion of stock options in the CEO’s portfolio) that they have a
clear economic interpretation. However, the value of these measures may be highly dependent on
the accuracy of the valuation model used to compute the derivatives as well as of the numerous
approximations that are made when estimating the model’s parameters. In this respect, the
record of contingent claims models, such as the one used to compute AVV, to value corporate
liabilities or predict financial distress is mixed at best (see, e.g., Bharath and Shumway (2008) or
Campbell et al. (2011)). The problem is, arguably, more acute when these models are applied to
the valuation of executive stock options, because some of the models’ key assumptions—notably
the ability to hedge the option—do not hold if applied to obtain the value of employee stock
options for undiversified executives (Lambert et al. (1991), Carpenter (2000), Hall and Murphy
(2002), Ingersoll (2006)). Moreover, the incentive measures are highly nonlinear functions of
the parameters, making interpretation complicated in the presence of model misspecification.
Therefore, to help interpret our results we also compute a simple reduced-form measure of risk
taking incentives, which we label leveraged-delta (LD) and define as:
LD = Δ × leverage, (4.4)
where Δ is defined, as it is the norm in the literature on executive compensation, as the
approximate change in CEO wealth associated with a 1% change in the stock price.20 Our
definition of LD aims to capture that, on the one hand, the increase in equity value generated
by an increase in firm volatility can be expected to be increasing in the firm’s leverage. On the
other hand, the value to an executive of an increase in equity value will be increasing in the
executive’s exposure to the firm’s equity (as measured by Δ). Since LD cannot be interpreted
meaningfully as a change in the CEO’s wealth, for ease of interpretation we normalize it by
dividing it over the sample standard deviation. Thus, one can interpret regression coefficients on
LD as the impact of a change of one standard deviation in LD.
It is important to note that because of the assumptions made to compute AVV and because
of the nature of LD as a simple yet crude approximation to the potential benefits stemming
from increasing firm risk, both measures are likely to be quite noisy approximations to the true
risk taking incentives implied by CEOs holdings of their firm’s equity. Therefore, even if the
measurement error is unrelated to the underlying incentives, the coefficients on the risk taking
incentives measures will tend to be biased towards zero because of the attenuation bias due to
measurement error. There may also be additional unmeasured sources of risk taking incentives,
such as those stemming from CEOs’ holdings of other financial assets (which may allow them to
hedge the risk of their holdings of the firm’s stock or options), dynamic incentives stemming from
the relation between bank performance and future compensation, or, importantly, incentives
generated by the threat of replacement, which we discuss further in Section 4.5.
20As it is usual in the executive compensation literature, we measure the sensitivity of option value to a change
in the stock price as the derivative of the Black-Scholes value of the option with respect to the stock’s price
times a 1% change in the stock price (see the appendix). We note that, as a result of applying the standard
Black and Scholes’ model to obtain the delta of stock options, the LD measure is not fully “model-free.”
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Before analyzing the relation between risk taking incentives and bank failure, it is important to
evaluate the strength of those incentives and whether there is substantial variation in incentive
strength among the financial institutions in the sample. Panel A in Table 4.4 provides descriptive
statistics of the incentive measures measured in year 2006.21 The incentives to take risk as
measured by option vega are substantial: a 0.01 change in the standard deviation of bank stock
returns leads, on average, to an increase of $323,192 in CEO wealth (about 5% of the average
total pay).22 However, the strength of incentives as measured by AVV is much greater: a 0.01
change in the standard deviation of bank asset returns leads, on average, to an increase of $2.65
million in CEO wealth (about 40% of the average yearly total pay).23 The incentive measures
also display substantial dispersion, with standard deviations at least twice as large as the mean.
A 0.01 change in the standard deviation of bank asset returns would increase the wealth of the
CEO at the 10th percentile of the distribution of AVV by a mere $19,200. The same change
in asset return volatility would increase the wealth of the CEO at the 90th percentile of the
distribution of AVV by $5.2 million. The distribution of the incentive measures also exhibits
right skewness, with a lower bound at zero, some very high values, and with means substantially
higher than the median.
Although the magnitude of option vega is much smaller than that of AVV, if the two variables
were highly positively correlated we might expect a similar impact on the probability of bank
failure. However, we show in Panel B of Table 4.4 that the correlation between vega and
AVV is just 0.16 and the correlation between option vega and LD is 0.26. Therefore, whereas
there is a positive correlation between option vega and our incentive measures, they exhibit
different distributions. At the same time, we would be concerned if AVV and LD exhibited
a low correlation. On the contrary, Table 4.4 shows that the simple correlation coefficient
between these two variables is 0.84, which strengthens our confidence that the two variables are
meaningful measures of risk taking incentives.
In Table 4.4 we also report summary statistics for delta, which is commonly used as a measure
of the CEO’s incentives to increase shareholder value and which, as we discuss in Section 4.5,
has also been used to account for risk taking incentives. Delta has a positive correlation with all
the risk taking incentives measures and a very strong one with LD, which indicates that the
variation of the latter measure is not due mainly to differences in leverage.
21We note that we compute the incentive measures differently for seven firms because of data availability or
management changes. In three firms (First Niagara, Goldman Sachs, and UnionBanCal Corporation), the
CEO retires in 2006. Since retirement years are highly atypical, for these firms we compute the incentive
measures in year 2005. Starting December 15, 2006, SEC disclosure rules require firms to report disaggregated
information of option grants awarded to CEOs. This disaggregated information allows us to compute the
risk incentive measures directly as described in the Appendix. However, a few firms in our sample had an
earlier fiscal year end, so that they did not have to comply with the new disclosure requirement until the next
fiscal year (2007). For such firms (Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley, and
Washington Federal Savings) we use the one year approximation technique described in Core and Guay (2002).
22Total pay includes salary, cash bonuses, the value of stock and option grants, and the value of other compensation,
such as pension contributions.
23We note that the distributions of option vega and AVV are very similar to the ones reported by Chesney et al.
(2012) and Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) (the latter only compute option vega).
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4.4 Risk taking incentives and failure
4.4.1 Empirical strategy
We seek to estimate the relation between risk taking incentives and bank failure during the
financial crisis. Whereas, as described in Section 4.2, we follow the Fed in dating the financial
crisis, a key element in our empirical strategy is the choice of the period in which we measure
incentives. This choice is determined by several requirements. We require the period to be
sufficiently close to the crisis to be able to potentially attribute to the compensation incentives
in the measurement period an impact over the probability of failure during the crisis. Choosing
a year such as 2000 would not satisfy this requirement. We also require that the incentive
measurement period not be a crisis year for two reasons. First, to the extent that bank failure
was motivated to a large extent by actions taken by banks in the years prior to the crisis, the
measurement of incentives would take place after the actions they were supposed to incentivize.
Second, we want to avoid reverse causality: Measuring incentives during the crisis would capture
the reaction of CEOs’ compensation packages to negative realizations of uncertainty during
the crisis. To meet the above criteria and maximize the availability, quality, and intertemporal
comparability of the data, we measure incentives in year 2006, after the passage of a new set of
compensation disclosure requirements by the SEC.24 Moreover, other studies have used 2006 as
their measurement period (e.g., Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), Chesney et al. (2012)), which
makes it easier to compare our results with theirs.
Although we have a panel with firm and compensation data, by construction we have only a
single cross section of the dependent variable (failure). Therefore, our empirical specifications are
cross section regressions with failure during the crisis as the dependent variable and incentives
measured in 2006 as the explanatory variable of interest. We note that the use of bank failure
during the financial crisis as the dependent variable rules out the use of fixed effect estimation
to control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity among financial institutions.
Since we would like to capture the potential effect of risk taking incentives on the likelihood of
failure, we cannot include as controls in our regressions measures of risk taking that could be the
result of those incentives. To make this point clear, suppose that the credit risk of a bank’s loan
portfolio were the only variable determining bank risk. In this case, even if compensation fully
determined CEOs’ incentives to take risk (through the choice of riskiness of the loan portfolio),
we would observe no effect of compensation on bank risk if we controlled for the credit risk
of the loan portfolio in our regressions. In Section 4.5, we, nonetheless investigate the effect
of including proxies for bank risk in the estimating equations. The small size of our sample
significantly limits the power of the tests and further constrains our choice of control variables
in the estimating equations. Thus, we include control variables only if there are a priori reasons
to expect them to be related to both risk taking incentives and the probability of bank failure.
In Section 4.5 we discuss our choice of regressors in the multivariate specifications. Here we
emphasize that the goal of our analysis is not to accurately predict bank failure but to estimate
the relation between pre-crisis incentives and bank failure during the crisis.
24Before 2006, the information on pension benefits and termination payments is very limited. The information
provided regarding executive stock options also changes in 2006.
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Our main specification throughout the paper is the linear probability model:
fi = α + βwi,2006 + xi,tγ + εi, (4.5)
where w is the measure of risk taking incentives and xi,t is a vector of controls measured in year t
(to avoid reverse causality concerns, t is set to 2003 for some variables). Linear probability models
have the advantage of easy interpretability, yet are necessarily misspecified because they do not
restrict probabilities to lie between zero and one. The small size of our sample, however, makes
estimation of nonlinear models (such as probit or logit models) highly imprecise.25 Therefore,
we focus on the results from linear probability models, although in Section 4.8 we also evaluate
the robustness of our results to both non-linear transformations of the incentive measures and
non-linear specifications of the estimating equation.
4.4.2 Univariate results
As a first step to measuring the relation between risk taking incentives and bank failure, we
compare the means and medians of the incentive measures in the subsamples of failed and
surviving financial institutions. The results, which we display in Panel C of Table 4.4, show that
failed and surviving banks differ greatly in their risk taking incentives as measured by AVV
and LD. Thus, the mean AVV (leveraged delta) among failed banks is about 8 times (almost 4
times) larger than among surviving banks and the difference is statistically significant at the 1%
level. At the same time, although failed banks exhibit a higher option vega, the difference in
mean option vega between failed and surviving banks is smaller and not statistically significant
at the 10% significance level. We obtain similar results when we compare the medians of the two
subsamples, which suggests that the difference between the subsamples is not driven by extreme
values. Therefore, the comparison of the subsamples of failed and surviving banks shows that
the measure of risk taking incentives matters: Whereas failed banks have substantially higher
risk taking incentives as measured by AVV or LD, the difference is small and not statistically
significant if measured by option vega.
In Table 4.5 we report estimated coefficients of the simple linear probability model (4.5), in
which the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the bank failed during
the crisis years and 0 otherwise and the single independent variable is a measure of risk taking
incentives. The results show that a change of AVV of $1 million increases the probability of
failure by about one percentage point and the estimated coefficient is statistically significant at
the 1% level.26 To better understand the magnitude of this estimated coefficient, a one standard
deviation (10.38, see Table 4.3) increase in AVV would increase the probability of failure by
0.11 (11 percentage points). In turn, increasing AVV from its median to the 90th percentile
would increase the probability of failure by 0.054. The results are very similar for LD, with
an estimated coefficient that is statistically significant and of a similar magnitude than the
one obtained for AVV: A one standard deviation change in LD is associated with about a 0.10
increase in the probability of failure. However, increasing leveraged delta from its median to
the 90th percentile would increase the probability of failure by 0.09. Therefore, increases in risk
taking incentives, when measured either by AVV or LD, are associated with a statistically and
economically significant change in the probability of failure.
25The small sample size also recommends against alternative specifications such as duration models.
26Unless otherwise noted, all standard errors are robust. Using classical OLS standard errors does not diminish
the statistical significance of the results.
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If we measure incentives by means of option vega, however, the estimated coefficient is smaller (a
one standard deviation change in option vega is associated with a 0.03 increase in the probability
of failure) and not statistically significant at conventional significance levels. Therefore, with a
different risk measure and a somewhat different sample, our results replicate those of Fahlenbrach
and Stulz (2011), who find no statistically significant relation between option vega and bank risk
taking. However, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) do find a positive and statistically significant
coefficient for delta. Given that there is a strong and positive correlation between delta and
AVV, their results are not surprising in the light of ours and can be interpreted as capturing the
risk incentives embedded in delta. We also estimate a positive coefficient for delta, bur it is not
statistically significant at conventional significance levels. Therefore, it appears that it is the
interaction of delta with leverage, not delta alone, what is is associated with bank failure. In
Section 4.5 we further explore the role of delta in explaining our results.
Our univariate results are consistent with the existence of an effect of CEO compensation on
bank risk. However, we do not have a source of exogenous variation in CEO compensation to
identify such causal effect. Therefore, there are obviously alternative explanations for the results.
In particular, risk taking incentives may be correlated with bank or CEO characteristics that
either make banks inherently more risky or provide CEOs alternative incentives to take on risk.
In the next section, we evaluate the plausibility of several possible explanations of the univariate
results.
4.5 Alternative explanations
4.5.1 Other sources of incentives
In our sample, the risk taking incentives generated by CEOs’ holdings of their company stock
and stock options (as measured by AVV) are very strong. However, CEOs’ motivation to take
on risk may not be determined primarily by these incentives and the positive relation between
our incentive measures and the probability of failure could be due to the correlation between
these incentive measures and other, more relevant, determinants of bank risk or CEOs’ risk
taking choices.
First, the implicit incentives created by the threat of termination could be more powerful in
determining CEOs’ risk choices than concerns about the sensitivity of current wealth to firm
risk. These implicit incentives will arise if banks pay CEOs more than their reservation value
and bank risk affects the probability of termination (as in standard efficiency wage models).
Whether the threat of termination provides incentives to increase or decrease risk will hinge on
the determinants of CEO replacement. If CEOs are replaced only when firm performance is
dismal, then the threat of termination may, in general, provide incentives to reduce risk, since
CEOs will seek to lower the probability of negative tail risk (see, e.g., Espen Eckbo and Thorburn
(2003)). On the other hand, if continuation as CEO requires being at the top of the distribution
of performance among banks, then the threat of termination may provide incentives for taking
on risk, since moderately poor performance would be as bad as extremely poor performance,
whereas the CEO would benefit from very strong performance. In the former case, our results
could be explained by the presence of weaker termination incentives in firms with higher AVV or
LD; in the latter case, by a positive correlation between AVV or LD and termination incentives.
In either case, if termination incentives dominated those provided by CEOs’ equity portfolios,
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controlling for termination incentives would significantly reduce the estimated coefficient for
AVV or LD. Unfortunately, measuring the sign of the effect of termination incentives on risk
taking and the strength of these incentives at each firm in our sample is beyond the scope of
this paper. However, termination incentives are, other things equal, likely to be stronger for
CEOs with a higher total pay (to the extent that at least part of the pay premium reflects
quasirents and not merely compensation for unobserved general skills that would also increase
their reservation value), and for younger CEOs, since the number of periods in which these
CEOs may earn rents if they are not replaced is higher. Therefore, including total pay and CEO
age in the estimating equation is likely to capture in part the effect of termination incentives.
Golden parachutes (which are termination payments associated with a change in control of the
firm, such as a takeover or a merger) or more general severance pay may also affect a CEO’s
termination incentives. Thus, other things equal, a CEO with generous termination payments
will suffer less if replaced, which would increase his or her risk taking incentives by reducing
the CEO’s downside risk. Therefore, if termination payments were positively related to our
incentive measures, they could explain our univariate results. Termination payments could also
be set in place in firms at which there is an inherently higher risk of CEO replacement or a
higher sensitivity of replacement decisions to firm performance. If either of these two factors is
associated both with firms’ inherent riskiness and with AVV or LD, this association could help
explain our univariate results.
Second, CEOs may have incentives to take or hedge risks to affect the perception that shareholders
of their firm or of other firms have of their ability, since this perception is likely to have a significant
impact on their career prospects (DeMarzo and Duffie (1995), Breeden and Viswanathan (1998)).
Again, the sign of the relation between the form or strength of these career concerns and CEOs
incentives to take risk is not a priori clear. However, there are several variables that are likely to
be correlated with a greater strength of those incentives. As in the case of termination incentives,
the career concerns of older CEOs are likely to be muted because more information about their
abilities has already accumulated and because there are fewer years left in which they may
benefit from a higher perceived ability.
Third, our incentive measures may not capture other incentives generated by CEOs’ equity and
option portfolios. In particular, a CEO’s delta may have an impact on risk taking even if the
manager’s compensation is linear in firm performance. On the one hand, as Coles et al. (2006)
discuss, if there were a positive correlation between project risk and net present value, a higher
delta, by increasing CEOs’ incentives to invest in positive NPV projects, could lead managers to
implement riskier projects. On the other hand, a higher delta implies that the manager’s wealth
depends more strongly on the firm’s risky returns. A risk averse manager who cannot hedge
this risk may, thus, respond to an increase in delta by reducing the volatility of firm returns. In
the first case, our results could be explained by a positive correlation between delta and our
measures of risk taking incentives. In the second case, by a negative correlation between delta
and our incentive measures.
Finally, our risk taking incentives variables measure the incentives to take risk stemming from
CEOs’ equity portfolios. However, as recently emphasized by Sundaram and Yermack (2007),
Edmans and Liu (2011), and Anderson and Core (2013), defined benefit pension plans and
deferred compensation are similar to debt. Such debt-like assets make the CEO akin to a
debtholder and, thus, provide incentives to take on (or limit) risk similar to those of debtholders.
Again, our univariate results could be due to the fact that equity incentives are negatively
correlated with debt-like incentives and the latter are the ones that truly motivate bank CEOs.
Since pension benefits are usually benchmarked with total pay and typically increase with the
tenure at the firm, we control for these incentives by including total pay and CEO tenure in the
regressions.
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4.5.2 Matching, risk, and compensation
Our univariate results could also be explained not by the correlation between our incentive
measures and other unmeasured incentives, but by the fact that high AVV contracts are the
least costly contracts to compensate the CEOs of inherently riskier firms or those CEOs who
are more likely to engage in risky practices.
Standard principal-agent models provide one explanation of why there may be a relation between
riskiness and incentives. In the standard models, in which the manager’s action affects expected
returns but not the volatility of returns, the performance sensitivity of pay should be, other
things equal, negatively correlated with firm riskiness.27 In this case, riskier firms would have
lower deltas, which does not seem to be the case in our sample. However, the applicability
of the results of the benchmark principal-agent model to bank CEOs is limited, since, among
other things, bank CEOs are likely to be able to substantially affect firm risk, not just expected
returns. Despite these potential limitations, Cheng et al. (2013) apply the standard model with
the twist that firms that are inherently riskier (which would make a low sensitivity of pay to
performance optimal) are also firms in which the marginal return of CEO effort is higher (which
would make a high pay-performance sensitivity optimal). In their model, the CEOs of firms with
different risk levels could, as a result, have similar similar pay-performance sensitivities. In turn,
these similar pay-performance sensitivities would imply that the CEOs of riskier firms would be
exposed to more risk. Since risk averse CEOs have to be compensated for bearing risk, total
pay would have to be higher for the CEOs of riskier firms. According to this theory, there is a
relation between compensation and firm risk, not because the former creates incentives for the
latter (in fact, in their model, the CEO’s actions do not affect firm risk) but because a firm’s
inherent riskiness determines the optimal CEO compensation. Cheng et al.’s model yields the
prediction that, as long as the relation between riskiness and the marginal productivity of CEO
effort is positive and strong enough, the CEOs of riskier firms will not have significantly lower
deltas and, as result, will have both higher AVV and LD (if risk is related to bank leverage) and
a higher total pay.
Alternatively, larger banks could be inherently risky (because of, say, their complexity) or more
likely to engage in certain risky practices (because, for example, the existence of a too-big-to-fail
implicit guarantee).28 At the same time, a well known regularity in executive compensation is
that CEO pay is increasing in firm size. To the extent that a larger total pay also implies a
larger equity pay, firm size could be, somewhat mechanically, positively correlated with our risk
taking measures. Controlling for pay in our regressions could control for the impact of size on
risk through this channel. However, we would still like to include size as a regressor to control
for potential effects of size on risk other than through total pay (and which could otherwise bias
the coefficients of total pay or the incentive measures). As we discuss in Section 4.4.1, however,
we do not want to include controls that may be themselves measures of bank riskiness. Since
risky expansion policies in the years prior to the crisis may have influenced bank size as of 2006
(Fahlenbrach et al. (2012)), we measure firm size with a lag of three years.
Finally, rather than there being firms with different inherent risk levels, there may be CEO char-
acteristics that determine CEOs’ risk choices and different compensation contracts may attract
27See Prendergast (2002) for a discussion of the standard models and the empirical evidence.
28Of course, size could have the opposite effect of reducing the probability of failure, if larger banks had more
skilled managers, if there were economies of scale in risk management, or if, despite the potentially perverse
incentives they create, the net effect of too-big-to-fail guarantees on the probability of failure were negative.
However, given the positive correlation between incentive measures and size, if the correlation between size
and failure probability had a negative sign, then it would not explain our univariate results.
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CEOs of different characteristics or be optimal given different risk-relevant CEO characteristics.
We do not have a measure for CEOs unobserved risk aversion. However, we can control for
variables that are likely to be correlated with CEOs risk perception or risk aversion. First, CEO
age may be correlated with CEOs risk aversion, CEOs’ estimates of the risk of different policies
(for example, older CEOs may have lived previous crises, like the savings and loans crisis, in
positions of responsibility),29 or their degree of overconfidence. Similarly, if CEOs’ risk aversion
decreases with their wealth, a measure of CEOs’ wealth may also allow us to partly control for
differences in risk aversion. Therefore, we also control for CEO wealth (other than the wealth in
the form of their own firm’s equity) in our regressions.
4.5.3 Measures of risk taking incentives or of risk?
As we discuss in Section 4.3, the incentive measures we use will generally be positively related
to firm leverage. At the same time, leverage may be interpreted as a measure of firm risk.
Therefore, an alternative explanation of our results could be that the incentive measures are not
measuring risk taking incentives but, instead, firm risk itself. In such a case, our results would
just imply that the value of some nonlinear increasing function of firm risk is associated with a
higher probability of failure.
To the extent that a higher risk of failure increases risk shifting incentives, distinguishing the
effect of an exogenous increase in firm risk from the effect of the increase in risk generated by
the stronger risk shifting incentives is not straightforward. However, as a crude way to evaluate
the possibility that our incentive measures simply measure bank leverage, one can control for
leverage in the regressions. If the relation between incentives and failure is due to the fact
that the former are simply a proxy for leverage, then controlling for leverage should make the
coefficients for incentives vanish. However, if the relation between leverage and the probability
of failure is nonlinear, the incentive measures could still be capturing the nonlinear effect of
leverage. To partly account for this possibility we also include leverage squared in the regressions.
However, as we discuss in Section 4.4.1, if CEOs have the ability to determine leverage and
leverage is an important determinant of risk, controlling for leverage could make the estimated
coefficient of incentives vanish, even if risk taking incentives fully determined leverage and, thus,
risk. The substantial correlation between leverage and incentives together with our small sample
size may also render the estimates less precise.
4.5.4 Results
Before we describe the multivariate regression results, we present in Table 4.6 several summary
statistics, as a way to evaluate the a priori plausibility of the different alternative explanations.
Panel A in Table 4.6 shows that average total compensation for the CEOs in the sample is $6.97
million (with a median value of $2.2 million) and there is substantial heterogeneity in pay levels
(with a standard deviation that is higher than the mean and with the CEO at the 90th percentile
earning 30 times more than the CEO at the 10th percentile). At the same time, all incentive
measures are positively correlated with total pay. Moreover, Panel B in Table 4.6 shows that
failed banks also exhibit a higher average total pay (almost three times as large) than surviving
ones. However, the difference in medians is negligible and the differences seem to be driven by
29See Malmendier and Nagel (2011) or Koudijs and Voth (2014).
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the top payers among failed banks.30 Therefore, total pay may be related to bank failure and,
at the same time, is positively related to the incentive measures. Therefore, an explanation
along the lines of the one proposed by Cheng et al. (2013) is a priori possible. If higher pay is
associated with larger losses upon forced replacement, and if the threat of replacement provided
stronger risk taking incentives, our results could also be explained by a positive correlation
between risk taking incentives stemming from the threat of replacement and the measures of risk
taking incentives. At the same time, Panel C in Table 4.6 shows that the correlation between
total pay in 2006 and firm size in 2003 is 0.77, the correlations between firm size in 2003 and
AVV and leveraged delta are, respectively, 0.32 and 0.41, and (as reported in Panel C of Table
4.3) failed banks are larger on average than surviving banks. Therefore, the explanation of our
results based on the relation between size and total pay, on the one hand, and a mechanical
relation between total pay and incentive measures, on the other, is also plausible.
Table 4.6 also shows that there is substantial variation in the use of termination payments.
First, of the 118 firms for which we have the necessary information, only 64 have contractually
determined severance pay and 81 have golden parachutes (although this does not mean that
these firms may not pay the CEO in case of replacement, as shown by Yermack (2006).) For
those firms with severance or golden parachutes, there is also significant variation in the value of
the termination payments. At the same time, termination payments are positively correlated
with the incentive measures and failed banks have higher termination payments (although the
differences are not statistically significant). Thus, there is room for explaining our univariate
results in terms of higher termination payments generating stronger risk taking incentives, or
being associated with a higher exogenous firm risk.
As Table 4.4 shows, delta has a positive (and very strong in the case of LD) correlation with the
risk taking incentive measures and seems to be higher in failed firms (although the difference in
means is not statistically significant). Thus, if a higher delta reduced CEOs’ incentives to take on
risk, including delta in the regression specification would strengthen our univariate results. On
the contrary, if a higher delta affected bank risk by providing CEOs stronger incentives to invest
in positive NPV projects, including delta in the regression could help explain the univariate
results.
CEO age is very weakly correlated with the incentive variables, and failed and surviving banks
do not seem to differ significantly in the age of their CEOs. Thus, differences in career concerns
or termination incentives stemming from differences in CEO age do not seem a likely candidate
to explain our results. Similarly, tenure has a very weak correlation with the incentive variables.
Further, total pay (which is likely to be positively correlated with the value of pension benefits)
is positively correlated with both a higher probability of failure and with the incentive measures.
Therefore, explanations of our results as stemming from the correlation between the incentive
measures and the debt-like incentives faced by CEOs do not seem very plausible. On the other
hand, even though CEOs’ non-firm wealth is strongly and positively correlated with the incentive
measures and is higher for the CEOs of failed banks (which could be associated with a smaller
risk aversion for these CEOs), the latter difference is not statistically significant.
Finally, regarding the explanations of our results based on the role of our incentive measures as
measures of risk, we find, as expected, that both AVV and LD have a strong positive correlation
with leverage. Moreover, leverage is clearly higher for failed banks than for surviving banks.
Therefore, this explanation deserves closer scrutiny.
In Table 4.7, we report the results of estimating our linear probability model including the
different control variables discussed above. Including total pay reduces in about 25% the
30The 90th percentile bank among failed institutions pays more than two times the amount paid by the 90th
percentile bank among surviving institutions.
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magnitude of the estimated coefficients. Whereas the change does not affect the statistical
significance of the AVV coefficient, the coefficient for LD is not statistically significant once total
pay is included. At the same time, the coefficient of total pay is positive and not statistically
significant when AVV is the incentive measure, and positive and marginally significant if the
incentive measure is LD. Therefore, our results lend some support to explanations of the relation
between the incentive measures and bank failure having to do with the need to compensate the
CEOs of riskier firms for their risk exposure (such as the explanation proposed by Cheng et al.
(2013)), or for the possibility that the threat of replacement may provide incentives for greater
risk taking. Given the relatively large correlation between risk taking incentives and total pay,
however, it is difficult to disentangle their effects with a sample the size of ours.
The effect of termination payments is ambiguous. Thus, although neither golden parachutes
nor severance pay are significantly associated with failure when we do not control for total
pay, they are statistically significant at conventional significance levels when all controls are
included. However, their coefficients have opposite signs (with severance pay being positively
and golden parachutes negatively associated with failure). These results could be explained by
the possibility that golden parachutes are higher in firms that are more likely to be takeover
targets. This larger probability of takeover, in turn, could provide incentives to CEOs to decrease
risk to avoid very weak performance, which could trigger a takeover attempt. However, the
relatively large correlations between termination incentives, the incentive variables, and total pay,
together with our small sample size, recommend caution when interpreting the results. Including
termination payments in the regressions has different effects depending on the incentive measure
used. The coefficient for AVV increases sixfold when we include termination payments and
remains highly statistically significant. In contrast, the point estimate of the coefficient for LD
shrinks marginally and is measured less precisely, so that it loses its statistical significance.
The impact of the inclusion of delta depends on the incentive measure used. If we measure
incentives by means of AVV, the coefficient for delta is negative, but small and not statistically
significant, and its inclusion does not affect the magnitude or statistical significance of the
coefficient for AVV. However, delta has a negative and both economically and statistically
significant relation with the probability of failure if we measure risk taking incentives by means
of LD. Further, including delta almost doubles the size of the LD coefficient, which remains
highly statistically significant. Therefore, our results are consistent with a negative effect of
delta on incentives in unlevered firms, and a positive and strong positive effect in highly levered
firms, such as the banks in the sample.31 Interestingly, if we include both delta and total pay
as regressors, the coefficient for LD and delta remain similar in size and highly statistically
significant, whereas the coefficient for total pay becomes smaller than the one reported in column
3 of panel B and loses its statistical significance.
The coefficients for the different CEO characteristics (age, tenure, non-firm wealth) are both
small (point estimates imply that a one standard deviation change in each of the variables leads
to changes in the probability of failure of around 0.02) and estimated very imprecisely, so that
no coefficient is statistically significant at conventional significance levels. Moreover, neither the
value nor the statistical significance of the coefficient of the incentive measure is affected by the
inclusion of these additional controls. Therefore, either these variables are very noisy proxies of
the variables of interest, or the factors they are proxying for do not play a first-order role in
explaining our results.
In column 9 of Panels A and B in Table 4.7, we display the results of estimating a regression
equation that includes the incentive measure, leverage, and leverage squared. The results show
31The estimated net effect of delta on the probability of failure is positive for all firms in our sample. We note
that including leverage as a regressor, together with LD and delta, does not change the results: the coefficient
for both delta (negative) and LD (positive) are statistically significant and of similar magnitude.
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that the relation between the probability of failure and AVV and LD is not simply due to the
positive correlation between these variables and leverage. Thus, either the relation between
leverage and the probability of failure is nonlinear in a way that is captured both by AVV and
LD, or the interaction between leverage and CEO compensation has a positive relation with risk
beyond the direct impact of leverage on risk.
In summary, the multivariate regression results having to do with total pay provide, at best,
weak support for the hypotheses that the threat of replacement provides incentives for risk
taking and that riskier firms compensate their CEOs for the additional risk through a higher
total pay. At the same time, controlling for variables that are likely to be correlated with riskier
firms or less risk averse CEOs or with different strengths of other incentives does not explain
away the association between incentive measures and bank failure. Further, this relation does
not seem to be a mere artifact of their correlation with bank leverage. Our results are, thus,
consistent with the existence of a causal effect of the risk taking incentives we measure on bank
risk. However, we do not have a credible source of exogenous variation in incentives in our sample
that would allow us to test this hypothesis. Therefore, there are at least two other explanations
of our results. The first one is that firms differ in their inherent riskiness, that differences in
riskiness are not captured by any of our controls, and that riskiness determines the optimal
compensation contract in such a way that the optimal compensation contracts of riskier firms
generate higher values of the incentive measures. The challenge with this explanation is to show
that riskier firms would like to compensate their CEOs in a manner that would lead to higher
values of AVV or LD. The second explanation is that our incentive measures are correlated with
unmeasured incentives not captured by the variables we use to proxy for those incentives. Again,
there remains the challenge to identify those incentives and explain why they are associated
with the risk taking incentive measures. To partly address these challenges and to shed light on
the determinants of risk taking incentives, in the next section we consider a set of explanations
having to do with firm governance.
4.6 Bank governance
The quality of a bank’s governance may determine the level and structure of CEO compensation.
At the same time, the strength of bank governance may also determine the CEO’s risk choices.
In particular, governance failures are commonly cited as a main cause of the 2007-2010 financial
crisis and a proposed alternative to limit bank risk is to improve the quality of the governance
of financial firms. In this section, we investigate the impact of bank governance on risk taking
and incentives.
According to managerial power theories of CEO pay, the CEOs of poorly governed banks are
likely to be paid more. To the extent that higher pay is not accompanied by a change in
compensation structure (in particular, with a reduction in the fraction of total pay that takes the
form of equity), the CEOs of poorly governed firms will have larger equity holdings of their own
firms and, thus, other things equal, stronger risk-taking incentives. Moreover, according to some
managerial power theories of CEO pay poorly governed firms may structure CEO compensation
so as to camouflage the level of that compensation (Bebchuk and Fried (2004)). In particular,
poorly governed firms may make greater use of equity compensation, especially of stock option
compensation, because these forms of compensation can be justified as providing incentives to
the manager and because the cost to the firm of these compensation vehicles may have been
easier to conceal or undervalue. Therefore, the risk taking incentives measures (which increase
with the size of equity holdings and with the use of stock options) may be higher for the CEOs of
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poorly governed firms. At the same time, the CEOs of poorly governed banks may make riskier
choices for reasons unrelated to the risk taking incentives captured by our incentive measures.
For example, entrenched CEOs may be less likely to be replaced if the bank performs poorly.
Therefore, these CEOs may not suffer much from downside risk and benefit as much as other
CEOs from upside risk, which would make risky strategies more attractive for more entrenched
CEOs. Worse governed firms may also have poorer risk management systems, which may allow
for the excessive accumulation of risk.32
To investigate the impact of bank governance on the probability of bank failure, we consider
several standard measures of the quality of corporate governance: board independence (measured
as the percentage of directors who are independent); board size (since larger boards have been
often described as less effective); the Governance Index (GI) of Gompers et al. (2003); and the
Entrenchment Index (EI) of Bebchuk et al. (2009). The GIM governance index and the EI
attempt to measure the degree of managerial entrenchment, with higher values of these variables
denoting greater managerial entrenchment. We compute board independence and board size
using information from RiskMetrics, BoardEx, and proxy statements. We obtain the GI index
from Andrew Metrick’s webpage,33 and the EI index from Lucian Bebchuk’s webpage.34
Table 4.8 displays summary statistics of the governance variables. The boards of the banks in
the sample are relatively large (which is consistent with the size and complexity of the banks
in the sample) and there is not a large heterogeneity in board independence. Otherwise, the
levels and variation in the governance indices are similar to those reported in previous articles
(Gompers et al. (2003), Bebchuk et al. (2009)).
We first check whether including standard governance measures in our regressions affects the size
or sign of the coefficients of the incentive measures. As we report in Table 4.9, the coefficients
of the incentive measures and their standard errors are largely unchanged with respect to
the benchmark specification with only firm size as control. Moreover, the size and statistical
significance of the coefficients of the governance variables are both small. Finally, the signs of
the estimated coefficients for the standard governance variables have no obvious interpretation.
For example, greater board independence is often argued to be a sign of good governance and
a large board size is argued to lead to worse board performance. However, the coefficient for
board independence is positive, indicating that greater board independence is associated with a
higher probability of bank failure. At the same time, the coefficients for the GI and EI are of
opposite signs. Therefore, standard measures of governance do not help explain the relation
between incentives and risk.
Although the above results show that, controlling for compensation incentives, worse bank
governance quality is not associated with a higher probability of failure, governance quality could
be responsible for firms’ risk choices if it determined the risk taking incentives embedded in CEO
pay. To evaluate this possibility, we regress our measures of incentives on different governance
variables. The results, reported in Table 4.9, show that only board size has a relation with
the incentive measures that is marginally statistically significant. Therefore, overall, standard
governance variables do not seem to be major determinants of risk taking incentives.
32We note that poor governance may also decrease firm risk. For example, less entrenched managers may need to
achieve stelar performance to keep their job (which would increase risk incentives), whereas more powerful
managers may be able to remain at their post with mediocre performance. To the extent that entrenched
managers earn greater rents, they may also be less inclined to follow policies that increase the probability
of default, since default (or regulator intervention to replace the management team) would imply the loss of
those rents. In any case, what matters for the argument is that governance may be associated with firm risk
through channels other than the incentives measured by AVV or leveraged delta.
33http://faculty.som.yale.edu/andrewmetrick/data.html.
34http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/data.shtml.
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As a further check, in Table 4.9 we report the estimated coefficients of simple regressions with
size and a governance measure as explanatory variables. The estimated coefficients are both
small (implying changes in the probability of failure associated with a one standard deviation
change in the governance variable of less than 3 percentage points) and not significantly different
from zero in any case. Therefore, standard measures of the quality of corporate governance
do not help explain either bank risk or CEOs’ risk taking incentives. Our results are in line
with the ones by Cheng et al. (2013) and Chesney et al. (2012), who find no discernible relation
between governance variables and bank risk or incentives.
All the above governance variables are meant to measure the severity of the agency problem
between shareholders and management. However, managers’ incentives to take on risk may
be determined, instead, by the incentives that shareholders themselves have to encourage risk
taking. Because of a combination of limited liability, very high leverage, and implicit government
guarantees, bank shareholders may have an incentive to take on risk at the expense of depositors
and debtholders. As we discuss in Section 4.3, equity can be interpreted as a call option on
the firm’s assets. Therefore, in the same way that we measure the CEO’s incentive to take on
risk, shareholders’ risk-shifting incentives may be measured by the shareholder returns from
increasing firm risk. Thus, we define Shareholder Asset Volatility Vega (SAV V ) as the return
on the firm’s stock associated with a 0.01 increase in the standard deviation of asset returns.
Thus, we define SAVV as:
SAV V = 1
S
dS
dσV
0.01. (4.6)
Because of the possibility that SAVV may measure actual risk levels as of 2006 instead of
risk-shifting incentives, we also measure it in 2003.
In stark contrast with the results regarding standard governance measures, the correlation
between SAVV (measured in 2006 or 2003) and our incentive measures is essentially one (0.997
for SAVV measured in 2006, and 0.943 for SAVV measured in 2003). On the one hand, finding a
positive correlation between AVV and SAVV may not be surprising given the definitions of the
two variables. To see this, let AV VS = dSdσV 0.01 and AV VO =
∑
i nOi
dOVi
dσv
0.01 (where i indexes
the different option grants held by the CEO) be the AVV stemming from stock and option
holdings, respectively. Then:
AV V = AV VS + AV VO = (S × nS × SAV V ) + AV VO = (SV × SAV V ) + AV VO, (4.7)
where SV = SnS is the value of the stock held by the CEO. Therefore, if the value of CEOs’
equity holdings (SV ) and AV VO were unrelated to SAV V , then a positive correlation between
AVV and SAVV would emerge.
However, there are theoretical reasons to expect that there should be a negative correlation
between SAVV and both SV and AV VO. If debt markets accurately reflected bank risk, excessive
risk would be borne by shareholders through higher interest rates of the firm’s debt (Jensen and
Meckling (1976)). Therefore, it may be in the interest of those firms whose shareholders have
stronger incentives to shift risk to debtholders to design the compensation of their managers so
as to limit their incentives to take risk. It follows from this argument that the CEOs of more
levered banks or, more generally, banks whose shareholders have a higher incentive to take on
risk, will have lower pay-performance sensitivity (John and John (1993)), which can be achieved
by ensuring that SV is low, and a smaller AV VO. Therefore, if shareholders bore the costs of
higher default risk, then one would not expect a strong and positive correlation between SAVV
and AVV. However, because of deposit insurance, implicit government guarantees, or lack of
sophistication by depositors, the interest rates on banks’ debt and deposits may not reflect bank
riskiness. In such case, those banks whose shareholders have greater incentives to take on risk
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may also provide stronger risk taking incentives to their CEOs. Table 4.8 shows that SAVV has
a positive and substantial correlation with SV , delta, and AV VO. Therefore, in our sample,
shareholders with stronger risk taking incentives do not reduce the risk taking incentives of their
CEOs by reducing their equity exposure or the risk sensitivity of their option portfolio.35
Our results are consistent with two alternative explanations. According to the first explanation,
shareholders design compensation arrangements to align CEOs’ risk taking incentives with their
own or to compensate CEOs in the least costly manner given banks’ inherent riskiness. Thus, if
shareholders bear little of the cost of increased bank risk, then the shareholders of banks with
higher SAVV would optimally give incentives to their CEOs to take on more risk. However, an
alternative explanation is that CEOs’ compensation arrangements are not optimally designed
by shareholders and that, instead, the size and structure of compensation arrangements are
largely orthogonal to firm riskiness or shareholders’ incentives to take on risk. However, the
characteristics of compensation packages may be such that, in general, they lead to higher
measured incentives in riskier firms (irrespectively of whether the measured incentives capture
actual incentives or just measures of inherent riskiness). To explore this possibility, as well as
the impact of potential regulatory curbs on certain forms of compensation, we analyze next the
characteristics of the compensation mix offered by the banks in our sample to their CEOs.
4.7 Compensation policies and risk taking
Firms’ compensation policies may differ in terms of the compensation level or the compensation
structure. We measure the compensation level by means of total pay, which encompasses salary,
cash bonuses, the value of stock awards, restricted stock awards, and option awards, as well
as other compensation components such as contributions to pension plans or disclosed perks.
To describe the structure of CEOs’ compensation packages, we define two ratios that seek to
capture the relative use of different types of pay. We define a firm’s equity ratio in year t as the
total dollar value of stock and stock option grants in year t over total compensation in year t.
Thus, equity pay reflects the relative importance of equity as a compensation vehicle (the part
of compensation that is not equity consists mainly of cash—salary and performance-related cash
compensation—and pension contributions). We also define the option ratio as the total value of
option grants in year t over the total value of equity grants (options and stock) in year t. For
firms in which the denominator is zero we define the option ratio to be zero. The option ratio
captures the relative importance of options versus stock in CEOs’ equity compensation. Since
pay levels and the compensation ratios may vary year to year, we also study four-year averages
(2003-2006) of the different pay variables.
Table 4.6 shows that there is substantial variation in total pay across financial institutions. Thus,
in year 2006 almost 30% of firms do not pay any equity compensation and 42% of firms do
not grant any stock options to their CEOs. For firms that do pay some equity compensation,
the average and median ratios are around 45% and whereas firms in the bottom decile of the
distribution do not reach 15%, firms in the top decile of the distribution of equity ratio pay more
than 70% of total compensation in the form of equity. Of the firms that provide some equity
compensation, almost 20% do not grant any options, whereas more than 10% of them pay all
their equity compensation in the form of options. Among the firms that pay stock options, there
is smaller but also significant heterogeneity. Although the fraction of firms with zero equity or
option ratios is smaller once the ratios are averaged over the period 2003-2006, there is still
35There are some observations with very high AV VS (which explains why the mean of AV VS is higher than the
90th percentile). Winsorizing AV V , AV VS , and AV VO does not change the results.
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substantial heterogeneity in the 2003-2006 averages. Therefore, it does not seem to be the case
that the financial firms in our sample compensate their CEOs in a homogeneous way.
Panel C in Table 4.10 shows the differences in compensation practices between failed and surviving
firms. As we discuss in Section 4.5.4, the average total pay is higher in failed firms, even if
we cannot reject the test of equality of medians between the failed and surviving subsamples.
However, there are no significant differences between the equity and option ratios of failed and
surviving firms. The regression results reported in Table 4.11 also show that the coefficients of
the equity and option ratios are not statistically significant at conventional significance levels.
Tables 4.10 and 4.11 thus show that whereas pay levels may be associated with bank risk, there
is no clear relation between compensation structure and risk.
Panel B in Table 4.10 displays the simple correlations between the compensation and the incentive
variables. Focusing on the 2003-2006 averages (the results are similar for the year 2006 values),
one can see that total pay is strongly and positively correlated with the incentive variables. The
correlation between the incentive measures and the equity ratio is also positive, but smaller, and,
remarkably—given the usual identification of options with risk taking incentives—the correlation
between the incentive measures and the option ratio is essentially zero (even with a negative
sign in the case of AVV). In Table 4.11, we display the results of regressions with our incentive
measures as dependent variables and the compensation variables and firm size as controls. These
results show that there is a negative—but not statistically significant at conventional significance
levels—relation between the equity and option ratios and AVV. Therefore, if anything, firms
with higher equity or option ratios have lower incentives to take on risk.
The results in this section, together with the results concerning termination payments discussed
in Section 4.5, suggest that risk taking incentives at a point in time are not associated with any
particular compensation vehicle or compensation structure. At most, our results suggest a weak
relation between pay levels and risk and, less clearly, between termination payments and risk.
Therefore, our results suggest that limiting the use of certain compensation vehicles may not be
a fruitful way of controlling bank CEOs’ incentives.
4.8 Robustness checks
4.8.1 Sample selection
The diversity of activities carried out by large financial institutions makes it difficult to come up
with unambiguous sample selection criteria. For this reason and for the sake of comparability, we
also conduct our analysis for the sample of financial institutions used by Fahlenbrach and Stulz
(2011). Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011)’s sample contains only 98 firms and is not a proper subset
of our sample. For example, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) include—and we do not—federal
credit agencies, such as Fannie Mae. As Column 1 in Table 4.12 shows, the results are largely
unchanged if we use this alternative sample of financial institutions. The only difference is
that, whereas in our sample the coefficient for delta is not statistically significant, it becomes
statistically significant for the Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011)’s sample, in line with their results.
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4.8.2 Failed institutions
Some of the steps of the procedure that we use to identify firms as failed requires the use of
some judgement and soft information. In particular, as we discuss in Section 4.2, we consider
as failed two firms (Mellon Financial and Countrywide Financial) that were acquired during
the crisis but that cannot be said to clearly meet our merger discount requirements. We also
consider as failed three firms (Merrill Lynch, National City Corp and Provident Bankshares) on
the basis of information obtained from the media. Column 2 in Table 4.12 shows that results are
largely unchanged if we consider that none of these five firms fail during the crisis. In unreported
results, we also consider each of the two groups separately, and the results are identical.
4.8.3 Investment banks
Our sample contains three primary dealers (Bear Sterns, Goldman Sachs and Merrill Lynch)
that supervisors do not identify as a regulated institution, but that we include because of their
systemic importance. Moreover, our sample also contains the two other large investment banks.
Lehman Brothers and Morgan Stanley, which the National Information Center of the FFIEC
identifies as regulated institutions. To investigate whether our results are driven by the inclusion
of the five large investment banks, we estimate the baseline regressions excluding them from
the sample. As column 4 in Table 4.12 shows, the coefficients for the incentive variables remain
highly statistically significant and increase in magnitude, because, as we explain below, some of
the investment banks have very large values of the incentive variables. In unreported results,
we observe that the results are similar if we exclude only the investment banks not identified
as regulated institutions. Including a dummy for the investment banks (rather than excluding
them from the sample) does not change the results relative to our baseline specification.
4.8.4 Too big to fail institutions
We identify as failed those firms that either close or are acquired with the intervention of
regulators. However, some financial institutions may be too large for regulators to either allow
them to fall or be able to find a suitable acquirer. These financial institutions may thus not be
part of our list of failed institutions, even if they took on large risks ex ante and experienced
strongly negative outcomes as a result of those risks. This possibility may bias our estimates
towards zero if the risk taking incentives of too-big-to-fail (or be acquired) institutions are strong
and these firms took on large risks. On the other hand, it may lead us to overestimate the
relation between risk taking incentives and bank risk if, for example, large banks take on large
risks yet opt for compensation arrangements with low values of AVV or LD.
We take two approaches to evaluate the potential biases generated by too-big-to-fail institutions.
First, following Fahlenbrach et al. (2012), we consider Citigroup and Bank of America as failed,
given the massive amount of aid they received from the government. As column 3 of Table 4.12
shows, considering these banks as failed does not alter our results. Second, we identify the banks
in the sample that could be considered both too-big-to-fail and “to-big-to-be-acquired,” banks,
which we label TBTBA. There is obviously no official list of TBTBA firms, so we consider the
robustness of our results to different definitions. Our first definitions take as TBTBA those
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firms larger than the largest failed institution in our sample (with size measured either as
market capitalization or total assets in 2006).36 The other two definitions use the Financial
Stability Board’s lists of systemically important financial institutions (created in 2011) and
global systemically important banks (created in 2012). Our first definition defines as TBTBA
all the U.S. institutions on the 2011 list. The 2012 list divides the systemically important
financial institutions into five buckets, according to their level of systemic importance, with
bucket five (one) containing the institutions with the greatest (smallest) systemic importance.
Our second definition defines as TBTBA only those firms on the 2011 list that are in buckets
two to five (the ones with the greatest systemic importance) of the 2012 list.37 To evaluate
the potential biases introduced by TBTBA institutions, we include a dummy variable for these
firms in our regressions and run the regressions excluding the TBTBA firms from the sample.
For the sake of brevity, we only report in columns 5-6 of Table 4.12 the results obtained when
we exclude TBTBA banks, defined in terms of market capitalization or according to the 2011
list of systemically important institutions, from the sample. The results, which are essentially
identical for the other definitions or when we include dummies instead of excluding banks from
the sample, show that our results are not biased by the presence of TBTBA institutions.
4.8.5 Extreme values and specification
A possible concern about our results, especially given the small size of our sample, is that they
may be influenced by the presence of firms with extreme values of the incentive measures. In
fact, some firms, such as Bear Sterns, have very large values of AVV or leveraged delta. The
presence of firms with very large values of an incentive measure in the group of failed banks
may lead to a positive estimated coefficient even if there is no positive relationship between the
incentive measure and failure. However, since the dependent variable lies between zero and one,
the presence of banks with very large values of the incentive measures among the banks with a
value of one for the dependent variable may have the opposite effect of biasing the estimated
coefficient towards zero. To check the robustness of our results to the presence of firms with
very high values of the incentive measures, we winsorize them at the 1% level and re-estimate
the baseline univariate regression. As column 1 of Panel B in Table 4.12 shows for the case of
AVV, the estimated coefficient remains highly statistically significant and increases threefold in
magnitude. Therefore, if anything, the presence of large values of AVV is biasing our estimates
downwards. We obtain similar results for LD.
A related concern is that our linear specification (given by expression 4.5) is necessarily misspeci-
fied, since the dependent variable is bounded between zero and one. Although this misspecification
may not be severe in some cases, it may create substantial bias if, as it is the case with the
incentive measures, the explanatory variable of interest has a skewed distribution. Therefore,
we also consider the robustness of our results to different specifications that are nonlinear in
the incentive measures. The first specification is a simple log linear model, in which we replace
the incentive measure by the natural logarithm of one plus the incentive variable (we add one
36If size is measured by total assets, the largest failed institution is Merrill Lynch and the TBTBA institutions are
Morgan Stanley, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America and Citigroup. If size is measured by market capitalization
in 2006, the largest failed institution is Wachovia and the TBTBA institutions are Wells Fargo, JPMorgan
Chase, Bank of America and Citigroup.
37The 2011 and 2012 lists contain the same eight U.S. financial institutions: Bank of America, Bank of New
York Mellon, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, State Street, and Wells Fargo.
Buckets two to five contain all these banks except for State Street and Wells Fargo. Further restricting the list
to buckets three to five would leave only Citigroup and and JPMorgan Chase as TBTBA. The list can be
accessed at the Financial Stability Board’s website: https://www.financialstabilityboard.org/list/fsb_
pa/tid_174/index.htm.
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because of the presence of firms with zero or close to zero values of the incentive measures). This
specification allows for a concave relation between the incentive measures and the probability of
failure and, at the same time, can be estimated by OLS. The estimated coefficient, which we
report in Column 2 of Panel B in Table 4.12, is highly statistically significant. The marginal
effect of an increase in AVV is 0.04 if AVV is evaluated at its mean and 0.13 if it is evaluated
at its median. In columns 3 and 4 of Panel B in Table 4.12 we also report estimated marginal
effects (evaluated at the sample means of the explanatory variables) of probit and logit models.
The estimated marginal effects are larger than the coefficients of the linear probability model.
Whereas the probit coefficient is significantly different from zero at the ten percent level, the
logit estimate is not significantly different from zero at conventional significance levels (with a
p-value equal to 0.14).
4.9 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the relation between the risk taking incentives created by executive
compensation and bank risk and study both the potential determinants of those incentives and
whether they are associated with the use of certain compensation vehicles (such as stock options
or termination incentives).
To measure bank risk taking in the period prior to the 2007-2010 financial crisis we identify
those banks that failed during the crisis. Because of the potential for government intervention
to facilitate the acquisition of distressed banks by sounder financial institutions, we propose a
definition of bank failure that identifies as failed not only those financial institutions that went
bankrupt or were forced into receivership but also those that were acquired by others with the
assistance or intervention of supervisors or the government. This ex post measure of bank risk
aims to, on the one hand, sidestep the limitations of standard ex ante risk measures (which may
not have been that informative about the actual risks taken by banks in the run-up to the crisis)
and, on the other hand, measure the full risk borne by banks and not only the part borne by
bank shareholders.
Since financial institutions are highly levered, we use measures of the risk taking incentives
generated by CEO compensation that incorporate the incentives generated by the option-like
nature of equity in levered institutions. In particular, we use the asset volatility vega (AVV)
developed by Chesney et al. (2012) and propose as well a simple reduced form measure (leveraged
delta) which is increasing both in the sensitivity of the CEO’s wealth to changes in the firm’s
stock price (delta).
For our sample of large U.S. financial institutions, we show that the risk taking incentives
implied by these measures are strong and that there is substantial dispersion in risk taking across
firms. We also show that these risk taking incentives are associated with higher probability of
failure during the financial crisis. We propose and investigate different potential explanations
for these results and interpret our results as supporting two alternative explanations for the
positive relationship between our measures of risk taking incentives and bank failure. The first
explanation is that these incentives did have an impact on banks’ risk choices prior to the crisis.
The second explanation is that inherently riskier banks found it optimal to compensate their
CEOs in ways that lead to high values of our incentive measures, even if either CEOs did not
have the ability to determine bank risk or their choices were motivated by other incentives
or constraints. However, to our knowledge there is no theory of the optimal compensation of
bank executives that would yield this prediction. Moreover, to the extent that our incentive
measures are really capturing incentives to take on risk, the measured incentives are strong, so
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to render them irrelevant, the incentives stemming from alternative sources (such as the threat
of replacement) must be even stronger or the constraints faced by CEOs regarding their risk
choices stringent.
We show that standard measures of governance quality, such as the Governance Index, the
Entrenchment Index, board size, or board independence, do not help explain bank failure or the
level of risk. In stark contrast, CEOs’ risk taking incentives are almost perfectly correlated with
a measure of shareholders’ risk taking incentives, which we term shareholder asset volatility vega.
These results suggest that either compensation incentives are designed to align CEOs’ incentives
with those of shareholders or, at least, that compensation policies are not set so as to counteract
the risk taking incentives embedded in banks’ equity.
Unexpectedly, we find no relationship between the weight of options in CEO compensation
or the fraction of CEO pay in the form of stock or options and either bank failure or CEO
risk taking incentives. We find also that there is at most a weak relation between termination
payments (severance pay or golden parachutes) and bank failure. Therefore, we find that there
is no particular compensation vehicle responsible for bank CEOs’ incentives to take on risk.
Our results have several implications for bank supervision and regulation. First, our results
are consistent with compensation being a significant source of risk taking incentives for bank
executives and, therefore, suggest that some form of incentive regulation could modulate those
incentives. However, we cannot make any strong policy recommendation because because of the
lack of an exogenous source of variation in incentives does not allow us to identify the causal
effect of compensation incentives on bank risk. Regarding the potential form that incentive
regulation may take, our results suggest that it may be unwise to regulate bank CEOs’ risk taking
incentives by means of limits to particular forms of compensation. Defining and monitoring
actual measures of risk taking incentives may be a more useful form of incentive supervision.
Similarly, we find no support for the proposition that improving bank governance by, say, limiting
managerial entrenchment or increasing board independence, would have a significant effect on
risk taking incentives or bank risk. However, our results are silent regarding some governance
failures specific to banks, which have also received attention from regulators, such as the financial
background of directors, the quality of the risk management systems, or the relevance in the
organization of the executives in charge of risk management. We should emphasize as well that
even if we provide evidence that is consistent with an important role for compensation incentives
in determining bank risk taking prior to the financial crisis, our results alone do not prove that
those incentives were excessive.
The limitations of our analysis point at several promising avenues for future research. On
the theory side, our results suggest that it may be useful to derive the optimal compensation
contract for bank CEOs under different assumptions of the roles played by bank executives,
boards of directors, and shareholder in determining and monitoring compensation decisions and
risk choices. The implications of these models could then be taken to the data to shed light
on the actual mechanism that links compensation and bank risk. The very different results
obtained when option vega and asset volatility vega (or leveraged delta) are used as measures
of incentives also suggest that more attention should be paid to deriving better measures of
risk taking incentives. On the empirical side, finding credible sources of exogenous variation in
incentives remains the main challenge to be addressed to be able to confidently propose policy
recommendations regarding the compensation of bank executives.
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4.10 Appendix
4.10.1 Risk Incentive Measures
Asset Volatility Vega (AVV) We follow the procedure described by Chesney et al. (2012) to
compute the Asset Volatility Vega from stocks (AV VS) and from options (AV VO). Here we
provide only the formulas that we use to compute the different variables and the data used
to perform the computations. We refer to the article by Chesney et al. (2012), especially the
appendix, for the derivation and details of the calculations.
We compute the Asset Volatility Vega from stocks (AV VS) and from options (AV VO) sepa-
rately.
AV VS for a single share of stock is defined as:
AV VS =
∂BS(V,D, r, T, σv)
∂σV
× 0.01, (4.8)
where BS(V,D, r, T, σv) is the Black-Scholes value of equity as a call option on the firm’s value
(see Chesney et al. (2012) for the detailed assumptions made to obtain this value) and σV is the
volatility of asset value (all other variables are described below). It follows from the Black-Scholes
formulation that:
AV VS = ϕ(d1(V,D, r, T, σV ))V
√
T (1/100), (4.9)
where
d1 =
ln(V/D) + (r + σ2V /2)T
σV
√
T
. (4.10)
To compute AV VS , we multiply the AV VS for a single share of stock by the number of shares
held by the CEO.
Following Chesney et al. (2012), we define AV VO for a given stock grant as:
AV VO =
∂CC
∂σV
× 0.01, (4.11)
where CC is the value of the stock option computed according to the Compound Option Pricing
model. The value of the derivative is obtained in Proposition 1 of Chesney et al. (2012)’s
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appendix and is given by:
∂CC
∂σV
= V
[
ϕ(h + σV
√
τ1)N1
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
k + σV
√
τ2 − τ1
τ2
(h + σV
√
τ1)√
1 − τ1
τ2
⎞
⎟⎟⎠√τ1
+ ϕ(k + σV
√
τ2)N1
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
h + σV
√
τ1 − τ1
τ2
(k + σV
√
τ2)√
1 − τ1
τ2
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ d(k + σV
√
τ2)
dσV
]
− De−rτ2ϕ(k)N1
⎛
⎜⎜⎝h −
√
τ1
τ2
k√
1 − τ1
τ2
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ dkdσV , (4.12)
where:
k =
ln(V/D) + (r − 12σ2V )τ2
σV
√
τ2
, (4.13)
h =
ln(V/V¯ ) + (r − 12σ2V )τ1
σV
√
τ1
, (4.14)
dk
dσV
= − k
σV
− √τ2
d(k + σV
√
τ2)
dσV
= − k
σV
. (4.15)
See below for the definition of all variables.
To compute AV VO, we first compute for each option contract held by the CEO the AV VO for a
single stock option and multiply it by the number of options held by the CEO. We then sum the
AV VO’s of the different option grants.
Asset Volatility Vega (AVV) is defined as:
AV V = AV VS + AV VO. (4.16)
4.10.2 Variable definitions
• S: stock price
• D: book value of debt per share
• T : maturity of long-term debt (set equal to 7.5 years following Guay (1999))
• r: yield on Treasury bonds with time to maturity 7 years (the closest possible to 7.5)
• Xdebt: weight of debt in the firm’s capital structure.
• Xequity: weight of equity in the firm’s capital structure.
• σequity = σS : annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns.
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• σdebt: annualized standard deviation of monthly (log) returns using the Merrill Lynch
Bank of America Corporate Financial Bond Index using a five year period (Datastream
mnemonic MLUCFIN(RY)).
• Cov(σdebt, σequity) = σdebtσequity because we assume, following Guay(1999) that
Corr(σdebt, σequity) =
Cov(σdebt, σequity)√
σ2debtσ
2
equity
= 1. (4.17)
• σ2V = X2debtσ2debt + X2equityσ2equity + 2XdebtXequityσdebtσequity
• N1(.)= standard normal cumulative distribution.
• N2(.)= standard normal bivariate cumulative distribution.
• ϕ= standard normal probability density.
• τ1= expiration of the stock option.
• τ2= maturity of debt. If τ2 < τ1 then set τ2 = τ1 + 2.
• K= strike price of the option.
• V¯ = firm value where the option is just at the money at time τ1. It comes from solving
V N1(k + σV
√
τ2 − τ1) − De−r(τ2−τ1)N1(k) − K = 0 (4.18)
• V = per share firm value, as the implicit solution to the Black-Scholes equation:
S = V N(d1) − De−rTN(d2), (4.19)
where:
d2 = d1 − σV
√
T (4.20)
and d1 is as defined previously.
4.10.3 Sample Selection
4.10.4 Failed firms
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Table 4.1: List of Financial Institutions Included in the Sample. Column FFIEC contains the
institution type of each firm in the sample in year 2006, according to the firm’s history at the FFIEC’s
National Information Center. The Primary Dealer column displays a 1 if the firm is listed as a primary
dealer in 2006 according to the NY FED.
Number Company Name SIC SICDESC FFIEC Primary Dealer
1 AMERICAN EXPRESS CO 6199 FINANCE SERVICES S&LHC
2 AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL INC 6211 SECURITY BROKERS & DEALERS S&LHC
3 ANCHOR BANCORP WISCONSIN INC 6035 SAVINGS INSTN,FED CHARTERED
4 ASSOCIATED BANCCORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
5 ASTORIA FINANCIAL CORP 6035 SAVINGS INSTN,FED CHARTERED
6 BANCORPSOUTH INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
7 BANK MUTUAL CORP 6035 SAVINGS INSTN,FED CHARTERED
8 BANK OF AMERICA CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
9 BANK OF HAWAII CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
10 BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
11 BANK OF THE OZARKS INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
12 BANKUNITED FINANCIAL CORP 6035 SAVINGS INSTN,FED CHARTERED
13 BB&T CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
14 BBCN BANCORP INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
15 BBX CAPITAL CORP 6035 SAVINGS INSTN,FED CHARTERED
16 BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC 6211 SECURITY BROKERS & DEALERS 1
17 BOSTON PRIVATE FINL HOLDINGS 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
18 BROOKLINE BANCORP INC 6035 SAVINGS INSTN,FED CHARTERED
19 CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP 6141 PERSONAL CREDIT INSTITUTIONS FHC
20 CASCADE BANCORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
21 CATHAY GENERAL BANCORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
22 CENTRAL PACIFIC FINANCIAL CP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
23 CHITTENDEN CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
24 CITIGROUP INC 6199 FINANCE SERVICES FHC 1
25 CITY HOLDING CO 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
26 CITY NATIONAL CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
27 COLONIAL BANCGROUP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
28 COLUMBIA BANKING SYSTEM INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
29 COMERICA INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
30 COMMERCE BANCORP INC/NJ 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
31 COMMERCE BANCSHARES INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
32 COMMUNITY BANK SYSTEM INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
33 COMPASS BANCSHARES INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
34 CORUS BANKSHARES INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
35 COUNTRYWIDE FINANCIAL CORP 6162 MORTGAGE BANKERS & LOAN CORR FHC 1
36 CULLEN/FROST BANKERS INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
37 DIME COMMUNITY BANCSHARES 6035 SAVINGS INSTN,FED CHARTERED
38 DOWNEY FINANCIAL CORP 6035 SAVINGS INSTN,FED CHARTERED
39 E TRADE FINANCIAL CORP 6211 SECURITY BROKERS & DEALERS S&LHC
40 EAST WEST BANCORP INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
41 FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
42 FIRST BANCORP P R 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
43 FIRST COMMONWLTH FINL CP/PA 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
44 FIRST FINL BANCORP INC/OH 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
45 FIRST FINL BANKSHARES INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
46 FIRST HORIZON NATIONAL CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
47 FIRST INDIANA CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
48 FIRST MIDWEST BANCORP INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
49 FIRST NIAGARA FINANCIAL GRP 6036 SAVINGS INSTN, NOT FED CHART
50 FIRST REPUBLIC BANK 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
51 FIRSTFED FINANCIAL CORP/CA 6035 SAVINGS INSTN,FED CHARTERED
52 FIRSTMERIT CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
53 FLAGSTAR BANCORP INC 6035 SAVINGS INSTN,FED CHARTERED
54 FRANKLIN BANK CORP 6036 SAVINGS INSTN, NOT FED CHART
55 FRONTIER FINANCIAL CORP/WA 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
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Table 4.1: List of Financial Institutions Included in the Sample (continued). Column FFIEC
contains the institution type of each firm in the sample in year 2006, according to the firm’s history at
the FFIEC’s National Information Center. The Primary Dealer column displays a 1 if the firm is listed
as a primary dealer in 2006 according to the NY FED.
Number Company Name SIC SICDESC FFIEC Primary Dealer
56 FULTON FINANCIAL CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
57 GLACIER BANCORP INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
58 GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP INC 6211 SECURITY BROKERS & DEALERS 1
59 GREATER BAY BANCORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
60 GUARANTY FINANCIAL GROUP INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
61 HANMI FINANCIAL CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
62 HUDSON CITY BANCORP INC 6035 SAVINGS INSTN,FED CHARTERED
63 HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
64 INDEPENDENT BANK CORP/MI 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
65 INDYMAC BANCORP INC 6162 MORTGAGE BANKERS & LOAN CORR FSB
66 INVESTORS FINANCIAL SVCS CP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
67 IRWIN FINANCIAL CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
68 JPMORGAN CHASE & CO 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS 1
69 KEYCORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
70 LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC 6211 SECURITY BROKERS & DEALERS S&LHC 1
71 M & T BANK CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
72 MAF BANCORP INC 6035 SAVINGS INSTN,FED CHARTERED
73 MARSHALL & ILSLEY CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
74 MELLON FINANCIAL CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
75 MERCANTILE BANKSHARES CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
76 MERRILL LYNCH & CO INC 6211 SECURITY BROKERS & DEALERS 1
77 MORGAN STANLEY 6211 SECURITY BROKERS & DEALERS S&LHC 1
78 N B T BANCORP INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
79 NATIONAL CITY CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
80 NATIONAL PENN BANCSHARES INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
81 NEW YORK CMNTY BANCORP INC 6036 SAVINGS INSTN, NOT FED CHART
82 NORTHERN TRUST CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
83 OLD NATIONAL BANCORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
84 PACWEST BANCORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
85 PEOPLE’S UNITED FINL INC 6036 SAVINGS INSTN, NOT FED CHART
86 PINNACLE FINL PARTNERS INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
87 PNC FINANCIAL SVCS GROUP INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
88 POPULAR INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
89 PRIVATEBANCORP INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
90 PROSPERITY BANCSHARES INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
91 PROVIDENT BANKSHARES CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
92 RAYMOND JAMES FINANCIAL CORP 6211 SECURITY BROKERS & DEALERS S&LHC
93 REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
94 S & T BANCORP INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
95 SANTANDER HOLDINGS USA INC 6035 SAVINGS INSTN,FED CHARTERED
96 SCHWAB (CHARLES) CORP 6211 SECURITY BROKERS & DEALERS FHC
97 SIMMONS FIRST NATL CP CL A 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
98 SOUTH FINANCIAL GROUP INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
99 STATE STREET CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
100 STERLING BANCORP/NY 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
101 STERLING BANCSHARES INC/TX 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
102 STERLING FINANCIAL CORP/WA 6036 SAVINGS INSTN, NOT FED CHART
103 SUNTRUST BANKS INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
104 SUSQUEHANNA BANCSHARES INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
105 SVB FINANCIAL GROUP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
106 SWS GROUP INC 6211 SECURITY BROKERS & DEALERS S&LHC
107 SYNOVUS FINANCIAL CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
108 TCF FINANCIAL CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
109 TD BANKNORTH INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
110 TOMPKINS FINANCIAL CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
111 TRUSTCO BANK CORP/NY 6035 SAVINGS INSTN,FED CHARTERED
112 U S BANCORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
113 UCBH HOLDINGS INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
114 UMB FINANCIAL CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
115 UMPQUA HOLDINGS CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
116 UNIONBANCAL CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
117 UNITED BANKSHARES INC/WV 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
118 UNITED COMMUNITY BANKS INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
119 WACHOVIA CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
120 WASHINGTON FEDERAL INC 6035 SAVINGS INSTN,FED CHARTERED
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Table 4.1: List of Financial Institutions Included in the Sample (continued). Column FFIEC
contains the institution type of each firm in the sample in year 2006, according to the firm’s history at
the FFIEC’s National Information Center. The Primary Dealer column displays a 1 if the firm is listed
as a primary dealer in 2006 according to the NY FED.
Number Company Name SIC SICDESC FFIEC Primary Dealer
121 WASHINGTON MUTUAL INC 6035 SAVINGS INSTN,FED CHARTERED
122 WEBSTER FINANCIAL CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
123 WELLS FARGO & CO 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
124 WESTAMERICA BANCORPORATION 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
125 WHITNEY HOLDING CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
126 WILMINGTON TRUST CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
127 WILSHIRE BANCORP INC 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
128 WINTRUST FINANCIAL CORP 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
129 ZIONS BANCORPORATION 6020 COMMERCIAL BANKS
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Table 4.3: Firm characteristics: Summary Statistics. Market Cap. is the firm’s market capital-
ization computed as total common equity multiplied by the price of the stock at the close of the calendar
year. Total Assets is the book value of the total assets of the firm. Market Cap. and Total Assets are
measured in billions of dollars. Leverage is the quasi-market value of leverage computed as the ratio of
book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity divided by market value
of equity, ROA is the ratio of operating income before depreciation over total assets at the end of the
previous year. Unless specified otherwise, all variables are measured in 2006. Panel A displays summary
statistics for the sample used in this paper. Panel B displays descriptives for the entire population of
firms available in Compustat for year 2006 with SIC codes between 6000 and 6050. Panel C contains the
means and medians of the variables of interest for the subsamples of failed and surviving institutions
in our sample. Asterisks in the mean and median columns of the group of failed institutions represent
statistically significant differences according to the t-test of means and the rank-sum test for differences
in medians. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Firms in the sample
Count Mean SD p10 p50 p90
Market Cap 125 466.01 1257.75 7.12 36.67 1204.44
Total Assets 125 106.81 288.33 2.85 11.16 199.95
Leverage 125 6.34 2.79 3.96 5.66 8.71
ROA 125 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05
Panel B: Compustat population (SIC codes 6000–6050)
Count Mean SD p10 p50 p90
Market Cap 749 113.23 615.30 0.40 2.15 78.32
Total Assets 778 41.37 203.17 0.28 1.01 20.86
Leverage 746 7.28 3.19 4.31 6.52 10.97
ROA 759 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.04
Panel C: Surviving vs. failed banks
Surviving Failed
Mean Median Mean Median
Market Cap 421.19 33.29 716.07 91.60∗
Total Assets 95.16 10.76 171.79 22.78
Leverage 5.97 5.41 8.43∗∗∗ 8.32∗∗∗
ROA 0.03 0.03 0.04∗∗ 0.03
N 106 19
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4.10.5 Tables
Table 4.4: Incentive Measures: Summary Statistics. AVV is the change in the value of the CEO’s
portfolio of stocks and options (measured in $ million) associated with a 0.01 change in the standard
deviation of the value of the assets of the firm. LD is the standardized product of Leverage and Delta,
where Leverage is the quasimarket value of leverage, as defined in Table 4.3, and Delta is the change
in the value of the CEO’s portfolio of stock and options (measured in $ million) associated with a 0.01
change in the price of the stock of the firm. OV is the change in the value of the CEO’s option portfolio
(measured in $ million) associated with a change of 0.01 in the standard deviation of the price of the
stock. Unless specified otherwise, all variables are measured in 2006. Panel A contains summary statistics.
Panel B contains pairwise correlation between the incentive variables in year 2006. Panel C contains the
means and medians of the variables of interest for the subsamples of failed and surviving institutions
in our sample. Asterisks in the mean and median columns of the group of failed institutions represent
statistically significant differences according to the t-test of means and the rank-sum test for differences
in medians. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Firm level variables
Count Mean SD p10 p50 p90
AVV 125 2.65 10.38 0.02 0.26 5.20
LD 125 0.40 1.00 0.01 0.09 1.01
OV 125 0.32 0.56 0.00 0.08 0.90
Delta 125 1.34 4.24 0.04 0.37 2.97
Panel B: Pairwise correlations
AVV LD OV Delta
AVV 1
LD 0.84 1
OV 0.16 0.26 1
Delta 0.25 0.72 0.24 1
Panel C: Differences in means and medians between failed and surviving banks
Surviving Failed
Mean Median Mean Median
AVV 1.27 0.19 10.34∗∗∗ 2.23∗∗
LD 0.28 0.08 1.05∗∗∗ 0.43∗
OV 0.30 0.07 0.46 0.15
Delta 1.22 0.30 1.99 1.03
N 106 19
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Table 4.5: Univariate Regressions. The table present estimated coefficients of different specifications
of a linear probability model, in which the dependent variable is Failed. Failed is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the firm has been closed by the intervention of a Federal Regulator in the period 2007–2010.
AVV is the change in the value of the CEO’s portfolio of stocks and options (measured in $ million)
associated with a 0.01 change in the standard deviation of the value of the assets of the firm. LD is the
standardized product of Leverage and Delta, where Leverage is the quasi-market value of Leverage as
defined in Table 4.3, and Delta is the change in the value of the CEO’s portfolio of equity (measured in
$ million) associated with a 0.01 change in the price of the stock of the firm. OV is the change in the
value of the CEO’s portfolio of options (measured in $ million) associated with a change of 0.01 in the
standard deviation of the stock price. AVV, LD, OV, and Delta are measured in year 2006 in millions
of dollars. *, ** and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The number of
observations is 125. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AVV 0.011∗∗∗
(0.003)
LD 0.100∗∗∗
(0.036)
OV 0.065
(0.067)
Delta 0.006
(0.009)
R2 0.099 0.077 0.010 0.004
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Table 4.7: Multivariate Results. The table presents the estimated coefficients of different specifications
of a linear probability model. The dependent variable in all columns is Failed, which is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the firm has been closed with the intervention of a Federal Regulator in the period 2007–2010.
AVV is the change in the value of the CEO’s portfolio of stocks and options (measured in $ million)
associated with a 0.01 change in the standard deviation of the value of the assets of the firm. LD is the
standardized product of Leverage and Delta, where Leverage is the quasi-market value of Leverage as
defined in Table 4.3, and Delta is the change in the value of the CEO’s portfolio of equity (measured
in $ million) associated with a 0.01 change in the price of the stock of the firm. Total pay is the total
compensation received by the executive, and it comprises salary, bonus, other annual payments, restricted
stock grants, LTIP Payouts, other compensation, and the value of option grants. G. Parachute and
Severance Pay are the amounts of the contingent payments upon termination with and without a change
in control, respectively, as in year 2006’s proxy statements. Non-firm wealth is the non- firm wealth of
the CEO, as defined by Dittmann and Maug (2007). Leverage is the quasi-market value of leverage as
defined in Table 4.3 and Leverage_sq is leverage squared. CEO age and CEO tenure denote the age and
years in office, respectively, of the CEO as in year 2006. Panel A displays multivariate results where the
risk taking incentive measure is AVV. Panel B displays similar results with LD as the measure of risk
taking incentives. *, ** and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust
standard errors in parentheses.
Panel A: AVV and bank failure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
AVV 0.010∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.020) (0.020) (0.002)
Firm Size (03) 0.014 −0.030 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.026 −0.017 −0.015 0.000
(0.020) (0.029) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.020)
Total Pay 0.010
(0.006)
Delta −0.003
(0.002)
CEO Age −0.004
(0.005)
CEO tenure 0.001
(0.005)
Non-firm wealth −0.000
(0.000)
Severance Pay 0.000
(0.002)
G. Parachute −0.000
(0.002)
Leverage 0.115 ∗ ∗
(0.046)
Leverage sq −0.005 ∗ ∗
(0.002)
N 125 123 125 125 125 122 118 118 125
R2 0.103 0.129 0.104 0.110 0.104 0.112 0.160 0.160 0.174
Panel B: LD and bank failure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
LD 0.090 ∗ ∗ 0.060 0.164∗∗∗ 0.098 ∗ ∗ 0.089 ∗ ∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.088 0.074 0.084∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.036) (0.047) (0.039) (0.039) (0.034) (0.095) (0.092) (0.031)
Firm Size (03) 0.013 −0.037 0.011 0.013 0.013 0.028 0.018 0.016 −0.005
(0.022) (0.029) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.022)
Total Pay 0.012∗
(0.006)
Delta −0.024∗∗∗
(0.006)
CEO Age −0.005
(0.005)
CEO tenure 0.002
(0.005)
Non-firm wealth −0.000
(0.000)
Severance Pay −0.002
(0.003)
G. Parachute −0.000
(0.002)
Leverage 0.122 ∗ ∗
(0.047)
Leverage sq −0.005 ∗ ∗
N 125 123 125 125 125 122 118 118 125
R2 0.079 0.115 0.116 0.087 0.080 0.095 0.031 0.029 0.17066
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Table 4.8: Governance Variables: Summary Statistics. G-index is the Governance index defined
as in Gompers et al (2003), E-index is the entrenchment index as defined by Bebchuck et al. (2009),
Boardsize is the number of members of the board of directors, Independence is the number of independent
directors divided by board size, SAVV is the stock return associated with a change of 0.01 in the standard
deviation of the asset value of the firm measured in 2006. AVV_S is the change in value of the stock
portfolio held by the CEO after a change of 0.01 in the standard deviation of the asset value of the firm.
AVV_O is the change in value of the option portfolio held by the CEO after a change of 0.01 in the
standard deviation of the asset value of the firm. All variables are measured in year 2006 unless stated
otherwise. Panel A contains summary statistics for the governance variables and Panel B contains
pairwise correlations between the main variables of interest.
Panel A: Summary statistics
Count Mean SD p10 p50 p90
G - index 105 10.03 2.76 7.00 10.00 13.00
E - index 105 2.95 1.31 1.00 3.00 4.00
Board Size 103 13.91 3.88 9.00 14.00 19.00
Independence 121 0.72 0.12 0.55 0.75 0.87
SAVV 125 0.49 1.72 0.00 0.11 1.07
AVV_S 125 1.66 9.73 0.00 0.04 1.15
AVV_O 125 0.99 2.00 0.00 0.18 2.13
Panel B: Pairwise correlations
AVV LD G - index E - index Board Size Independence SAVV AVV_S
G - index −0.10 −0.08 1.00
E - index −0.27 −0.28 0.73 1.00
Board Size −0.05 −0.05 −0.04 −0.13 1.00
Independence −0.23 −0.15 −0.08 0.04 −0.03 1.00
SAVV 0.97 0.80 −0.11 −0.29 −0.08 −0.25 1.00
AVV_S 0.98 0.81 −0.10 −0.27 −0.07 −0.27 0.97 1.00
AVV_O 0.41 0.44 −0.02 −0.07 0.06 0.10 0.30 0.23
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Table 4.9: Governance, Risk Taking Incentives and Bank Failure. Panel A displays estimations
for the linear probability model with Failed as dependent variable in all columns. Failed is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the firm has been closed with the intervention of a Federal Regulator in the
period 2007–2010. G-index is the Governance index defined as in Gompers et al (2003), E-index is the
entrenchment index as defined by Bebchuck et al. (2009), Boardsize is the number of members of the
board of directors, Independence is the number of independent directors divided by board size. AVV is
the change in the value of the CEO’s portfolio of stocks and options with a 0.01 change in the standard
deviation of the value of the assets of the firm. SAVV is the stock return associated with a change of
0.01 in the standard deviation of the asset value of the firm. AVV_S is the change in value of the stock
portfolio held by the CEO after a change of 0.01 in the standard deviation of the asset value of the firm.
AVV_O is the change in value of the option portfolio held by the CEO after a change of 0.01 in the
standard deviation of the asset value of the firm. All variables are measured in year 2006 unless stated
otherwise. Firm_Size is the natural logarithm of total assets as of year 2003. Panel B displays coefficient
estimates of linear probability model estimations where the dependent variable is AVV. Panel C shows
results for the linear probability model with Failure as the dependent variable. *, ** and *** represent
significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Panel A: Governance, risk taking incentives, and bank failure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AVV 0.010∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
G - index 0.010
(0.011)
E - index −0.011 0.018
(0.026) (0.025)
Board Size −0.001 0.004
(0.010) (0.011)
Independence 0.039 0.248
(0.259) (0.285)
(0.027)
Firm Size 0.024 0.020 0.029 0.025 0.021
(0.023) (0.025) (0.023) (0.020) (0.027)
N 105 105 103 121 88
R2 0.122 0.118 0.132 0.120 0.140
Panel B: Governance and risk taking incentives. AVV as dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
G - index −0.234
(0.227)
E - index −1.514 −1.617
(1.412) (1.371)
Board Size −0.624∗ −0.7704∗
(0.322) (0.391)
Independence −19.295 −33.529
(19.810) (26.808)
AVV_S 1.015∗∗∗
(0.011)
AVV_O 1.525∗∗∗
(0.482)
SAVV 5.730∗∗∗
(0.281)
SAVV 03 5.675∗∗∗
(0.965)
Firm Size 2.500∗∗ 2.198∗∗∗ 2.887∗∗ 2.276∗∗∗ 0.702∗∗∗ 1.169 0.435∗∗ −0.164 3.046∗∗∗
(1.003) (0.742) (1.156) (0.849) (0.140) (0.777) (0.182) (0.308) (1.048)
N 105 105 103 121 125 125 125 96 88
R2 0.139 0.164 0.180 0.188 0.977 0.190 0.945 0.877 0.315
10
Panel C: Governance and failure. Dependent variable: Failure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
G - index 0.007
(0.011)
E - index −0.026 0.001
(0.028) (0.028)
Board Size −0.006 −0.004
(0.010) (0.011)
Independence −0.1474 −0.105
(0.280) (0.344)
(0.026)
Firm Size 0.048∗∗ 0.041 0.054∗∗ 0.047∗∗ 0.0532∗
(0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.021) (0.028)
N 105 105 103 121 88
R2 0.046 0.050 0.065 0.053 0.056
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Table 4.10: Compensation Policies: Summary Statistics. Equity ratio is the fraction of a CEO’s
annual total pay that is granted in the form of equity pay (options and stock). Option ratio is the value
of all stock option grants awarded in a year divided by total equity pay (options and stock). Panel A
displays summary statistics for year 2006 for the whole sample as well as for the subsample of executives
with a positive value of the corresponding ratio (>0). Panel B displays summary statistics for the ratios
averaged over the period 2003–2006. Panel C contains simple correlation coefficients.
Panel A: Summary statistics (year 2006)
Count Mean SD p10 p50 p90
Equity ratio (all) 123 0.33 0.28 0.00 0.35 0.68
Option ratio (all) 123 0.38 0.41 0.00 0.23 1.00
Equity ratio (> 0) 88 0.46 0.22 0.15 0.45 0.71
Option ratio (> 0) 71 0.66 0.33 0.20 0.64 1.00
Panel B: Summary statistics (average 2003- 2006)
Count Mean SD p10 p50 p90
Equity ratio (avg - all) 123 0.36 0.24 0.00 0.37 0.65
Option ratio (avg - all) 123 0.48 0.32 0.00 0.50 1.00
Equity ratio (avg > 0 ) 111 0.40 0.21 0.12 0.41 0.66
Option ratio (avg > 0) 106 0.56 0.28 0.20 0.55 1.00
Panel C: Correlations for averaged values (2003-2006)
AVV (avg) LD (avg) Equity ratio (avg) Option ratio (avg)
Equity ratio (avg) 0.23 0.27 1.00
Option ratio (avg) −0.04 0.05 0.20 1.00
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Table 4.11: Compensation policies, Risk Taking Incentives, and Failure. Panel A contains
estimated coefficient of linear probability models with Failed as dependent variable. Equity ratio (avg)
and Option ratio (avg) are the averages for each firm of Equity ratio and Option ratio, respectively, over
the period 2003–2006. Firm size is the log of total assets as of year 2006. Panel B contains the results
of multivariate regressions where the dependent variable is AVV, as defined previously. *, **, and ***
represent significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Panel A: Compensation policies and failure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Pay (avg) 0.016∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006)
Equity ratio (avg) −0.234 −0.325∗
(0.181) (0.167)
Option ratio (avg) −0.099 −0.029
(0.110) (0.100)
Firm Size −0.026 0.061∗∗ 0.042∗ −0.008
(0.032) (0.028) (0.022) (0.034)
N 123 123 123 123
R2 0.085 0.051 0.044 0.114
Panel B: Compensation policies and AVV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Pay 0.637∗ 0.686∗
(0.382) (0.412)
Equity ratio −1.972 −5.558
(2.811) (4.268)
Option ratio −2.249 −0.437
(1.931) (1.056)
Firm Size −0.943 2.454∗∗ 2.363∗∗ −0.741
(1.287) (1.088) (0.960) (1.175)
N 123 123 123 123
R2 0.269 0.138 0.144 0.287
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5
Too Big to Discipline?
Bank supervision entails both monitoring financial institutions and compelling them to take
corrective actions if they do not comply with regulations or follow unsafe or unsound practices.
The main tool to compel regulated institutions to change their practices is the issuance of
enforcement actions, which direct financial institutions to take (or prevent them from taking)
certain actions specified by the supervisor. For example, an enforcement action may prompt a
bank to maintain a certain level of capital or an adequate allowance for loan and lease losses or
may prevent a bank from paying out dividends or acquiring other institutions.
Bank regulation in the US requires supervisors to disclose the formal enforcement actions issued
against banks. This requirement presents a challenge for supervisors, who must trade off two
effects of the issuance of a formal enforcement action. On the one hand, the enforcement action
is expected to have a direct and positive effect on the bank’s condition by forcing the bank to
take corrective actions to improve such condition. On the other hand, the disclosure of the
enforcement action, by revealing to investors and depositors the condition of the bank, may lead
to a run on the bank or affect the stability of the banking sector if investors and depositors
extrapolate from the enforcement action that other banks may also be in trouble. In this paper,
we investigate whether bank supervisors trade off these two effects differently for very large
banks. In particular, we investigate whether there are banks that are “too large to discipline”
by means of enforcement actions.
The answer to this question has important implications for the risk taking incentives of large
financial institutions. If supervisors are less likely to issue formal enforcement actions against
these financial institutions, the latter’s incentives to take on risk will be stronger for two reasons.
First, large banks will expect that they will be not be forced to correct unsafe, yet profitable,
practices. Second, large banks will expect a softer market discipline, since supervisors’ reluctance
to issue enforcement actions may have the effect of not revealing negative realizations of bank
risk to market participants.
To investigate the possibility that supervisors are less likely to issue formal enforcement actions
against very large banks, we collect all formal enforcement actions issued against a sample of
large bank holding companies and their bank subsidiaries in the period 2007–2010. We analyze
the text of these enforcement actions to determine which ones are related to bank risk, as
opposed to those related to compliance with specific bank regulations—such as the Bank Secrecy
Act, anti-money laundering regulations, or the Community Reinvestment Act. Our first result is
that in the 2007–2010 period bank supervisors issued only one risk-related enforcement action
against the top 50 financial institutions. We then estimate the relation between bank holding
company size and the probability that a risk-related formal enforcement action is issued against
the bank holding company or its subsidiaries and find that, within our sample of large banks,
the very large banks (which we label too-big-to-discipline or, simply, TBTD) are less likely to
receive an enforcement action, controlling for other predictors of the issuance of enforcement
actions.
TBTD banks are highly complex institutions and their activities, operations, and management
may differ substantially from those of banks of smaller size. Therefore, a possible explanation
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for our results is that TBTD institutions are less likely to receive formal enforcement actions
because they are less risky. To investigate this possibility we identify the bank holding companies
that fail during the financial crisis. We consider that a company fails if it is either closed by
supervisors or acquired by other financial institutions with supervisors’ intervention and support.
We show that, in contrast to the case of enforcement actions, TBTD financial institutions are
not significantly less likely to fail during the crisis than large, yet relatively smaller, ones. This
result suggests, although we also consider alternative explanations, that TBTD banks did not
take on less risk than smaller banks, which could have, otherwise, explained the relation between
bank size and the issuance of enforcement actions.
In this paper, we explore whether there is another dimension of regulatory forbearance in bank
supervision, not considered in previous literature, namely the reluctance to issue enforcement
actions against very large institutions. Therefore, the paper is very much related to the broader
literature on regulatory forbearance and, more specifically, on too-big-to-fail policies. Several
articles in this literature have documented the value of being perceived as too-big-to-fail (see,
e.g., O’hara and Shaw (1990), Kane (2000), Penas and Unal (2004), Morgan and Stiroh (2005),
Rime (2005)). Our paper provides another another reason for the existence of a TBTF premium
beyond the implicit government guarantee in case of likely insolvency.
The paper is also tightly related to the literature that studies the optimal disclosure of supervisory
information to markets. In particular, there has been a long debate as to whether supervisors
should disclose the results of on-site examinations of regulated banks (see, e.g., Jordan et al.
(1999) or Prescott (2008)). A supervisor’s decision whether to issue a formal enforcement action
against a bank is, as we describe in detail in Section 5.1, tightly related to the confidential results
of on-site bank examinations performed by the supervisor. By issuing an enforcement action, a
supervisor, thus, reveals part of the confidential information obtained through on-site inspections.
Therefore, whether supervisors’ concerns about the disclosure of enforcement actions are justified
depends on the extent to which on-site examinations provide information that is, otherwise, not
available to market participants. Slovin et al. (1999) and Jordan et al. (2000) show that banks
experience negative abnormal returns upon the announcement of enforcement actions. However,
Jordan et al. (1999) find that the disclosure of enforcement actions in the midst of the Savings
and Loans crisis did not cause bank runs or otherwise had any destabilizing effect. Berger and
Davies (1998) and DeYoung et al. (2001) show that bank examinations produce information
not already incorporated in security prices, although Cole and Gunther (1998) and Berger et al.
(2000) find that this information degrades in a few months. The recent financial crisis has revived
this debate, especially in relation to the disclosure of the results of the stress-tests performed
during the crisis (see, e.g., Goldstein and Sapra (2014)).
5.1 Enforcement Actions
An enforcement action is a supervisory tool that allows the regulator to direct the behavior of
banking firms to ensure that it complies with laws and regulations and is consistent with sound
banking practices. Enforcement actions are triggered when regulators find evidence of unsound
or unsafe practices or conditions. The notion of unsound or unsafe practices is very broad and
encompasses, among others, the violation of laws and regulations, operating with an inadequate
level of capital or liquidity or without adequate internal controls, engaging in hazardous lending
and lax collection practices or in speculative or hazardous investment policies, or the lack of
effective risk management practices. Through enforcement actions, regulatory agencies have the
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power to, among other things, improve capital, restrict asset growth and risky lending, restrict
dividends, levy fines, and remove management.
Enforcement actions can be issued against financial institutions of individuals. We will focus on
actions issued against financial institutions, because institutional enforcement actions are related
to the overall condition of the firm, while actions against individuals are generally related to
the commission of fraud and non-compliance with fiduciary duties and not necessarily represent
the overall situation of the firm. Both stand-alone depository institutions and bank holding
companies can be targeted by enforcement actions. Moreover, holding companies and each of
their insured subsidiaries can receive an enforcement action simultaneously.
Enforcement actions differ in their severity and level of enforceability. Informal enforcement
actions attempt to persuade banks to take certain actions and, although they main contain
quite specific provisions, they are not enforceable in a court of law (Curry et al. (1999)). Very
importantly, the supervisor issuing an informal enforcement action is not mandated to make it
public and will typically keep it confidential.1 The confidentiality of informal enforcement actions
is in keeping with the confidentiality of the results of on-site examinations and the spirit of much
of bank supervisory activity. However, if the problems identified by the on-site examination are
severe enough (or if the bank has not complied with previous informal enforcement actions),
supervisory agencies may decide or be compelled to issue a formal enforcement action against the
bank. Formal enforcement actions are enforceable in court and often carry legal and monetary
penalties for non-compliance. Moreover, since FIRREA in 1989 and the Crime Control Act
(CCA) of 1990, most formal enforcement actions must be made public by the supervisor.
There are several types of formal enforcement actions taken against institutions. Formal Written
Agreements consist of corrective actions that a financial institution’s management and directors
must take. These actions are issued with the consent and agreement of the institution and are
both the least severe and the most frequent type. Cease and Desist Orders (C&D) are issued
when the agency requires an entity to change certain practices, to take action to correct violations
or practices, and to follow any prescriptions contained in the order. Civil Money Penalties (CMP)
work as a fine for various types of infractions. In case the firm does not pay the CMP, the party
can be subject to criminal penalties. Prompt Corrective Action Directive (PCA) enforcement
actions correspond to supervisory actions related to the capital level of a bank or thrift institution.
The PCA provisions classify insured depository institutions into five categories based on their
capital levels. PCAs are applied for capital categories (3) undercapitalized; (4) significantly
undercapitalized; and (5) critically undercapitalized. PCAs may also be supplemented by
other actions at the supervisor’s discretion. Finally, the most severe enforcement actions are
the Termination of Deposit Insurance, Appointment of conservator or Receivership, the 4(m)
Agreement,2 and Termination of Membership of the FRB.
The most severe enforcement actions are very infrequent. The most frequent ones are written
agreements consisting of dividend restrictions, debt and stock redemption restrictions, capital
levels, inadequate reserves, asset improvement plans, board oversight, liquidity, and funds
management, among others (Brown, 2009). In severity, Written Agreements are followed by
C&D orders and then Termination of Insurance. While PCAs are initiated when there are
severe capital problems, any enforcement action can contain directives to improve and change
capital levels. Brunmeier and Willardson (2006) explain that institutions are more likely to sign
1In the case of publicly traded banks, securities regulations may require the bank to disclose the informal
enforcement action if it is considered material, but there is room for discretion regarding disclosure and the
form and timing of such disclosure.
2This action is named after section 4(m) of the Bank Holding Company Act, which requires that the Board take
corrective action against any financial holding company (FHC) with a depository institution subsidiary that
fails to remain well managed or standard capital levels. The Board of Governors does not disclose publicly
4(m) Agreements in order to avoid disclosing the institution’s management rating.
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an Agreement than a C&D order and that the civil money penalties in the last 10 years have
increasingly focused on compliance issues. Moreover, the authors find that between 2000 and
2005 written agreements primarily dealt with safety and soundness issues more frequently than
C&D orders.
Enforcement actions generally are the result of on-site examinations by the supervisory agencies.
If an on-site examination reveals non-compliance with laws and regulations, financial weaknesses,
or a potential deviation from safe and sound banking practices, the supervisor may (or may be
compelled to) issue an enforcement action against the bank. Following on-site examinations of
commercial banks or depository institutions, supervisors rate the adequacy of the institution’s
Capital, Asset Quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity and Sensitivity to Market Risk on a
scale of 1 to 5. Those ratings are combined to form the composite CAMELS rating ranging from
1 (best) to 5 (worst). A similar procedure is applied to bank holding companies, leading to a
rating known as the RFI/C(D).3 Although obtaining a rating of 4 or worse is not a necessary
or sufficient condition for the initiation of an enforcement action, a rating downgrade to 4 or 5
usually triggers a formal enforcement action. Enforcement actions are often applied gradually,
with informal actions preceding formal ones (Gilbert and Vaughan (2001), Curry et al. (2003);
Brunmeier and Willardson (2006)). Although ratings revisions are closely related to the issuing
of enforcement actions, the latter are not an immediate consequence of the former. Brunmeier
and Willardson (2006) show that although the factors leading to lower satisfactory ratings and
those producing enforcement actions against institutions are positively correlated, there is a lag,
since actions are taken when examination results are final and can take considerable time to
write, negotiate, and execute. The lag reported by the authors is of approximately one year. In
the same line, Brown (2009) argue a spike in the number of enforcement actions released by the
Federal Agencies during 2009-2010 as a consequence of the recent crisis started in 2007-2008.
In this paper, we analyze the enforcement actions issued by the four main federal banking
agencies: the Federal Reserve System (FRB), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS).
5.2 Data
5.2.1 Sample selection
The sample selection process is the same as in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. We first select
all firms with 4-digit SIC codes between 6000 and 6300 covered by the compensation database
Execucomp and whose CEO is identified in this database in year 2006. Of the 167 firms so
selected, we keep all firms with SIC codes 6020 (Commercial Banks), 6035 (Savings Institutions,
Federally Chartered), and 6036 (Savings Institutions, Not Federally Chartered)—a total of 114
firms—and we exclude firms with SIC codes 6111 (Federal Credit Agencies) and 6282 (Investment
Advice). To determine the inclusion of the 41 firms in the remaining SIC codes, we search the
National Information Center of the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC)
3RFI/C(D) ratings replaced the BOPEC ratings used until 2004.
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to verify each firm’s institution type in year 2006.4 We keep a firm in the sample firm if it is
identified as any type of regulated institution.5 We also keep in the sample those firms listed as
primary dealers by the New York FED. This process yields a base sample of 130 firms in 2006,
but we have to drop one (Center Financial Corp) because it does not match with Compustat
Fundamentals. Therefore, our final sample has 129 firms. These firms are either single standing
commercial banks, Bank Holding Companies (BHCs), or Financial Holding Companies (FHCs).
For some of our specifications, we focus on the subsample of banks with SIC codes 6020, 6035,
and 6036, since for these banks we have additional information.
5.2.2 Enforcement actions
A large number of the firms included in the sample are BHCs or FHCs. In such types of firms,
supervisors are entitled to issue enforcement actions against either the holding company itself
and/or one or more of its depository subsidiaries.6 To account for every enforcement action,
we unfold each holding company into its regulated subsidiaries using the FDIC Institution
Directory.7
We match our sample with the information provided by the FDIC for regulated top holders and
their corresponding insured subsidiaries and cross-check with the information provided on-line
by the FFIEC.8 For each of the firms in the original sample of 129 firms, we manually check
the names of the subsidiaries that correspond to any form of regulated institution by the FED,
FDIC, OCC and OTS. We then match this final sample of banks’ and subsidiaries’ names with
the data set of enforcement actions. We perform the merger of the holding companies and their
subsidiaries using the RSSDID of each firm.
We construct a dummy variable, EAit, which is equal to one if firm i (or any insured subsidiary)
receives one or more firm-level enforcement actions related to solvency and soundness in year t,
for t in the financial crisis period, which we define as the period from 2007 to 2010. To date the
crisis, we follow the time-lines provided by the New York Fed (which dates the beginning of the
“financial turmoil” in June 2007)9 and the Saint Louis Fed (which dates the beginning of the
financial crisis in February 2007).10 and define 2007 to be the first year of the financial crisis.
4These firms have SIC codes: 6099 (Functions Rel. To Dep. Bkg.), 6141 (Personal Credit Institutions), 6153
(Short-Term Business Credit), 6159 (Misc Business Credit Instn), 6162 (Mortgage Bankers & Loan Corr), 6172
(Finance Lessors), 6199 (Finance Services), 6200 (Security & Commodity Brokers), 6211 (Security Brokers &
Dealers). We access the National Information Center of the FFIEC at http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/
nicweb/SearchForm.aspx.
5The classes of regulated institutions are: financial holding company, bank holding company, savings and loans
holding company, federal savings bank, national bank, state member bank, FDIC-insured non-member bank,
federal savings association.
6For example, Bank of America is a FHC with several insured subsidiaries. If an on-site examination of an
insured subsidiary results in soundness or solvency concerns, the FDIC can start actions against the subsidiary
and, at the same time, the FED can prompt actions against the holding company.
7http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/SearchForm.aspx
8The FDIC defines Regulatory top holder as any company that directly or indirectly owns, controls or has power
to vote 25 percent or more of a bank’s or direct holding company’s shares or controls in any manner the
election of a majority of the directors or trustees of a bank or direct holding company or exercises a controlling
influence over the management or policies of a bank or direct holding company. Information on Thrift Holding
Companies that own Savings Associations but do not own banks is not currently available in the ID System.
Source: Federal Reserve Board National Information Center data base.
9http://www.ny.frb.org/research/global_economy/Crisis_Timeline.pdf (last accessed on October 17,
2013).
10http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/index.cfm?p=timeline (last accessed on October 17, 2013).
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To determine whether a bank holding company or depository subsidiary receives a risk related
enforcement action during the financial crisis, we access the websites of the different federal
bank supervisors and build a data set that contains all the enforcement actions issued from
January 2007 to December 2010. We then manually match the data set of enforcement actions
with our extended sample of 129 firms and all their insured subsidiaries and download the text
of each matched enforcement action. By reading the text of each enforcement action, we identify
whether the enforcement action is related to issues or risk, solvency, or soundness. Thus, we do
not consider civil money penalties as risk-related enforcement actions, because in our sample
they apply to non-compliance issues not directly related to solvency. Of the remaining C&D
Orders and Written Agreements, we disregard those that are clearly not related to risk. In
Appendix 5.7.2, we report the enforcement actions issued against the firms in the sample and
whether they could be considered risk related. We also provide examples that illustrate how we
determine whether enforcement actions are risk related from their texts.
As we describe in detail below, several banks disappear as independent entities during the
financial crisis. The definition of EAit implies that if a bank disappears in year t and the bank
did not receive an enforcement action in year t, then EAit = 0. However, it is not clear that
one should assign a value of zero to a bank that lives only part of the year, since supervisors
have less time during the year to issue an enforcement action against the bank. In the limiting
case in which a bank closes at the beginning of the year, it is not possible or extremely unlikely
that supervisors can issue an enforcement action in the year. Therefore, for robustness, we also
define a dummy variable that is not defined (i.e., defined to be missing) for a year in which firm
i fails and EAit = 0. We also define a dummy variable, EAi, that takes the value 1 if firm i
receives an enforcement action during the crisis period and is zero otherwise.
Figure 5.1 graphs the evolution of the number of enforcement actions and the number of the
types of enforcement actions that we consider in our analysis for the population of regulated
institutions. Figure 5.2 graphs the same variables for the firms in our sample. From both graphs,
one can see that whereas the number of enforcement actions is relatively low and stable in the
period 1995-2006 (with a dip in the second half of the 1990s) and does not experience a large
change in 2007, both the total number of enforcement actions as well as those that are risk
related (in the case of our sample) or potentially risk related (in the case of the whole population
of regulated institutions) increase dramatically in the years 2008-2010. As Figure 5.1 shows,
the number of enforcement actions in these years greatly surpasses the number of enforcement
actions during the Savings & Loans crisis in the early 1990s.
5.3 Enforcement Actions and Bank Size
As a first step to evaluating the relation between bank size and the incidence of enforcement
actions, we order the firms of the sample by size (measured as the natural logarithm of total
assets as of December 2006) and divide the sample by size into 13 groups of 10 firms each
(except for the top group, which has only 9 firms). In Table 5.5 we display the number of formal
enforcement actions by size group. Strikingly, of the fifteen firms in our sample that receive at
least one risk-related enforcement action during the crisis period, not a single one is in the top
four size groups (i.e., the top 39 firms by total assets).
To investigate whether the absence of enforcement actions among the largest firms is due to the
fact that they are less risky, we estimate a simple linear probability model to predict the issuance
of a formal enforcement action. In the model, we include as regressors variables that previous
papers have found to be predictive of supervisory ratings changes (as well as a subsample of
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the regressors used by Peek and Rosengren (1997) to predict formal enforcement actions issued
against New England banks in the period 1989-1992). More concretely, we estimate the following
model:
EAit = α + βsizeit−1 + γxit−1 + εit, (5.1)
where size is a vector (possibly with just one component) of size measures and x is a vector
of controls, which contains ROA (defined as the ratio of operating income before depreciation
scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year) and leverage (defined as the book value of
total debt over total assets) For the subsample of banks in SIC codes 6020, 6035, and 6036, we
have additional information, so we also use as controls the Tier capital 1 ratio (Tier 1) and the
ratio of non-performing loans to total assets (NPA).
Before presenting the estimation results, Panel A of Table 5.6 presents summary statistics of
the different variables and Panel A of Table 5.7 the table of simple correlations. We obtain all
variables from Compustat Annual Fundamentals. When interpreting the summary statistics, it
is important to keep in mind that the financial condition of the banks in the sample changes
substantially over the sample period and that there is significant attrition (21 banks disappear
as independent entities between 2007 and 2010). To shed more light on the distribution of the
relevant variables, in panels B and C of tables 5.6 and 5.7 we also report summary statistics
and correlations for the first (2007) and last (2010) years of the crisis period. As the tables of
summary statistics highlight, the banks in the sample are very large and the size distribution,
even within this tranche of the size distribution of banks, is highly skewed. Thus, whereas the
median assets are $ 13.3 billion, the top twelve banks have assets larger than $ 225 billion. Table
5.7shows that bank size is positively correlated with both leverage and ROA and negatively
correlated at the beginning of the crisis with NPA.
Table 5.8 shows the results of estimating equation 5.1 with different size measures. In the first
two columns we include size (measured as total assets) linearly and with a quadratic term, and in
the third column we measure size as the natural logarithm of total assets. In all three cases, the
probability of receiving an enforcement action is decreasing in bank size, although the coefficients
are not statistically significant at conventional levels for the quadratic specification (in all cases,
standard errors are robust and clustered by firm). Instead of including size parametrically, in
the fourth and fifth columns we use five size dummies corresponding to each size quintile (with
quintile 5, being the quintile with the largest firms, and quintile 1 being the omitted category).
The probability of receiving an enforcement action is significantly lower for the two top quintiles
than for the bottom quintile. Further, Wald tests of equality of coefficients reveal that the
coefficients for both the top quintile and the fourth quintiles are also significantly larger than
that for the second lowest quintile. Columns 5 and 6 present the results for the alternative
definition of the enforcement action dummy (which disregards observations of firms that fail
in year t and do not receive an enforcement that year). The coefficient estimates and their
statistical significance are virtually unchanged relative to those obtained with EAit. Therefore,
the results are in line with the unconditional results reported in Table 5.5: Banks in the top two
quintiles are significantly less likely to receive an enforcement action.
5.4 Bank Size, Enforcement Actions, and Bank Failure
The results in the previous section could be explained by larger banks being more diversified
or better at risk management, which would allow them to be less risky than smaller banks for
given levels of leverage or return on assets. To check whether firms in the sample differ in their
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riskiness, we also construct a dummy variable, called Failed, which indicates whether a firm
fails during the period from 2007 to 2010. Since many of the banks in our sample are likely to
be systemically important, bank supervisors may intervene to support them if there is risk of
insolvency. Therefore, if we defined bank failure narrowly to include only those banks that are
formally closed, we would run the risk of underestimating the riskiness of systemic institutions.
Instead, we define bank failure in an encompassing way: We consider a bank failed if it is closed,
put into receivership with FDIC intervention, or sold to another company while in trouble under
the supervision and recommendation of regulators during the period 2007-2010. To construct
this variable and identify a firm in the sample as “failed”, for each of the firms in our sample
we follow the procedure described in Chapter 2 of the dissertation. In particular, we manually
check the firm’s history records at the FFIEC website, the information at the FDIC website,
and the news media. If a firm disappears as an independent entity during the 2007-2010 period
because of a merger or acquisition of strategic nature, we do not consider the firm failed for our
purposes and leave the dummy equal to zero. See the appendix for Chapter 2 for a list of banks
that fail in the 2007-2010 period.
We first note that the set of failed banks does not coincide with the set of banks that receive
an enforcement action. On the contrary, Table 5.4 shows that, even though firms that are the
subject of an enforcement action during the financial crisis are more likely to close subsequently,
only 31.2% of firms subject to an enforcement action fail, whereas 15.31% of firms that are not
the subject of an enforcement action fail. Put differently, a large fraction (75%) of the banks
that fail during the crisis do not receive a prior enforcement action in the crisis period.
Table 5.9 is the analog to Table 5.5 and reports the incidence of bank failure for different quantiles
of bank size. For ease of comparison, we duplicate the numbers of Table 5.5. The difference
between the two tables is stark: Whereas none of the sixteen firms that receive an enforcement
action is among the top forty banks, eight of the twenty-one failed firms is in this group of banks
and seven out of the top twenty banks fail during the crisis. Therefore, it does not appear as if
the largest banks were less likely to fail than smaller banks. The regression results reported in
columns 1 to 4 of Table 5.10 also show that, conditional on predictors of bank failure, such as
leverage or ROA, the very large banks were not less likely to fail than smaller banks. In fact,
there is no statistically significant relation between size and failure probability in the sample.
However, if enforcement actions have the intended effect of forcing banks to implement policies
to reduce their risk, then large banks could be less risky ex ante, yet, at the same time, the very
fact that they are less likely to receive formal enforcement actions could explain that they do not
fail less frequently than smaller banks. To control for this possibility, we also include dummies to
capture whether a bank receives an enforcement action the current or past crisis years (EAPC)
or in past crisis years (EAP). As we report in columns 5 and 6 of Table 5.10, the coefficients
for these dummies are positive, large, and highly statistically significant. The large, positive
sign indicates that our controls have only limited explanatory power in explaining failure, so
that the issuance of a formal enforcement action against a firm is highly informative about the
firm’s weak condition. This information greatly outweighs the possible positive causal effect on
a firm’s financial condition of the issuance of an enforcement action. In any case, including the
dummies for the issuance of a formal enforcement action does not alter the result that size is
not associated with the probability of failure.
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5.5 Robustness Checks
As explained in 5.2, the sample of 129 firms consists of bank and financial holding companies
that control insured depository institutions. However, commercial banking may not have been
the main activity for some of these holding companies, especially the financial holding companies,
so that their depository institutions may have received less supervisory attention. At the same
time, these holding companies with a large fraction of their activity outside banking include
some of the largest and riskiest institutions in the sample (such as, say, Bear Sterns of Lehman
Brothers). Therefore, we re-estimate our main specifications restricting the sample to the most
bank-centered subset of holding companies, in particular those with SIC codes 6020, 6035, and
6035. Moreover, for this subsample of financial institutions we have additional information, such
as the Tier 1 capital ratio and the fraction of non-performing assets, which we can include as
controls in our regressions. Table 5.11 displays the number banks that fail or receive a formal
enforcement action by size group for the subsample of banks with SIC codes 6020, 6035, and
6035. As in the full sample, firms in the top quantiles by size do not receive any enforcement
action, whereas they do not seem to be substantially less likely to fail. In Table 5.12 we report
the results of the linear probability model of the probability of receiving an enforcement action
and of failing, estimated for the subsample of firms with SIC codes 6020, 6035, and 6035. In
these specifications, in addition to Leverage and ROA, we include as regressors the ratio of
non-performing assets to total assets (NPA) and the Tier 1 capital ratio (Tier 1). As in the case
of the full sample, the probability of receiving an enforcement action is significantly lower for
the top quintile (and for the second to top in some specifications) than for the bottom quintile.
Further, Wald tests of equality of coefficients reveal that the coefficient for the top quintile is also
significantly larger than that for the second lowest quintile. At the same time, the probability of
failure is not associated with firm size.
Since the division of banks into size quintiles is, to some extent, arbitrary, for robustness we
re-estimate the enforcement action and failure equations using size quartiles instead of quintiles.
As we show in Table 5.13 (both for the whole sample and for the bank subsample), the probability
of receiving an enforcement action is significantly lower for the top quartile of firms, whereas the
probability of failure is not related to size.
An additional concern with our results is that, as reported by Brunmeier and Willardson (2006),
there is a lag of up to a year between an on-site examination and the issuance and disclosure of
a formal enforcement action. Therefore, the relevant information in predicting an enforcement
action may not be that of the year immediately preceding the enforcement action, but that of
two years before the issuance of the enforcement action. Moreover, in some instances, there
is no available information for the year prior to firm failure or the issuance of an enforcement
action (typically because firms fail to file their quarterly or annual reports in time). To check
the robustness of our results we, thus, also estimate our main specification with size and other
regressors lagged two periods. As Table 5.14 shows, the results change little when regressors are
lagged two years.
5.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that federal bank supervisors appear to practice greater regulatory
forbearance with the very large financial institutions in relation to the issuance of formal
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enforcement actions. These very large banks appear to be “too big to discipline” by means of
formal enforcement actions. Our results suggest that the lack of enforcement actions against
very large financial institutions during the financial crisis is not due to their being less risky. In
contrast to the results we obtain for enforcement actions, very large banks do not have a lower
propensity to fail than smaller, yet still large, banks.
There are several possible interpretations of our results. First, it is possible that supervisors’
regulatory forbearance towards the very large banks is optimal, both ex post (that is, in the event
of a situation of financial instability) and ex ante (that is, even taking into account its potential
negative effect on large banks’ incentives to take on risk). Second, the policy of abstaining from
issuing formal enforcement actions against large banks could be optimal ex post, yet not be
optimal ex ante, because the perverse incentives to take on risk that it generates outweigh the
ex post benefits in times of financial distress. Finally, this policy could be suboptimal even ex
post and motivated either by regulators’ excessive caution in relation to large institutions or by
regulatory capture. Further research is needed to tease out these potential explanations for our
results.
5.7 Appendix
5.7.1 Variable definition
EA: Dummy equal to 1 if the firm has received and enforcement action in the year 2007 -
2010
EAit: Dummy equal to 1 if the firm i has received a solvency related enforcement action in
year t, and zero otherwise.
EAitN : Dummy equal to 1 if the firm i has received a solvency related enforcement action
in year t, missing if the firm has closed that year and has not received any EAit, zero in all
remaining cases.
F: Dummy equal to 1 if the firm has failed in the period 2007 - 2010.
Fit: Dummy equal to 1 if the firm i has failed and closed by intervention of a federal regulator
in year t.
Leverage: Book value of leverage ratio computed as the ratio of debt (short term and long
term) to total assets (Leverage = (dltt + dlc)/at).
logSize: Natural Logaright of total assets as reportes in Compustat (logSize = log(at))
NPA: Non-performing assets ratio is the ratio of the total amount of non-performing assest
scaled by total assets (NPA = npat/at)
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ROA: Return on Assets is the ratio of operating income before depreciation scaled by total
assets at the begining of the year. (ROA = oibdp/at[_n − 1])
Size: Size is the total assets of the firm measured in trillion dollars. (Size = at/1000000)
Size_sq: Size squared.
SizeQ5: Categorical variable with values from 1 to 5 indicating the quintile of Size of the firm
in year t.
SizeQ4: Categorical variable with values from 1 to 5 indicating the quartile of Size of the firm
in year t.
Tier1: Tier 1 capital ratio as reported in Compustat annual (capr1).
5.7.2 Enforcement Actions
5.7.2.1 Examples of Enforcement Actions
Example of a C&D text that is classified as risk related: Anchor Bankcorp (2009)
” [...]NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that:
1. The Association and its directors, officers, and employees shall cease and desist from any
action (alone or with others) for or toward causing, bringing about, participating in or counseling
all unsafe or unsound practices that resulted in the Association operating at a loss, with a large
volume of adversely classified assets, and with an inadequate level of capital for the kind and
quality of assets held.
Capital
2. (a) No later than September 30, 2009, the Association shall achieve and maintain: (i) a Tier
1 (Core) Capital Ratio of at least seven percent (7%) and (ii) a Total Risk-Based Capital Ratio
of at least eleven percent (11%) after the funding of an adequate Allowance for Loan and Lease
Losses (ALLL).
(b) No later than December 31, 2009, the Association shall achieve and maintain: (i) a Tier 1
(Core) Capital Ratio of at least eight percent (8%) and (ii) a Total Risk-Based Capital Ratio of
at least twelve percent (12%) after the funding of an adequate ALLL.
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(c) Effective immediately, the Board shall review the Association’s capital levels at each regular
monthly Board meeting and ensure that the Association continually assesses the sufficiency of
the Association’s capital levels relative to its risk profile, including but not limited to, such risks
as: classified asset levels, non accrual loans, and core earnings. The trends in such risks shall
also be reviewed and monitored by the Board. The Board’s review of capital adequacy and any
actions to be taken to ensure that adequate capital levels are maintained shall be fully detailed in
the Board meeting minutes.[...]”
Example of a C&D text that is NOT considered Risk related: WAMU (2007)
”[...] NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED THAT:
I. ORDER TO CEASE AND DESIST
A. The Institution and its directors, officers, employees, and agents shall cease and desist from
any action (alone or with another or others) for or toward causing, bringing about, participating
in, counseling, or aiding and abetting any violation of:
(1) The Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act (the Bank Secrecy Act or BSA), 31
U.S.C. §§ 5311 et seq., and the related BSA regulations issued by the United States Department
of the Treasury, 31 C.F.R. Part 103, and the OTS, 12 C.F.R. § 563.177; and
(2) The OTS regulations governing suspicious activity reports (SARs) set forth in 12 C.F.R. §
563.180 (the SAR Regulation).[...]”
When the C&D section is not explicitly related to risk or capital issues we complement the
reading of the C&D section with a search of four key words: capital, liquidity, solvency and risk.
If, the reading of the section I and the search of key words gives no results, then the action is
not classified as a Risk related action.
Example of a WA text that is considered Risk related: Flagstar2010a
”[...] WHEREAS, based on its August 3, 2009 examination of the Holding Company, the OTS
finds that the Holding Company has engaged in unsafe or unsound practices in conducting its
consolidated operations;
Capital Plan
1. (a) Within forty-five (45) days, the Holding Company shall submit to the Regional Director
an acceptable written plan for enhancing the consolidated capital and earnings of the Holding
Company (Capital Plan). The Capital Plan shall cover the period beginning with the quarter
starting January 1, 2010 through the quarter ending December 31, 2011.
At a minimum, the Capital Plan shall include:
(i) establishment of a minimum tangible capital ratio of tangible equity capital to total tangible
assets commensurate with the Holding Company’s consolidated risk profile;
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(ii) specific plans to ensure conformance with the Business Plan of the Holding Company’s
wholly-owned savings association subsidiary, Flagstar Bank, FSB, Troy, Michigan, OTS Docket
No. 08412 (Association), including capital levels projected by the Association;
(iii) operating strategies to achieve net income levels that will result in profitability and adequate
debt service throughout the term of the Capital Plan; [...]
Another example is the cases in whch the WA or CO is issued against the holding company
claiming it as source of strength for the subsidiary and followed by a Capital plan: Cascade 2009
”[...]WHEREAS, it is the common goal of Bancorp, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
(the Reserve Bank), and the Director of the State of Oregon’s Department of Consumer and
Business Services acting through the Administrator of the Division of Finance and Corporate
Securities (the DFCS) to maintain the financial soundness of Bancorp so that Bancorp may
serve as a source of strength to the Bank;[...]
”[...] Capital Plan
3. Within 60 days of this Agreement, Bancorp shall submit to the Reserve Bank an acceptable
written plan to maintain sufficient capital at Bancorp, on a consolidated basis, and at the Bank,
as a separate legal entity on a stand-alone basis. The plan shall, at a minimum, address, consider,
and include:
(a) The consolidated organization and the Bank’s current and future capital requirements, includ-
ing compliance with the Capital Adequacy Guidelines for Bank Holding Companies: Risk-Based
Measure and Tier 1 Leverage Measure, Appendices A and D of [Page Break] Regulation Y of the
Board of Governors (12 C.F.R. Part 225, App. A and D), and the applicable capital adequacy
guidelines for the Bank issued by the Bank’s federal regulator;
(b) the adequacy of the Bank’s capital, taking into account the volume of classified credits,
concentrations of credit, allowance for loan and lease losses (”ALLL”), current and projected
asset growth, and projected retained earnings;
(c) the source and timing of additional necessary funds to fulfill the consolidated organization’s
and the Bank’s future capital requirements;
(d) supervisory requests for additional capital at the Bank or the requirements of any supervisory
action imposed on the Bank by its federal or state regulator; and
(e) the requirements of section 225.4(a) of Regulation Y of the Board of Governors (12 C.F.R. §
225.4(a)) that Bancorp serve as a source of strength to the Bank.
4. Bancorp shall notify the Reserve Bank, in writing, no more than 30 days after the end of
any quarter in which any of the consolidated organization’s or the Bank’s capital ratios (total
risk-based, Tier 1, or leverage) fall below the approved plan’s minimum ratios. Together with
the notification, Bancorp shall submit an acceptable capital plan that details the steps Bancorp
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will take to increase the consolidated organization’s or the Bank’s capital ratios to or above the
approved plan’s minimums.[...]”
Example of a WA text that is NOT considered Risk related: Bank of America 2010
“[...]WHEREAS, the U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, the U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Internal Revenue Service,
and the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond (the “Reserve Bank”) (collectively, “the Agencies”)
conducted investigations and examinations concerning various types of anti-competitive activities
at Bank of America by certain employees in conjunction with the sale of certain derivative
financial products to municipalities and other non-profit organizations variously between the
years 1998 and 2003;[...]”
Usually, this cases have no results in a search of four key words: capital, liquidity, solvency and
risk.
Civil Money Penalties Example : Northern Trust (2008)
“[...]WHEREAS, the Comptroller of the Currency of the United States of America (“Comptroller”)
intends to initiate a civil money penalty proceeding against Northern Trust, N.A., Miami, Florida
(“Bank”), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(f), based on the Bank’s pattern or practice of making,
increasing, extending or renewing loans secured by property located in a special flood hazard area
for which flood insurance is available under the National Flood Insurance Act, without requiring
the property securing the loans to be covered by the requisite flood insurance.[...]”
In all cases, a word search for capital, liquidity, solvency and risk found no matches.
5.7.2.2 Cases
5.7.2.2 Civil Money Penalties
We have disregarded every CMP case on the grounds that all the matches were related to
compliance issues.
5.7.2.2 Written agreements, cease and desist orders and prompt corrective actions
Prompt corrective actions are related to capital requirements by definition of the action itself,
so all cases were included. For Cease and Desist Orders and Written Agreements we show in the
following tables the cases included and excluded, depending of whether they were related to risk,
capital or solvency.
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Table 5.1: List of firms in the sample that have received a Civil Money Penalty during the crisis period
(2007-2010). All cases were related to compliance and not to solvency, liquidity, risk or capital. Column
Cause gives details about the compliance issues.
Civil Money Penalty
Company Cause
AMEX (2009) Violations of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (“Section 5”).
AMEX (2009) Violations of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (“Section 5”).
Associated (2007) Flood Act Insurance.
Banco Popular (2008) No details.
Capital One No details.
Cascade (2008) Flood insurance compliance.
Cathay (2008) Flood insurance compliance.
City National (2008) Flood insurance compliance.
Compass Flood insurance compliance.
East West (2007) Flood insurance compliance.
First Horizon (2007) Flood insurance compliance.
First Tenesee (2009) Resulting in violations of appraisal regulations under 12 C.F.R. Part 34.
Glacier (Citizens) (2010) Flood insurance compliance.
Hanmi (2007) Flood insurance compliance.
Keybank (Keycorp) (2007) Flood insurance compliance.
Northern Trust Flood insurance compliance.
Regions (2009) Flood insurance compliance.
State Street (2010) Flood insurance compliance.
Sterling (2009) Flood insurance compliance.
Trustco (2010) Flood insurance compliance.
Umpqua (2008) Flood insurance compliance.
United (2008) Flood insurance compliance.
United (2009) Flood insurance compliance.
Wachovia (2008) Unfair commercial behavior.
Wachovia (2010) Bank secrecy and money laundering compliance.
WAMU Flood act compliance.
Webster (2007) Flood insurance compliance.
Wells Fargo (2008) No details.
Wells Fargo (2009a) Flood insurance compliance.
Wells Fargo (2009b) Flood insurance compliance.
Table 5.2: List of firms in the sample that have received a Cease and Desist order, a Written Agreement
or a Prompt Corrective Action in the crisis period (2007-2010) that were classified as being related to
solvency, liquidity, risk or capital and used in our study.
Actions related to risk, solvency or capital.
Company CD WA and CMP
Anchor (2009) 1 1
Cascade (2009) 1 1
Central Pacific (2010) 1
CIT (2009) 1 1
Citizens (Glacier)(2008) 1
Corus (2009) 1 1
Downey (2008) 1
First Bancorp (2010) 1
First Midwest (2009) 1
Firstfed (2009) 1
Flagstar (2010) 1
Franklin (2008) 1
Hanmi (2009) 1
Irwin (2008) 1 1
Prosperity (2010) 1
Sterling (2009) 1 1
United Bank (2010) 1
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Table 5.3: List of firms in the sample that have received a Cease and Desist order, or a Written Agreement
in the crisis period (2007-2010) that were classified as not related to solvency, liquidity, risk or capital
and excluded in our study.
Excluded enforcement actions
Company CD WA
Amex (2009) 1
Amex (2009b) 1
Brookline (2009) 1
SLM (2008) 1
TCF (2010) 1
Wachovia (2010) 1
WAMU (2007) 1
Washington Federal 1
American Express (2010) 1
Bank of America (2010) OCC 1
Bank of America (2010) 1
Capital One (2010) 1
Wachovia (2008a) 1
Wachovia (2008b) 1
Table 5.4: Enforcement actions and bank closures in the sample.
This table shows the cross tabulation of the incidence of enforcement actions and closure. Closure is
a categorical variable equal to 1 if the firm has been closed or sold with intervention from the federal
regulators in the period 2007-2010 and zero otherwise. Enforcement action is a categorical variable
equal to 1 if the supervisors have issued at least 1 enforcement action in the period 2007-2010 and zero
otherwise.
Not Failed Failed Total
No enforcement Action 98 15 113
Enforcement Action 11 5 16
Total 109 20 129
5.7.3 Tables
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Table 5.5: Distribution of EAs Distribution by size bins of firms receiving and not receiving enforcement
action during the crisis period (2007- 2010). Size is measured as total assets at the end of year 2006. Bin
1 contains the smallest firms in the sample and bin 13 the largest.
Number of firms
Bin Total Firms EA=0 EA=1
1 10 8 2
2 10 10 0
3 10 6 4
4 10 7 3
5 10 8 2
6 10 8 2
7 10 10 0
8 10 7 3
9 10 10 0
10 10 10 0
11 10 10 0
12 10 10 0
13 9 9 0
Total 129 113 16
Table 5.6: Firm characteristics: summary statistics. Size is the firm’s total assets measured in
trillion dollars. Leverage is the book-value ratio of debt to assets. NPA is the ratio of non performing
assets scaled by total assets. ROA is the ratio of operating income before depreciation scaled by total
assets lagged one year. Tier 1 is the capital asset ratio for banks. EAit is a dummy equal to 1 in the year
the firm receives an enforcement action related to capital or solvency. Fit is a dummy equal to 1 if the
firm is closed by regulatory intervention in year t. Panel A displays summary statistics for the entire
sample period (2007-2010). Panel B displays characteristics for the first crisis year (2007) and Panel C
displays summary statistics for the surviving firms in 2010.
Panel A: Years 2007 - 2010
Count Mean S.D. p10 p50 p90
Size 421 0.13 0.37 0 0.01 0.2
Leverage 416 0.18 0.12 0.05 0.16 0.33
ROA 441 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.03
NPA 375 0.02 0.03 0 0.01 0.05
Tier1 391 10.96 3.27 7.06 10.76 14.4
Panel B: Year 2007
Count Mean S.D. p10 p50 p90
Size 119 0.13 0.34 0 0.01 0.24
Leverage 118 0.22 0.14 0.05 0.19 0.41
ROA 121 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04
NPA 104 0.01 0.01 0 0.01 0.02
Tier1 106 9.73 2.61 6.94 9.45 12.17
Panel C: Year 2010
Count Mean S.D. p10 p50 p90
Size 97 0.13 0.4 0 0.01 0.2
Leverage 96 0.15 0.11 0.04 0.12 0.29
ROA 99 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.03
NPA 87 0.03 0.02 0 0.02 0.06
Tier1 89 12.4 3.64 7.95 12.44 17.01
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Table 5.7: Firm characteristics: correlation table. Size is the firm’s total assets measured in trillion
dollars. Leverage is the book-value ratio of debt to assets. NPA is the ratio of non performing assets
scaled by total assets. ROA is the ratio of operating income before depreciation scaled by total assets
lagged one year. Tier 1 is the capital asset ratio for banks. EAit is a dummy equal to 1 in the year the
firm receives an enforcement action related to capital or solvency. Fit is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is
closed by regulatory intervention during year t. Panel A displays pairwise correlation coefficients for the
period (2007-2010). Panel B displays pairwise correlation coefficients for the first crisis year (2007) and
Panel C displays pairwise correlation coefficients for the surviving firms in 2010.
Panel A: Years 2007 - 2010
Size Leverage ROA NPA Tier 1 Fit
Size 1
Leverage 0.4283 1
ROA 0.1418 0.146 1
NPA -0.0657 -0.0577 -0.7371 1
Tier1 -0.1062 -0.332 0.1943 -0.1739 1
Fit 0.0435 0.2087 -0.1994 0.3602 -0.1978 1
EAit -0.0634 0.0158 -0.2516 0.3494 -0.0753 0.1908
Panel B: Year 2007
Size Leverage ROA NPA Tier 1 Fit
Size 1
Leverage 0.4562 1
ROA 0.3048 0.2895 1
NPA -0.0748 0.1741 -0.2466 1
Tier1 -0.2167 -0.3943 0.2595 -0.1003 1
Fit -0.0214 -0.0318 0.2484 -0.1097 0.1085 1
Panel C: Year 2010
Size Leverage ROA NPA Tier 1 Fit
Size 1
Leverage 0.4621 1
ROA 0.1255 0.0788 1
NPA -0.1118 0.0301 -0.8086 1
Tier1 -0.0642 -0.2327 0.4356 -0.508 1
Fit -0.0444 -0.0591 -0.4985 0.5122 -0.2482 1
EAit -0.0693 0.0495 -0.1058 0.2057 -0.0962 -0.0331
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Table 5.8: Firm Size and the Probability of Receiving an Enforcement Action: Regression
Results. EAit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm i has received an enforcement action in year
t and zero otherwise. EAitN is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm i has received an enforcement
action in year t, missing if the firm has failed in year t but has not received and enforcement action that
year, and zero otherwise. Size is the firm’s total assets measured in trillion dollars. logSize is the natural
logarithm of total assets. Leverage is the book-value ratio of debt to assets. ROA is the ratio of operating
income before depreciation scaled by total assets lagged one year. Q2, Q3, Q4, Q5 are dummy variables
for quintiles of size 2, 3, 4, and 5 respectively by year. All independent variables are lagged one period.
All standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5%
and 1% respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EAit EAit EAit EAit EAitN EAitN
L.Size −0.0336∗∗∗
(0.013)
L.logSize −0.0159∗∗∗
(0.005)
L.Leverage 0.1162∗ 0.1823 ∗ ∗ 0.1569 ∗ ∗ 0.1470 ∗ ∗ 0.1747 ∗ ∗ 0.1624 ∗ ∗
(0.067) (0.076) (0.064) (0.062) (0.074) (0.072)
L.ROA −2.4630∗∗∗ −2.3551∗∗∗ −2.3753∗∗∗ −2.3341∗∗∗ −2.9951∗∗∗ −3.0734∗∗∗
(0.757) (0.747) (0.722) (0.857) (0.817) (0.990)
L.Q2 0.0402 0.0407 0.0381 0.0385
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
L.Q3 −0.0325 −0.0318 −0.0340 −0.0332
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
L.Q4 −0.0542 ∗ ∗ −0.0532 ∗ ∗ −0.0619 ∗ ∗ −0.0609 ∗ ∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026)
L.Q5 −0.0506∗ −0.0490∗ −0.0519∗ −0.0481∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027)
Year FE No No No Yes No Yes
N 437 437 437 437 421 421
R-sq 0.069 0.081 0.099 0.102 0.117 0.121
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Table 5.9: Distribution of Failed and EA in the Full Sample. Size is measured as total assets at
the end of year 2006. Panel A displays bins of 10 firms each, being firms in bin 1 the smallest ones and
bin 13 the largest in the sample.
Panel A Panel B
Bin Firms Failed Failed % EA EA %
1 10 0 0% 2 20%
2 10 1 10% 0 0%
3 10 0 0% 4 40%
4 10 3 30% 3 30%
5 10 0 0% 2 20%
6 10 3 30% 2 20%
7 10 1 10% 0 0%
8 10 2 20% 3 30%
9 10 2 20% 0 0%
10 10 1 10% 0 0%
11 10 0 0% 0 0%
12 10 4 40% 0 0%
13 9 3 33% 0 0%
Total 129 20 16% 16 12%
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Table 5.10: Firm Size and Failure: Regression Results. Fit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
firm i has been closed by means regulators intervention, and zero otherwise. Size is the firm’s total assets
measured in trillion dollars. logSize is the natural logarithm of total assets. Leverage is the book-value
ratio of debt to assets. ROA is the ratio of operating income before depreciation scaled by total assets
lagged one year. Q2, Q3, Q4, Q5 are dummy variables for quintiles of size 2, 3, 4, and 5 respectively by
year. EAP is a dummy equal to 1 is the firm has received an enforcement action in the years previous to
the year it is closed, and EAPC is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has received an enforcement action
either the years previous or the current year the firm is closed. All independent variables are lagged one
period. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** represent significance levels at
10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L.Size −0.0207
(0.030)
L.logSize 0.0024
(0.007)
L.Leverage 0.4189∗∗∗ 0.3797∗∗∗ 0.3751∗∗∗ 0.3178 ∗ ∗ 0.2951 ∗ ∗ 0.2695 ∗ ∗
(0.129) (0.130) (0.126) (0.125) (0.124) (0.110)
L.ROA −2.5000 ∗ ∗ −2.5538 ∗ ∗ −2.6118 ∗ ∗ −3.3942∗∗∗ −3.0353 ∗ ∗ −1.5868
(1.040) (1.039) (1.066) (1.259) (1.286) (1.194)
L.Q2 0.0196 0.0176 0.0119 −0.0113
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.018)
L.Q3 0.0129 0.0147 0.0163 0.0098
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.020)
L.Q4 −0.0149 −0.0133 −0.0100 −0.0018
(0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028)
L.Q5 0.0273 0.0435 0.0444 0.0366
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028)
EAP 0.7254∗∗∗
(0.091)
EAPC 0.8730∗∗∗
(0.064)
Year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
N 437 437 437 437 437 437
R-sq 0.099 0.098 0.102 0.137 0.163 0.307
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Table 5.11: Distribution of EA and Failure by Size for the Subsample of Commercial Banks.
The table reports the number and percentage of firms with SIC codes 6020, 6035, or 6036 that have
received and enforcement action or failed during the crisis period (2007- 2010) by size. Size is measured
as total assets at the end of year 2006. Bin 1 contains the smallest firms and bin 11 the largest in the
sample.
Panel A Panel B
Bin Firms Failed Failed % EA EA %
1 11 0 0% 2 18%
2 10 1 10% 1 10%
3 11 1 9% 5 45%
4 10 2 20% 2 20%
5 10 1 10% 2 20%
6 11 2 18% 1 9%
7 10 2 20% 0 0%
8 10 2 20% 3 30%
9 11 1 9% 0 0%
10 10 0 0% 0 0%
11 10 3 30% 0 0%
Total 114 15 13% 16 14%
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Table 5.14: Firm Size, Enforcement Actions and Failure: Regressors Lagged Two Periods.
Linear regression for enforcement actions and failure . EAit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm
i has received an enforcement action in year t and zero otherwise. Fit is a dummy variable equal to 1
if the firm i has been closed by means regulators intervention, and zero otherwise. Size is the firm’s
total assets measured in trillion dollars. Leverage is the book-value ratio of debt to assets. ROA is the
ratio of operating income before depreciation scaled by total assets lagged one year. NPA is the ratio of
non-performing assets to total assets and Tier 1 is the Tier 1 capital ratio. Q2, Q3, Q4, Q5 are dummy
variables for quintiles of size 2, 3, 4 and 5 respectively by year. EAP is a dummy equal to 1 is the firm
has received an enforcement action in the years previous to the year it is closed, and EAPC is a dummy
equal to 1 if the firm has received an enforcement action either the years previous or the current year the
firm is closed. All independent variables are lagged one period. Banks are firms with sic 6020, 6035 and
6036. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** represent significance levels at
10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
All sample Banks
(1) (2) (1) (2)
EAit Fit EAit Fit
L2.Leverage 0.2200 0.2965∗ 0.1664 0.2907
(0.135) (0.168) (0.135) (0.177)
L2.ROA 0.7903 0.5414 0.6389 0.6730
(1.033) (1.594) (1.048) (1.590)
L2.NPA 3.8427∗ 5.3268 ∗ ∗ 3.7514∗ 5.2106 ∗ ∗
(2.224) (2.483) (2.222) (2.513)
L2.Tier1 −0.0028 0.0023 −0.0026 0.0021
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
L2.Q2 0.0551 0.0362 0.0585∗ 0.0247
(0.037) (0.025) (0.035) (0.024)
L2.Q3 −0.0280 0.0308 −0.0128 0.0257
(0.025) (0.024) (0.030) (0.022)
L2.Q4 −0.0572∗ −0.0114 −0.0156 0.0184
(0.030) (0.035) (0.033) (0.042)
L2.Q5 −0.0589 ∗ ∗ 0.0373 −0.0517∗ 0.0119
(0.027) (0.037) (0.027) (0.031)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 380 380 380 380
R2 0.091 0.096 0.082 0.088
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